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Abstract:
This thesis utilizes Gramscian theory to explore the antimafia movement’s shift in
tactics from the 1980s to present day. The movement that arose out of the violence of
1980s Sicily is hardly the same in nature as the contemporary movement. During the
1980s, the mafia was conceptualized mainly as a political problem requiring political
solutions. When legislative reforms did not eradicate the mafia’s entrenched power,
however, Cosa Nostra came to be perceived as a cultural phenomenon. In order to curb
mafia power, therefore, the antimafia movement recognized the need to focus on society
as the agent that could deliver Sicily into a new future. Using my own fieldwork from
Sicily, it will be shown that the movement has changed its focus over time from state to
society. Gramscian theory will be employed to argue that the antimafia movement is
counter-hegemonic in nature, as it works to eliminate the physical and ideological
domination Cosa Nostra has held over Sicilians for nearly 150 years. Moreover,
Gramsci’s ideas will show why—when challenging hegemonic power—it is not enough
for civil society to target the state for reform. Rather, the antimafia movement must
engage in a deliberate and evolving attack on Cosa Nostra, working amongst society in
order to redirect Sicily’s political, social, and economic trajectory that the mafia has
dictated since the 1860s.
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INTRODUCTION:
It is a Saturday morning, but Gobina Scuola in Sicily is full of students. Today
represents an important day for the high school children; while school is not in session,
attendance is taken to see how many students have shown up for the antimafia lecture.
The turnout is remarkable, forcing students and teachers alike to sit on the floor or stand
in the doorway of the classroom. All attendees have come to hear five members of one of
Sicily’s leading antimafia organizations, Libera, speak to the students about their role in
la lotta contro la mafia. The atmosphere in the room is one of intrigue, curiosity, and a
touch of skepticism. Libera is just one of several antimafia organizations working to
drastically alter the political and social trajectory of Sicily by destroying Cosa Nostra.
Images of fallen antimafia heroes flash across the projector screen and video clips are
shown of emotive speeches against the mafia at the height of its violence in the 1980s. It
is a day of education in civic responsibility, for all young Sicilians are told today that
they have the power and obligation to resist, denounce, and actively fight against the
mafia just as these fallen martyrs did. The students are encouraged to view themselves as
part of a society that respects and values legality, law and order, and the dignity of
legitimate work—a marked departure from decades of acquiescence to criminality on the
island. Scrap pieces of paper are passed around displaying a famous quote from now
immortalized antimafia magistrate Giovanni Falcone who first called ordinary citizens to
action in the form of the antimafia movement in the late 1980s. The paper reads: “yes, I
am afraid, but we all should be more courageous.”
This educational lecture represents a key component of the contemporary
antimafia movement: working at the societal level, and particularly among Sicilian youth,
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to destroy Cosa Nostra. Thirty years ago, such cultural work was not prudent or effective
among a society that had not yet broken free of its stupor of acquiescence and fear that
reigned in Sicily as long as the mafia has been a dominant power on the island. This
widespread sentiment was responsible for effectively suppressing any limited forms of
resistance that occurred in the years prior to the 1980s. Indeed, thirty years ago in Sicily
the mafia ruled with heavy hand, as any opposition or resistance to its authority was met
with violence or murder, and consequently apathy and turning a blind eye to pervasive
mafiosi illegality became an everyday survival mechanism. The general conviction in
Sicily for decades was that “to save your life…you have to be careful, wary, silent.”1 The
civilian-based antimafia movement is responsible for transforming the Sicilian climate
from trepidation to one in which individuals can now collectively stand up against mafia
power and influence. While much progress has occurred, there are still many who believe
that Cosa Nostra represents the “irreversible destiny” of Sicily—a scar that is imprinted
too deep upon the land to remove. One of the most significant challenges the antimafia
movement faces today, therefore, is overcoming and dismantling the insidious mentality
of apathy and passive acceptance of mafia domination of social, economic, and political
affairs on the island—sentiment that has become solidified over a period of 150 years.
While educational lectures are a common tactic among many contemporary
antimafia organizations, this now widespread practice represents a fairly new
development and phase in antimafia strategy. Now attending exclusively to efforts at the
societal level, the antimafia movement is very different from when it first arose out of the
violence and chaos of 1980s Sicily. The reason for the uniqueness of the 1980s was the
evolving and growing nature of Cosa Nostra during these years. In the late 1970s, the
1

Roberto Saviano, Gomorrah (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2007), 119.
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mafia entered the drug trafficking market and began acquiring unprecedented wealth. As
a result, a “mafia war” between competing mafia families waged publicly in the streets as
mafiosi vied for supremacy and the chance to head Cosa Nostra whose power was
growing ever more potent. This publicly fought war began compromising law and order
and the safety of ordinary civilians.2 This decade, therefore, stood apart from previous
decades of mafia power, where in the past Cosa Nostra had taken strides to avoid
implicating civilians unnecessarily in its affairs, as long as the criminal organization’s
ability to maintain a dominant influence over businesses, attitudes, and culture was not
impeded.
Another important factor contributing to mafia power during the 1970s-80s was
the Italian state and its historical relationship with Cosa Nostra. Since unification in 1860
and particularly after World War II, the Italian state has depended on and utilized Cosa
Nostra as an organization to help carry out state functions of controlling order,
monopolizing violence, and providing essential services to citizens. The mafia has grown
over the years as a result of this partnership. Particularly after the 1950s, the state
informally granted legal impunity to the mafia in exchange for electoral support from
Cosa Nostra—a mutually beneficial transaction that allowed the mafia to acquire a new
level of dominance by the 1980s.3 This symbiotic relationship largely went unnoticed and
unchallenged for many years, as Sicilians became accustomed to such state of affairs, not
questioning this system as long as their basic needs were met by some higher authority—
whether that authority was the state or mafia. However, in the late 1970s and early 1980s
when it became increasingly clear that the Italian state had delegated its roles to the mafia

2
3

Alison Jamieson, The Antimafia (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 24-5.
Jamieson, 16.
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to the extent that the state was incapable of carrying out basic functions of enforcing
order and providing protection to civilians, powerful state authorities came forward
calling for an end to state-mafia relations, and more importantly, the eradication of Cosa
Nostra from the Sicilian landscape.
Early antimafia activists primarily hailed from the state level, including General
dalla Chiesa and Pio la Torre, and sought to check the mafia’s growing sense of
invincibility.4 These early forms of antimafia activism, however, were met with swift
elimination by Cosa Nostra, which effectively quelled out of fear any widespread civilian
activism that may have arose in the wake of these early protests against the mafia.
Through the murdering of early activists, Cosa Nostra clearly demonstrated its
commitment to eliminating any opposition threatening its power. Not all Sicilians were
ready to continue the trend of acquiescence and acceptance to status quo power structures
and the state-mafia system, however. Magistrates Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino
arose on the antimafia scene in a commanding way in the early 1980s in the wake of
these murders, determined to lead a widespread fight against the mafia that would destroy
Cosa Nostra for good.
Falcone and Borsellino advocated for a new strategy to combat the mafia.
Recognizing that past antimafia attempts had failed because state authorities were
isolated and alone in their challenge of Cosa Nostra, these magistrates aptly realized that
a successful fight against the mafia would require broad participation and involvement
from Sicilians—not simply at the magistrate level.5 Falcone and Borsellino, therefore,
effectively laid the framework for a grassroots, civilian-based antimafia movement to

4
5
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develop and flourish with their emotive calls to action that rallied ordinary Sicilians to
overturn decades of fear and acquiescence and fight against the mafia in their daily lives.
Civilian involvement began in the early 1980s, as a result, but would not culminate into
the widespread movement of today for several more years—a testament to the extent to
which Cosa Nostra had become engrained within Sicily.
How Falcone and Borsellino interpreted the mafia phenomenon in the 1980s
directly affected how ordinary Sicilians came to understand the factors that were
responsible for allowing Cosa Nostra to achieve the unprecedented level of power they
saw openly and unremorsefully expressed in the streets and against antimafia activists.
Through working with pentiti, or mafia penitents, Falcone and Borsellino learned
intimate details about Cosa Nostra and its relations with the Italian state.6 During the
1980s, therefore, these magistrates—in line with the thinking of past antimafia activists,
as well—believed Cosa Nostra fundamentally to represent a political problem. Falcone
and Borsellino believed the Italian state and its historical dependence on the mafia was
directly responsible for the unchecked power of the mafia Sicilians witnessed in the
1980s.7 Based on these sentiments, the magistrates spearheaded a new antimafia effort
that encouraged civilians to join in protesting the state to enact legislative reforms that
would end a symbiotic relationship that had existed for over a century.
The antimafia movement in its nascent form, therefore, focused on targeting the
state for reforms in order to dismantle Cosa Nostra and its influence over the island’s
economy, politics, and culture. Pressure at the civilian and magistrate level began
encouraging the state to reevaluate its historical ties to the mafia, as the full extent and
6

Jamieson, 3.
Jane Schneider and Peter Schneider, “Suggestions from the Antimafia Struggle in Sicily,”
Anthropological Quarterly 75, no. 1 (2001): 156.
7
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compromising nature of these ties were increasingly coming to light and could no longer
be hidden from the now aware and scrutinizing public eye. This reevaluation manifested
in important legislative reforms that broke with the state’s history of implicit grants of
impunity to the mafia. Among the earliest of these reforms was the Rognoni-La Torre
Law, which officially made it a crime to be a mafioso or to be associated with Cosa
Nostra, no matter the extent of that involvement.8 Another important political
development of the mid-1980s was harsher legislation dictating the condition of mafiosi
prison sentencing. These important reforms paved the way for the Maxi Trial—the first
Sicilian trial utilizing these new laws as a legal framework to fight the mafia. The Maxi
Trial of 1986-7 represented the culmination of Falcone and Borsellino’s testimonial work
with pentiti and culminated in the arrest of over 300 mafiosi.9
Cosa Nostra did not lie dormant in the wake of this rising antimafia tide,
however. Despite fear of a mafia response, Falcone and Borsellino continued their work
against mafiosi and encouraged the politicization and involvement of ordinary Sicilians in
the antimafia cause. When it became glaringly apparent that Cosa Nostra could no longer
depend on state allies to insulate the organization from judicial prosecution, the mafia
retaliated by murdering the famous faces and rallying loci of the antimafia movement,
publicly killing Falcone and Borsellino in 1992.10 While the civilian-based antimafia
movement had its first seeds sown in the mid-1980s particularly outside of the courtroom
that housed the Maxi Trial, civilian involvement in the antimafia cause had been
somewhat limited thus far. By murdering the leaders of the antimafia movement, Cosa

8
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Nostra believed it had effectively suppressed any future antimafia activism.11 What was
unanticipated by the mafia, however, was the extent to which ordinary citizens would be
incensed and mobilized by the death of these antimafia martyrs. Therefore, 1992 marked
a new phase of the antimafia movement, in which ordinary civilians in unprecedented
numbers and commitment carried on the antimafia fight to which Falcone, Borsellino,
and other early activists had devoted their lives.
Thus, in the wake of the magistrates’ deaths, the antimafia movement became
increasingly more civilian-driven, with ordinary Sicilians furthering the antimafia cause
in the best way they knew how: by continuing to push for political reforms and legislative
initiatives to curb mafia power as Falcone and Borsellino had begun to do before their
untimely deaths. Early antimafia organizations arising in the mid-1980s and early 1990s
showcased this commitment to targeting the state by lobbying authorities and government
leaders to adopt a harsher legal stance against the mafia. Also during this time, Sicilians
pressured the state to remove from power corrupt politicians with known mafia ties.12 A
new era of transparency, accountability, and legality was desired by Sicilians, and
political reforms appeared to be the necessary medium through which to accomplish such
a drastic change.
While the antimafia movement undoubtedly succeeded in prompting a rush of
legislative reforms in this era that allowed Sicily to develop an overdue penal code
against mafiosi, political reforms clearly were insufficient in eradicating Cosa Nostra.13
Despite the fact that a new law intending to address organized crime was said to be

11

Jamieson, xx.
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enacted every three weeks in the early 1990s, the mafia still reigned over Sicily with its
power and influence largely unchallenged.14 This was because the mafia—as it had
succeeded in doing several times since its origin in 1860—responded to the unfavorable
political climate of the 1980s-early 1990s by channeling its activities into more elusive
and less visible markets such as heroin trafficking and illegal immigration.15 Most
importantly, however, Cosa Nostra remained because it represented much more than a
political problem, and merely attending to political ends would never be enough to curb
this powerful criminal organization.
After the early 1990s, when it was clear that political reforms could only go so far
in checking mafia power, Cosa Nostra became widely perceived as a cultural problem
requiring work at the societal level to fully challenge and dismantle. Thus, beginning in
the mid-1990s the antimafia movement evolved from targeting the state to society,
engaging in community work among Sicilians in order to address the factors that have
allowed mafia power to perpetuate over 150 years. The hope behind these efforts is to
encourage legality, law and order, and denouncement of the mafia among ordinary
Sicilians whose involvement is an imperative component of this new phase of the
antimafia fight. Only by engaging in cultural work will the movement be able to address
the apathy and fear that continues to contribute to mafia power and influence. It is clear,
therefore, that the antimafia movement has changed significantly over time, from
perceiving the mafia as a political to a cultural problem, and focusing not on the state but

14

Savona, “The Mafia—What to Do Next?” 94.
Alessandra Stanley, “Palemo Shows Off as a Cleaned-Up Mafia Capital,” The New York Times,
December 13, 2000,
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rather Sicilians, and specifically the youth, as the agents that will carry Sicily towards a
future no longer dictated by Cosa Nostra.
The important ways in which the antimafia movement has changed since its
origins are hard to discern from current scholarly literature on the subject, however.
Indeed, the breadth of research about the movement in its nascent form stands in stark
contrast to the lack of contemporary examinations of antimafia efforts in Sicily. The
reason for disproportional attention from scholars during different time periods does not
reflect the movement’s strength or weakness in the 1980s versus the contemporary
period. Rather, the changing aims and strategies of the contemporary movement simply
have not attracted the international media spotlight to the extent that the movement did
when it first arose unpredictably out of the destruction and ruins of 1980s Sicily.
Contrary to assumptions that could be derived from the lack of research on the
contemporary movement, the antimafia movement has not lost strength or influence, but
has rather changed the way it operates in important ways deserving of attention. This
thesis seeks to fill this gap in scholarly literature about the movement by attending to the
following questions: What is the current nature of the antimafia movement compared to
its nascent form in the 1980s? With these new changes in mind, how does defining the
antimafia movement as counter-hegemonic reveal the complex aims of the movement
and the difficulties it faces in producing widespread cultural change in Sicily?
The complexity of these questions has required me to evolve my focus and
redirect my attention to different aspects of scholarly literature that will allow me to fully
uncover the intricacies of the antimafia movement and what it seeks to accomplish. My
focus centered first on social movement theory (SMT), which offered important insight
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on the conditions that can bring about a civilian-based movement and the hindrances that
commonly stand in the way of movements working to accomplish broad cultural changes.
I next examined important subsections of social movement theory, including political
opportunity structure, resource mobilization, and framing theories. While this was a
necessary theoretical framework from which to start, as these ideas shed light on how a
movement appeals to the masses, mobilizes support, and maintains constituents, social
movement theory failed to explain why the antimafia movement has changed over time,
and specifically why it was considered prudent to switch from targeting the state to
society in the mid-1990s.
What follows in Chapter One, therefore, is an analysis of Antonio Gramsci’s main
theoretical ideas about hegemony and civil society. The Italian Marxist’s notions will be
explicated, as his ideas offer a compelling framework from which to analyze what a
social movement must do in order to enact widespread cultural change in a society that
has long been under the control of a dominant group and ideology. Social movement
theory proved insufficient because its focus on the state hindered an understanding of
why a social movement might also need to work amongst society. Gramsci provides a
sound theoretical framework from which to analyze the antimafia movement, as he
describes what a movement must do in order to challenge hegemonic forces deeply
entrenched within a region’s economy, politics, and culture. Because Gramsci notes the
importance of working within but also outside the state when attempting to bring about
widespread cultural change, Gramsci explains what social movement theory could not.
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CHAPTER ONE: Gramsci, Hegemony, and Civil Society
Antonio Gramsci was an Italian Marxist who made his most significant
contributions to political theory during the 1920s-30s. Writing in Italy during the time of
fascism, Gramsci sought to understand and explain why a socialist revolution failed to
come to fruition in his home country.16 Incarcerated because of his beliefs, Gramsci was
forced to document much of his political thinking on scraps of paper while in his prison
cell. His ideas about how a society could enact widespread cultural change would later be
compiled in his Prison Notebooks.17 Because Gramsci explored how the proletariat could
generate a “cultural revolution” to overthrow the bourgeoisie,18 Gramsci’s theories offer
insight into why a social movement—socialist or otherwise—might change from
targeting the state to targeting society when trying to accomplish a broad revolution.
Gramsci’s ideas differed from other Marxist theorists of his time in a notable way; in
attempting to launch a cultural revolution, Gramsci recognized that tackling the state is
not enough to produce widespread cultural change. Rather, Gramsci believed that a
movement must also work amongst society if a revolution is to be successful. In order to
understand Gramsci’s rationale for why targeting the state is insufficient, it is imperative
to examine the Marxist’s concept of hegemony.
HEGEMONY:
As Gramsci described, hegemony is the “‘spontaneous’ consent given by the great
masses of the population to the general direction imposed on societal life by the dominant

16

Sidney Tarrow, Peasant Communism in Southern Italy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), 120-
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Roger S. Gottlieb, An Anthology of Western Marxism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 112.
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fundamental group.”19 Gramsci believed hegemony to manifest in both physical and
ideological domination,20 consequently resulting in “not only united economic and
political objectives but also intellectual and moral unity.”21 At the time when Gramsci
was writing what would become the Prison Notebooks, he conceptualized the locus of
hegemony creating such uniformity to be the Italian state. The widespread infiltration that
hegemony necessitates led Gramsci to devote time to explaining how other actors besides
the state are necessary in order to ensure that domination is spread so widely that it
infiltrated all levels of society.22 Simply put, the state requires the active involvement of
other external actors in order to achieve hegemony. Gramsci deemed these multifaceted
outlets outside the state to be “hegemonic apparatuses” that contributed to and helped
enforce state hegemony.23 Instead of a single locus of hegemonic power, therefore, there
exists a hegemonic or “historical bloc,” whose different components work in tandem to
achieve the level of domination needed for hegemony to be achieved.24 Gramsci’s
hegemonic bloc consisted of several actors, including institutions such as political parties,
the Catholic Church, civil society, and a last category he deemed “traditional
intellectuals.”25 The strength of the hegemonic bloc, therefore, was dependent on the
active involvement of these non-state actors, as dominant ideology continually was
reproduced through these varied mediums in order to create and entrench hegemony.26

19

Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, eds., Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio
Gramsci (New York: International Publishers, 1971), 12.
20
Gottlieb, 112.
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Mouffe, 181.
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Mouffe, 5.
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Mouffe, 5, 187.
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It is important to delineate how Gramsci conceptualized the latter two
components of the hegemonic bloc—civil society and traditional intellectuals—as these
elements are not self-explanatory and an understanding of their nature and function is of
paramount importance to grasping the complexity of the bloc and the vital role that each
actor plays within it. Gramsci’s understanding of civil society is particularly important, as
his way of conceptualizing this notion differs considerably from more modern, neoliberal
scholars who predominantly consider civil society to be a “third sector” operating outside
of state and market influences.27 Gramsci believed such positioning to be idealistic and
highly improbable—especially in Italy. Indeed, Gramsci suggested that civil society, as
the private sphere where individuals operate, is a vital medium the hegemonic state seeks
to control in order to ensure that hegemonic “ideology is produced and diffused”
throughout society.28 Quite to the contrary of neoliberal theorists, therefore, Gramsci
suggested civil society was the “hegemonic apparatus of the ruling group, or the arena
where hegemony is reproduced and legitimized, thereby helping to enforce pre-existing
power structures.29 Based on this definition, it is easy to understand why Gramsci
considered civil society to be an instrumental component of the hegemonic bloc.
It is also important to explicate Gramsci’s notion of “traditional intellectuals” as
another crucial pillar within the hegemonic bloc. Gramsci qualified that, while every
individual possessed the potential to act as an intellectual, not all carry out this function.30
In order to be an intellectual, one must “participate in a particular conception of the

27
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world”31 by perpetuating the ideology propelled by the dominant ruling group.32
Traditional intellectuals have a dual role in ensuring the effective functioning of the bloc,
therefore, as they show individuals how to conceive of their function within the dominant
system and also work to ensure that hegemonic ideology is accepted among the masses.33
In order to attend to these tasks, traditional intellectuals must coerce the masses
until they are in congruence with the dominant ideology. Traditional intellectuals work to
create a society where hegemony is so deeply rooted that over time the masses consider
such ideology natural to the extent that it comes to reflect the “collective will.”34 When
the hegemonic system becomes developed to this extent, the masses grant “spontaneous
consent” to the ruling group, and the system reproduces itself with little effort.35
However, in instances where consent is not spontaneous, it is the responsibility of
traditional intellectuals to patrol any deviation from the hegemonic ideology. The threat
of non-consent may be enough to hold society to an ideology. However, in “moments of
crisis of command and direction when spontaneous consent has failed,”36 and threats are
insufficient, traditional intellectuals play a large role in obtaining consent through force.
In this role, intellectuals function as an “apparatus of state coercive power” by punishing
those who break the trend of granting “consent, either actively or passively.”37
Traditional intellectuals are responsible, therefore, for spreading hegemony and the
acceptance of such ideals until its entrenchment is universal and widespread and therefore
hard to refute or dismantle. These intellectuals work to maintain a “culture of silence” in
31
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which the masses are “ignorant and lethargic” to hegemony, not protesting this state of
affairs out of fear or ignorance about the power structures controlling them.38 These
intellectuals are thus of vital importance, and represent a specific sector of the population
that tends to the perpetuation of the hegemonic system. Traditional intellectuals are
backed by institutions also serving the hegemonic bloc, and can be found in the capacities
of school teachers, religious leaders, or the media, for instance.39
IMPORTANCE OF NON-STATE ACTORS:
It is evident that hegemony is not just created and reproduced through the state.
Rather, the state controls institutions, the economy, and societal actors in a way that
ensures its dominance is reverberated throughout society, and that its ideology becomes
entrenched to stabilize and maintain the system.40 Hegemony thus becomes solidified
over time with the help of the components of the hegemonic bloc. The involvement of
varied non-state actors ensures that hegemony becomes an all-encompassing system of
dominance over the economy, politics, and culture. As a result, any alternatives outside
the system are hard to conceptualize, as the components of the bloc work diligently to
limit the expression and ability for alternatives to exist. The hegemonic bloc thus comes
to control production and creates a subordinate group of the masses who make sense of
their realities by contributing to the further production of the established system.41 In this
way, the masses form a “collective mentality” under the hegemonic system, and develop
“a typical way of perceiving and interpreting the world that provides orientations to
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Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed (New York: Continuum, 1997), 12.
Mouffe, 187.
40
Mouffe, 5.
41
Robert W. Cox, Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 17.
39

Diefendorf 20
action” for these individuals, channeling their activities and behavior into ways that
further perpetuate hegemony.42
DISMANTLING A HEGEMONIC BLOC:
Taking Gramsci’s ideas into consideration, it would be logical to assume that the
Marxist had little faith in society’s ability to generate a cultural revolution based on the
strength of hegemonic forces working to limit any deviation from dominant ideology.
While it is clear that the hegemonic bloc constantly works to maintain this system, it is
important to note that overthrowing hegemony is difficult, but not impossible. Gramsci
expressed the belief that hegemony could be dismantled by society under very specific
conditions.
Hegemonic blocs are not impermeable.43 Due to the fact that solidification
depends on a variety of actors working in congruence with one another constantly to
maintain the system, fissures are a natural occurrence within the dominant bloc. Fissures
can be understood as the natural breaks within a bloc that threaten its overall strength,
and can be created “endogenously as well as from external shocks” to the hegemonic
system.44
Internal fissures may develop within the hegemonic bloc as a result of the fact that
the bloc’s strength depends on the consistent efforts of a variety of state and non-state
actors working to perpetuate the hegemonic system. As the state depends on civil society,
traditional intellectuals, and various institutions to reinforce its hegemony, it is possible
that conflicts between the state and non-state actors can create fissures that threaten the
stability of the hegemonic bloc.
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The hegemonic bloc is far from stable, as it is also liable to external challenges to
its stability. Gramsci believed that an external source of fissures could be produced
through the medium of civil society. This requires sufficient explanation, as it has already
been noted above that Gramsci believed civil society to be a vital component of the
hegemonic bloc. However, this is precisely where civil society derives its unique ability
to challenge hegemony; because this medium is an important channel for the maintenance
of hegemony, should civil society renege on this imperative function, the stability of the
overall system is threatened. As Gramsci explained, civil society must be acutely aware
of its importance in maintaining hegemony in order to recognize its ability to also destroy
that system by no longer choosing to perpetuate it. Gramsci thus attributes civil society
with the ability to “reclaim political society” as a space for power negotiations instead of
a medium serving hegemonic ends.45 As Gramsci suggests, the moment civil society
recognizes that it does not need to “produce the hegemony that will stabilize bourgeoisie
domination” is the moment civil society recognizes its power to dismantle hegemony.
Civil society therefore must become aware that it is “capable of creating a new
history and collaborating in the formation of a new power, rather than to justify a power
which has already been established.”46 This recognition of civil society’s duality may
come about once natural fissures within the hegemonic bloc are made apparent, at which
point civil society becomes attuned to its ability to widen those fissures by withdrawing
its support of the hegemonic system. Civil society has the power, therefore, to either
capitalize on preexisting internal fissures within the bloc, or create its own external
fissures that jeopardize the hegemonic system by refusing to perpetuate hegemonic

45
46

Mouffe, 41.
Mouffe, 36.

Diefendorf 22
ideology. Therefore, Gramsci’s ideas suggest that civil society can play a variety of roles
and have varied relations with the state; while civil society can act as an enforcer of
already established power structures,47 it also has the ability to serve as an important
realm for power discussions and challenges—thereby representing the medium through
which cultural revolution can be enacted.48
Only when civil society becomes aware of its unique spatiality within a
hegemonic system—as both enforcer and potential challenger of hegemony—does it
realize its ability to work “within and against the state” in order to dismantle this
domination.49 Gramsci coined the duality of civil society as the “war of positioning.”50
Through a war of positioning, by working at the state but also societal level as a result of
civil society’s favorable location among these two entities, hegemony can be dismantled.
The importance of engaging in a “war of positioning” is paramount, Gramsci believed,
because to merely target the state for reform is not enough. This is because the state is not
the only source of hegemony, as many non-state actors also work to perpetuate
hegemonic domination and ideology.51 Thus, merely attending to the state is insufficient,
as these external pillars can still work to maintain the bloc. Counter-hegemonic initiatives
must also tackle society where these non-state actors exist and work, therefore, to limit
the dominant group’s ability to retain a hegemonic bloc over the masses.52 When civil
society becomes attuned to its ability to engage in a “war of positioning” to dismantle
hegemony, it is said to become aware of its “counter-hegemonic potential.”
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COUNTER-HEGEMONY:
In order to dismantle hegemony, civil society must create a counter-hegemonic
movement. Counter-hegemonic movements must attend to two essential tasks to
dismantle hegemony, the first of which involves dismantling the existing hegemonic
ideology perpetuated by the dominant group and made strong by the hegemonic bloc. In
order to dismantle hegemonic ideology, the individuals who perpetuate such—the
traditional intellectuals—must be targeted. In an effort to do so, a counter-hegemonic
movement must create its own group of intellectuals, the “new intellectuals,” who help to
destroy the dominant ideology. New intellectuals therefore must “assimilate and conquer
ideologically the traditional intellectuals” responsible for reproducing hegemony.
New intellectuals of a counter-hegemonic movement face a challenging task.
Hegemony is characterized by the extent to which it pervades all levels of society and
daily life. As previously stated, the longer hegemony goes unchallenged, the more it
becomes entrenched, and the harder task new intellectuals are presented with as they
attempt to deconstruct power structures and ideology that have long been acquiesced to
or considered the norm. In order to challenge these often deep-rooted sentiments, new
intellectuals must work amongst the masses to call into question how the masses
conceptualize the world they live in, and the power structures that dictate their reality.53 It
is imperative for new intellectuals to demonstrate to the masses that a given ideology or
authority is in fact hegemonic, and moreover that their lack of action against such forces
is perpetuating this domination.54
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An essential task before new intellectuals in dismantling hegemony, therefore, is
the development of a “critical consciousness” among the masses. Gramsci notes the
presence of two consciousnesses that exist within individuals, which stand in
contradiction to one another.55 One consciousness, he maintains, is “inherited from the
past and uncritically absorbed.”56 This consciousness is relevant, however, because it
dictates an individual’s moral convictions and their “direction of will.”57 The detriment of
this consciousness exists in the fact that these are inherited sentiments, which can have
the effect of discouraging individuals from acting against or questioning them, merely
encouraging them to continue to acquiesce to the status quo.58 The second consciousness
is the way in which an individual views the world in theory—felt but not performed.59 A
successful counter-hegemonic initiative must therefore encourage the contestation
between these two consciousnesses, and advocate for individuals to no longer act
contradictorily in “theory versus practice.”60 It is this contradiction among the masses
that enables them to acquiesce to or unknowingly accept hegemony.
New intellectuals directly challenge these contradictions by promoting “critical
consciousnesses,” where they work to advance an acute awareness among the masses of
how their double consciousnesses contribute to the hegemonic bloc. This critical
awareness promotes an intellectual awakening that shakes one from a stupor of
acquiescence, and encourages him to understand how hegemony has repressed him. This
intellectual awakening grants individuals agency over their lives and allows them to
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discover how to function within a new “intellectual-moral bloc”61 where they no longer
need to acquiesce to the “intellectual and moral direction” imposed upon society by the
hegemonic group.62 New intellectuals therefore demonstrate that hegemony need not
reflect the “collective national-popular will” as it does not truly reflect the will and
interest of the masses, but rather exclusively benefits the ruling group.63 This intellectualmoral bloc directly creates fissures within the hegemonic bloc, as it is created by critical
and aware masses who no longer passively acquiesce to advancing hegemony. As
Gramsci describes, through the development of a critical consciousness, every individual
is made into a “philosopher,” in that they critically evaluate the world and their role in
it.64
Paulo Freire optimistically suggested that “every human being, no matter how
‘ignorant’ or submerged in the ‘culture of silence’ he or she may be, is capable of looking
critically at the world in a dialogical encounter with others.”65 If new intellectuals can
prompt this realization, the oppressed “can gradually perceive personal and social reality
as well as the contradictions in it, become conscious of his or her perception of that
reality, and deal critically with it.”66 This is a crucial step towards cultural change,
because it is not until an individual comes to an understanding of the world that they can
then work to change it.67 The difficulty in accomplishing “critical consciousness” in a
society that has long been subjugated should not be underestimated, however. Hegemonic
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forces entrenched over time have the effect of creating a mentality among the masses that
discourages challenges against the hegemonic system, as individuals come to “confuse
freedom with the maintenance of the status quo.”68 The strength of counter-hegemony,
therefore, can be measured in its ability to overcome the “fear of freedom” among masses
long suffering under an oppressive power structure.69 Because the oppressed have been
victims under hegemony for so long, and only through counter-hegemonic activities are
made to realize they were exploited under status-quo power systems, freeing themselves
from this domination seems unnatural, unsafe, and difficult.70 Through developing
critical consciousnesses among the masses, however, counter-hegemonic movements
demonstrate that individuals need not fear, but rather should embrace and actively work
towards the attainment of the benefits and agency this freedom from hegemony brings.
Critical consciousness must occur throughout society; it is not enough solely for
intellectuals to engage in this introspective process if cultural change is to be
accomplished.71 Working within schools, Gramsci believed,72 is an important way to
carry out the development of critical consciousnesses in society and overcome the
“culture of silence” that perpetuates hegemony.73 Because schools can act as a medium
for either the reproduction or challenge of hegemonic ideology, it is important that a
counter-hegemonic movement reclaim these mediums in order to gain control over the
varied sources that strengthen hegemony daily. The importance of schools in counterhegemonic movements is an idea that will be revisited and explicated in Chapter 4.74
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It is important to note, however, that it is possible for the dominant group to
perceive an ideological shift occurring, and attempt to stop any shift away from the
hegemonic system so as to prevent its loss of control over the masses.75 A hegemonic
bloc will work diligently to monitor and limit fissures, particularly those created by
external forces. Specifically, the dominant group fearing a loss of power might attempt to
prevent “critical consciousnesses” from being attained, as the dominant group benefits
from a docile, consenting population that acquiesces to its power and does not realize that
it is oppressed. Gramsci therefore accurately worried that hegemonic groups would have
an interest in attempting to prevent counter-hegemonic initiatives.76 This is why the first
task of counter-hegemonic movements is to weaken the ability of traditional intellectuals
to carry out their role, because if the hegemonic bloc loses this agent of enforcement, its
overall strength is fundamentally weakened.
Because this introspection and critical awareness among the masses is dependent
on their ability to perceive alternatives to the hegemonic system, the second role of a
counter-hegemonic movement is to produce and spread a new, counter-hegemonic
ideology to take place of the old that new intellectuals work to deconstruct. As Gramsci
recognized, introspection among individuals only takes place in the arena of contesting
“political hegemonies,” when individuals are made to realize that there are viable
alternatives to the hegemonic ideology in place, causing them to critically reconsider the
ideology to which they wish to ascribe.77 New intellectuals, therefore, must further a new
way of conceptualizing the world, and actively encourage citizens to adopt this
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conception through a three-step process of constructing the counter-ideology, organizing
the masses, and then persuading the masses in concordance with the new system.78
Building a counter-hegemonic ideology requires a new category of intellectuals,
called “organic intellectuals.” Gramsci believed that most intellectuals came from peasant
backgrounds, and through their intellectualization ultimately left behind their class of
origin, no longer “organically” a member of their original background.79 This disconnect
between the informed and uninformed contributed to the perpetuation of hegemony, as
the uninformed classes possessed no intellectuals who stayed amongst them to further
their knowledge of their oppression and the need to challenge such.80 Therefore, Gramsci
believed that a successful counter-hegemonic movement must breed its own “organic
intellectuals” who stay within the movement and organize at the societal level, helping to
further the “alternative ideological and cultural awareness.”81 Only when organic
intellectuals work within the masses from which they arose will they be able to spread
widely counter-hegemonic ideals and a new ideology.82
Organic intellectuals must assure that the masses are made to support the creation
and uptake of counter-hegemonic ideology in society through actions and behaviors in
their everyday lives.83 This newly created ideology must reflect the “collective will” of
the masses and be compelling enough to act as the “organic cement” holding the masses
together in their counter-hegemonic movement.84 In other words, this ideology must help
individuals come to a larger understanding of the world in which they live, giving
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meaning and solutions to their problems. If organic intellectuals can attend to this end—
showing the masses a viable alternative to the hegemonic system—another divisive
fissure within the hegemonic bloc can be generated that delegitimizes the belief that only
through participating in the hegemonic system can individuals prosper. The ability of
organic intellectuals to convince the masses of the viability of the alternative counterhegemonic system depends on the ability of the movement to develop counter-hegemonic
institutions that support the new ideology. Just as the hegemonic bloc relies on non-state
actors to solidify its strength, the counter-hegemonic system must develop a similar
system of support that ensures its perpetuation. Various apparatuses must work to further
the counter-hegemonic ideology if it is to become pervasive like hegemony once was.
These apparatuses must enable the counter-hegemonic movement to offer an alternative
medium for economic, social, and cultural production. The strength of the counterhegemonic movement, therefore, is dependent on its ability to convince the masses of the
need to dismantle the hegemonic bloc, and making this pragmatic by proposing a
legitimate substitute to living and working outside the hegemonic system. Through this
practical alternative to the hegemonic system, counter-hegemony can become
incorporated and entrenched through daily practices.
The above mentioned steps must take place if a counter-hegemonic movement is
to succeed in bringing about cultural change. Locating the source of hegemonic
domination, destroying hegemony through an ideological attack on traditional
intellectuals, the creation of “critical consciousnesses,” and finally the development and
production of a counter-hegemonic ideology can be viewed as the stepping stones that
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precipitate a “transformation of civil society”85 that is fundamental in order for civil
society to break from its potential of being a breeding ground for the perpetuation and
reinforcement of hegemony. As civil society thus begins to “reclaim political society” as
the terrain once dominated by a hegemonic group,86 cracks and ruptures are produced as
a counter-hegemonic movement begins to deconstruct hegemonic ideology. To
summarize, if hegemony is envisioned as a formidable wall made strong over time with
the mortar of acquiescence, it is the counter-hegemonic movement, and specifically the
organic intellectuals, who must slowly chip away at this wall. Opportunities for political
activism are created in these fractures of hegemony, indeed the civilian politicization that
the dominant group once sought to prevent. When the masses begin to reclaim this space
as their own, organic intellectuals can encourage the further dismantling of hegemony
until it is destroyed.
The reclamation of “political space” and the conversion of civil society from a
breeding ground of hegemony to a medium challenging the hegemonic system take
significant time, however.87 Because counter-hegemonic movements involve many steps
in order to successfully destroy deeply-rooted hegemony, it is logical why movements of
this nature often are long in duration. Gramsci himself acknowledged that counterhegemonic movements take time to become fully developed and accepted widely among
the masses—to completely dismantle the hegemonic wall and promote the “progressive
disaggregation of a civilization and the construction of another” around the new
ideology.88 Therefore, just as hegemony becomes slowly solidified over time, counter-
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hegemony must slowly work to disaggregate the various sources perpetuating this
domination while simultaneously offering an alternative ideology that can be offered to
the masses.
Chapter Two follows, which aims to relate Gramscian theories of hegemony and
civil society to the case study at hand. It will be established that Cosa Nostra and the
Italian state are two competing and linked “hegemons” that dominate the hegemonic bloc
in Sicily. The symbiotic relationship between the mafia and state has perpetuated the
solidification of this bloc over a period of nearly 150 years. Societal and institutional
acquiescence to the mafia-state system has ensured its entrenchment that the antimafia
movement has recently begun working to deconstruct beginning in the 1980s. It will be
suggested that the antimafia movement, therefore, is counter-hegemonic in its aims and
strategies as it seeks to dismantle a deeply-rooted hegemonic bloc that has long dictated
Sicily’s politics, economy, and culture.
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CHAPTER 2: The State-Mafia Hegemonic Bloc
This chapter aims to establish Cosa Nostra as a vital part of the state’s hegemonic
bloc within Sicily that has controlled the masses since the 1860s. By tracing the nature
and evolution of the symbiotic relationship between Cosa Nostra and the Italian state, it
will be demonstrated that these two institutions work in tandem with one another in such
a way that has resulted in physical and ideological domination over Sicilians for nearly
120 years. The hegemonic nature of this partnership will be proven by demonstrating the
political, economic, and cultural manifestations of this relationship that receive
strengthening through hegemonic apparatuses within Sicily such as the Catholic Church,
civil society, political parties, and traditional intellectuals. Gramscian theory will be
employed to highlight the hegemonic bloc that exists as a result of state-mafia relations,
which brings attention to the need for a counter-hegemonic movement to dismantle this
system of hegemony that will work to challenge the state as the locus from which
hegemony radiates, as well as the varied apparatuses within society that reproduce
hegemonic ideals and practices daily.
REVISITING GRAMSCI:
Gramsci believed that the Italian state, with the help of institutions, civil society,
the Catholic Church, and traditional intellectuals comprised the hegemonic bloc in 1930s
Italy. The Marxist believed that the working class needed to dismantle this bloc in order
to bring about cultural change in Italy. In Sicily, however, the Italian state never
succeeded in establishing its dominance over the population following Italian unification
in 1860. Consequently, the state has historically cooperated with Cosa Nostra to provide
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essential services, enforce order, control violence, and extract electoral support in the
region.
Thus, while Gramsci believed the Italian state to be the center from which
hegemonic ideology and dominance radiated, in Sicily the Italian state has had to rely
heavily on the mafia to strengthen its influence on the island. With these two powers
working in conjunction with one another to enforce authority and control over the region,
a hegemonic bloc in Sicily comprised of and made strong through the symbiotic
relationship between the state and Cosa Nostra has developed that manifests in the
physical and ideological domination over Sicilians. This represents a unique case study in
hegemony, therefore, because while Gramsci explains that states rely on external
institutions and non-state actors to enforce ideology and dominance over the masses, in
the case of Sicily the state has had to rely on a criminal organization to control the masses
and carry out its functions—setting the stage for important power contestations that have
the potential to destabilize the hegemonic system upon which these powers both rely.
UNDERSTANDING SICILY’S HISTORY:
Before the state and mafia can be understood as constituting a hegemonic bloc
within Sicily, it is important to explain the origin and nature of this symbiotic relationship
on the island. In 1860, the Italian state succeeded in joining Sicily with mainland Italy
despite incredible opposition against unification.89 Sicilians—with their long history of
foreign rule, domination, and subjugation—considered unification with the Italian state to
be yet another instance of unwarranted foreign control.90 Sicilians believed themselves to
possess no cultural, linguistic, or historical commonalities with mainland Italy, and thus
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looked unfavorably upon unification with an unfamiliar entity.91 This popular opposition
in Sicily never was addressed or quelled effectively by the Italian state, and consequently
presented notable obstacles to effective state-building in the region.92 The Italian state’s
inability to successfully establish its authority over the island had tremendous
ramifications for Sicily’s future. In order to understand the implications that arose from
ineffectual state-building in Sicily, it is imperative to visit the ideas of Charles Tilly who
describes how a state should engage in state-building in order to establish its legitimacy
and authority over a population, and the consequences that result if these steps are not
carried to fruition.
It is useful to first delineate the notion of the “state” before proceeding with an
analysis of Tilly, as his ideas on state-building are grounded within a particular
conception of the state. While a wealth of definitions abound, this thesis will operate on
two widely accepted and interlinked understandings of the state. Because the state is a
complex entity composed of various parts, Skocpol’s definition is particularly helpful.
She suggests that the state is “a set of administrative, policing, and military organizations
headed, and more or less well coordinated by, an executive authority.”93 In the following
discussion of the Italian state, Skocpol’s definition will be beneficial in advancing the
notion that the state is not a monolithic body, and that its various parts do not always
work in congruence with one another. In addition, Max Weber’s definition of the state
will also heavily be drawn upon in this thesis. Weber defines the state as “a human
community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of force within
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a given territory.” Based on this conception, Weber emphasizes the state as the only actor
that has the “right” to utilize this control of force, as it is understood that this force is
used to advance the public good.94 Combining these two conceptions, the state can be
understood as a complex entity composed of a variety of apparatuses and agencies that, in
theory, works in harmony in order to serve and protect public interests.95 Utilizing these
understandings of the state, Tilly’s notions of state-building can now be explicated.
Charles Tilly offers a compelling theoretical framework from which to analyze
how state-building must transpire in order for a state to establish its legitimacy and
authority over a region. Tilly builds from the Weberian definition of the state, and
outlines the following four roles an effective state must carry out: “war making to
eliminate outside competitors, state making to eliminate rivals within the territory,
protection, and extraction.”96 The state’s ability to perform these four functions, Tilly
maintains, dictates its ability to constantly enforce and maintain a monopoly of
violence—indeed, a fundamental determinant of state authority.97 If a state proves
capable at performing one of these roles, its ability to perform the others is greatly
enhanced.98 Conversely, failing to perform one or all of these roles jeopardizes state
authority and legitimacy.
The state-making process is thus a formative time in which a state must establish
its monopoly of violence and force, or otherwise risk empowering and encouraging other
actors who desire to carry out these roles. Tilly suggests that the way in which state94
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building is carried out in terms of the pacification of competitors is a determinant of
whether the state attains a “territorial monopoly of legitimate violence,” or whether
organized crime and illegality are fostered.99 War-making is seen as a fundamental step to
effective state-making and attainment of a monopoly of violence,100 but this study will
focus more on attempts to quell internal as opposed to external threats to state power, as
it was challenge from local actors in Sicily during state-building that posed the greatest
threat to the Italian state’s ability to solidify its power.
Because control of territory and resources is vital to a state’s ability to establish
and centralize its authority, and a state’s legitimacy ultimately depends on the approval of
its citizens,101 states have to decide whether to utilize or challenge the existence of local,
external actors who have already established authority and control in a particular
region.102 States that construct a monopoly of violence without the help of external
authorities are best able to centralize and streamline their own authority without
challenge from these outside actors. This ideal scenario is not always possible, however.
Tilly describes that it is common for a variety of actors to possess claims to violence in
the early years of state-building.103 Through state-building efforts, however, all non-state
actors who possess claims to violence should be delegitimized, while the state must in
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turn elevate itself in the minds of the citizenry as the sole possessor of a legitimate
monopoly of force working in the interest of the public good.104
The eradication of rival actors that successful state-building necessitates is not
always an easy task.105 In circumstances where state-building transpires over previously
incongruous and remote areas, rival actors initially may be utilized in order to bolster the
state’s ability to rule indirectly over distant populations.106 This reliance on other actors
for state-making need not be perpetual; it is a hard tradition to break from, however,
unless the state can adopt other means to enforce its authority and power through
alternative mediums that will not compromise the state’s attempts at monopolizing force.
This can be done through state-backed institutions like a police force, for instance, that
supplement state authority instead of challenging it.107 Therefore, if a state depends upon
the assistance of local actors to construct state authority, the state recognizes and
promotes the existence of “a plurality of political actors” that effectively weaken the
legitimacy of the state as the sole provider of protection and security.108 This allows Tilly
to conclude that the existence of organized crime stems not from a lack of state presence,
but rather the deliberate will of the state to attain assistance in and ease the process of
state-making.109 Therefore, while challenges to state authority are highly probable during
early phases of state-building, a state’s monopoly on violence in a region is dependent
upon its ability to effectively respond to and dismiss such challenges going forward.110
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The state’s capacity to provide protection in a territory is a necessary aspect of
state-building that conditions its ability to attain a legitimate monopoly on violence.
States have a dual role in providing and selling protection to the citizenry. Thus, effective
and capable states are often deemed as possessing a "protection racket," or the ability to
control violence through security measures that can then be sold to others.111 In order for
a state to possess a protection racket, it “requires a monopoly of the means of coercion,”
for it cannot hope to extract support and legitimacy from the citizenry if other actors are
competing for the ability to carry out the role of providing protection.112 Therefore, it
becomes clear how intertwined state functions are; if the state fails at performing one of
its four main roles, its ability to perform the others is severely diminished. The state must
ensure that it establishes itself as a “legitimate form of protection racket” in a given
region.113 Similarly to how the state must delegitimize other actors who possess claims to
violence, an effective state must also destabilize alternative non-state actors who claim
the ability to protect against such violence.
Finally, Tilly suggests that states must also be able to obtain extractions from their
citizenry in order to effectively solidify their presence and authority in a region. The state
must succeed in creating “compliant national populations” that recognize the state’s
legitimacy and grant approval to its monopoly of violence.114 Compliant populations that
acquiesce to state power demonstrate their approval through acquiescing to state
extractions through instruments such as bureaucracy, conscription, and taxation.115
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What happens, however, when a state fails at performing these four imperative
roles that allow it to enforce its authority and legitimacy in a given territory? As Tilly
proposes, organized crime groups develop “only in certain states and in particular
historical circumstances.”116 Simply put, organized crime is encouraged when the state
fails or proves ineffectual at performing and establishing its authority and legitimacy to
carry out the four roles that Tilly outlines: war making, state making, protection, and
extraction. Failure in performing these functions effectively encourages other actors to
supplement state ineffectuality. It is pertinent to turn to the specific case at hand, applying
Tilly’s theories to Sicily to demonstrate how early state failings on the island after
unification in 1860 set the stage for dependence on rival actors in the form of Cosa
Nostra in order to establish domination over the population.
RELATING TILLY TO SICILY:
In Sicily at the time of unification, particular conditions on the island posed
significant difficulties to the Italian state as it attempted to “build a new state virtually
from scratch.”117 Under the varied powers that controlled Sicily prior to 1860, it was
customary for foreign rulers to involve and empower a variety of individuals in the
stabilization of the empire in order to ensure the perpetuation of their indirect rule. As a
result, many Sicilians at the time of unification were in positions of informal authority
that allowed them to control affairs typically reserved to a state, such as extracting taxes
and quelling unrest.118 As Tilly suggests, it is not uncommon for a variety of local actors
to exist prior to state-building, but if the Italian state was to effectively establish its
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authority and legitimacy in Sicily, it would have to delegitimize these local actors while
asserting its sovereign ability to rule and control the population.
Coupled with Sicily’s history of foreign domination and indirect rule that had
empowered local non-state actors on the island, feudalism also presented difficulties for
state-building. This system of subjugation and unequal land control and distribution was
characteristic throughout Sicily’s history of domination by French Normans, Spaniards,
Austrians, and finally Bourbons.119 Feudalism ensured unequal access to land and
disparate opportunities for wealth and resources, which therefore encouraged Sicilians to
depend on familial networks to obtain necessary resources for survival that otherwise
could not be easily acquired.120 Feudalism helped promote systems of “mutual aid” and
reliance on others for basic needs, which is recognized as having provided fertile ground
for patronage politics to flourish that would become an engrained feature of Sicilian
politics and culture for the next 150 years.121
Under unification, when the Italian state sought to improve Sicily’s
“backwardness” and consolidate state rule, feudalism came to an end, but the framework
for informal networks and illegality was already established.122 Moreover, the need to
parcel up and redistribute land and property required heavy-handed involvement the
nascent state in Sicily did not have the time or resources to oversee. This redistribution of
land and resources in the wake of feudalism encouraged the involvement of local actors
who eased the pace of privatization by granting property rights and resources through
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corrupt dealings or entrenched practices instead of the state.123 These local actors
possessed claims to violence as well as claims to the authority to act in typically statedominated roles. Many of these local actors were wealthy Sicilians who had also been
empowered and utilized by foreign rulers prior to unification. The Italian state’s failure to
delegitimize these actors sowed the seeds for a history of state ineffectuality marked by a
plurality of actors in Sicily working in competition with one another to provide necessary
services to the population.124
Moreover, as previously noted, a significant amount of unrest and discontentment
plagued Sicily in unification years, as many Sicilians resented being incorporated with
mainland Italy with whom they believed to possess no communal ties. This resistance did
not stop after unification, but rather gained steam, culminating in an anti-government
protest in 1866 in Palermo.125 Discontentment and resistance to state domination was so
severe that the Italian state declared martial law twice in Sicily before 1870, but this
action had little effect amongst a population that already distrusted and resented the
Italian state’s right to rule.126 Prior to and in the years following unification, therefore,
Sicilians frequently showcased their dislike of being hastily integrated into Italy.127 While
manifestations of state power came to Sicily in the 1880s in the form of institutions such
as national banks and courts, these were essentially facades of state legitimacy that
suggested the Italian state had streamlined its authority and power in the region more so
than it actually had succeeded in doing at this time.128 Uneven development, patronage
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networks left from feudalism, and inadequate political representation in Sicily were
testaments to the extent to which state-building was not fully completed. Sicily’s hasty
incorporation into mainland Italy during the late 1880s, therefore, would continue to have
devastating repercussions on Sicily’s economy, politics, and culture through the present
day.
Due to the varied problems the Italian state faced in state-building, it was prudent
to turn to local actors in Sicily for assistance in overcoming and mitigating these
hindrances.129 “Starved for credibility,” the Italian state began to look to Cosa Nostra as
an organization that would help in state-building and overcoming obstacles such as
linguistic and cultural barriers, popular opposition, underdevelopment, and the incredible
unrest and chaos on the island.130 Therefore, during these formative state-building years,
local actors were utilized by the state instead of delegitimized. During the years after
unification in particular, the mafia arose as a capable criminal organization that gained
prominence by offering protection to Sicilians against bandits that engaged in theft of
land, property, and livestock.131 As Blok explains, banditry was so widespread during the
late 1800s that it “constrained those who had property to buy protection.”132 While
bandits were looked down upon as a sign of southern Italy’s “backwardness,” Cosa
Nostra in contrast was coveted as an organization that could help carry out state functions
including enforcing order, controlling violence, and offering protection to Sicilians in the
absence of a strong state in the region.133 With state backing, Cosa Nostra quickly
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developed a protection racket over the island, where Sicilians paid a pizzo tribute to the
mafia in exchange for protection from banditry.134 Therefore, the absence of an effective
and legitimate state presence in Sicily provided the mafia with a lucrative void in which
to fill as “entrepreneurs of violence,” allowing the criminal organization to gain
commanding power in the years after unification through capitalizing on pervasive
violence and disorder.135 In short, the late 1800s saw the beginnings of a long tradition of
Cosa Nostra solidifying “a dense interweaving with the state.”136
During unification before the Italian state entered into a dependent relationship
with Cosa Nostra, “the ruling class was thus only dominant, not hegemonic” as a result
of its inability to foster respect for its authority and power among Sicilians who resented
being ruled from outside actors.137 As noted, local and regional sentiments inhibited the
ability of the state to develop a pervasive ideology to control the masses. However, when
the state began its contractual relationship with the mafia in the late 1800s, dominance
turned into hegemonic control over the masses, as Cosa Nostra over the following
decades would come to enforce its authority to the degree that it came to control and
dominate Sicily’s economy, politics, and society.
During the early years of the state-mafia partnership, some disapproving state
authorities voiced their hope that mafia collaboration would be “on a short-term basis,”
carried out only until the Italian state could “take the violence out of Sicilian society”
itself.138 The nature of this hegemonic relationship would only strengthen over time,
however, with mafiosi gaining commanding political positions within the government
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and extracting impunity from the state in exchange for its services rendered in Sicily.139
As a result of state support, therefore, by 1890 mafiosi had solidified “powerful political
connections and an international reach.”140 As Cosa Nostra proved incredibly efficient
and adept at providing protection and enforcing order—more effective than the nascent
state was able to be in this region—the state had little reason to reevaluate this
relationship. The Italian state’s reliance on mafiosi, therefore, and failure to delegitimize
these actors early on ensured the beginnings of a long-term, symbiotic relationship that
would continue well beyond the period of unification.
The Italian state had a second opportunity following World War II to engage in
state-building in Sicily, but failed at solidifying its authority and delegitimizing Cosa
Nostra as a provider of protection and security just as it had in the years after unification.
Similarly to unification, the turmoil and instability of the time encouraged the state to
again recognize, legitimize, and depend on a plurality of actors in the form of Cosa
Nostra to help control the region. It was precisely the political, social, and economic
shakeup of the postwar years that offered the state a prime opportunity to extend its
legitimacy—an opportunity that instead was capitalized on by the mafia.141 As Catanzaro
aptly concludes, “instability has always been the essential dynamic of Mafia power.”142
The instability ushered in through WWII came about as a result of Allied
involvement in the region and the political shakeup the war produced. Allied attacks on
Sicily greatly dismantled infrastructure and forced the relocation of thousands of Sicilians
who were targeted as Axis allies, despite the unacknowledged fact that most Sicilians
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favored the Allied effort.143 In addition, because WWII brought the overthrow—and
subsequent death—of Mussolini, Sicily’s political structure and state leadership was
dismantled during this time, as well. During occupation at the conclusion of the war,
Allies organized through the Allied Military Government of Occupied Territory
(AMGOT) sought to rebuild Sicily and Italy as a whole, engaging in state-building efforts
to establish a new political order in the wake of fascism.144 The challenge was too great
and the needs too immediate, however, for the Italian state who historically had never
been powerful in the region. Cosa Nostra again aptly recognized the weakness of the
political system during this time, and was able to capitalize on state ineffectuality during
rebuilding by providing security and protection to citizens that the state could not.
The mafia’s resilience was greatly enhanced by AMGOT, which encouraged an
intimate relationship between the mafia and state through recognizing Cosa Nostra’s
unique ability to offer services to a population under threat of noncompliance.145 The
Allies effectively undid what little antimafia progress had been made under Mussolini,
who inconsistently advanced a hardened stance against the mafia as evident by the
hundreds of mafiosi arrests he ordered during his reign. Mussolini’s antimafia stance
sprang from his resentment of mafiosi as non-state actors operating in state roles, who
compromised the state’s efforts to become a totalitarian and all-pervasive power.146 In the
wake of the war, however, this commitment fell by the wayside as rebuilding and
restructuring took priority, and Cosa Nostra offered its services in order to bring stability
to the chaotic region. Thus, while Calhoun suggests that the role of a state is to “pacify
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life within its territory,” this responsibility and authority was granted to non-state actors
in the form of mafiosi in the wake of WWII.147 Delegating state responsibilities to Cosa
Nostra was considered favorable because it meant a lesser role for Allied troops whose
time commitment to the region was never expected to be anything more than temporary,
until local authorities (or competing actors) could take control of affairs for themselves.
In addition, the vast destruction of Sicilian cities resulting from Allied bombing
created the need for construction and economic revitalization—a need that the mafia
rushed in to fill, and indeed was encouraged to fill through the ease in which mafia
interests attained state-issued business contracts during this time.148 “The Sack of
Palermo” of the 1950s-80s refers to the mafia’s total control of construction in the
postwar period—a period of corrupt contracts and political favors that enveloped Palermo
in concrete and illegality.149
While Tilly notes that it is common during stages of state-building for a plurality
of actors to operate in state functions, unfortunately this continued to be the reality in
Sicily as the Italian state never consolidated a monopoly of violence in the postwar years
or at any other time in Sicily’s history.150 During unification and again in the post-WWII
years, the Italian state failed to differentiate itself as the sole legitimate possessor of a
monopoly of violence by failing to delegitimize Cosa Nostra’s claims to violence in the
region, setting the stage for a long history of state dependence and acquiescence to the
mafia.
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ESTABLISHING THE PRAGMATISM OF STATE-MAFIA RELATIONS:
The reasons why the Italian state found it prudent to delegate responsibility and
state functions to Cosa Nostra in the periods of unification and WWII stem from the
many similarities between the criminal organization and the state. Because Cosa Nostra
and the Italian state both seek to provide similar services, simply through dissimilar
means, it is logical that the state has historically relied on the mafia as a result of the
mafia’s proven ability to carry out imperative functions. This is the theory of instrumental
rationalism, where organized crime succeeds because it “provides what the state is unable
to provide—jobs, protection, goods and services.”151
On a basic note, the principle motive driving the actions of both states and
organized crime is the same. Both entities work towards the pursuit of power and profit,
which often manifests in a desire to establish control over the economy and lucrative
industries.152 This shared motivator also leads to another similarity, where both states and
organized crime seek to enforce order and control violence. In order to quell disorder and
enforce legality, the state utilizes mediums such as the army and police to patrol any
deviation from law and order. 153 Therefore, the state is seen as enforcing an impersonal
rule of law that seeks to protect all civilians universally and equally. The state ideally
ensures, therefore, that “everyone is equal before the law, or that the state should serve
the interests of all its citizens rather than the friends and family of whoever happens to
wield power.”154 Consequently, states bear the burden of proving their impersonality in
order to attain legitimacy in the eyes of their citizens.
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In contrast, Cosa Nostra relies on intimidation and violence as tools for
pacification, lacking the legitimate mediums that the state possesses to carry out these
functions.155 Therefore, unlike the state, organized crime enforces rule of law personally
on the basis of who supports and submits to the organization’s authority. Cosa Nostra
does not need to offer its services universally or in an unbiased manner because the
organization does not depend on mandates or grants of legitimacy from citizens to
support its right to rule. Rather, the mafia relies on coercion and violence to extract
compliance, enacting harsh forms of retribution if necessary as a result of its ability to
disregard civilian approval. While both states and organized crime groups are driven by
the desire to control a territory, therefore, these entities do so through different means.
Both state and mafia also attempt to establish protection rackets over the
population, providing and selling security to the masses. The definition of a racketeer is
“someone who creates a threat then charges for its reduction.”156 Based on this
understanding, it is clear to surmise how both state and mafia can be considered
protection racketeers; as Tilly suggests, the state sells protection on the basis of real
threats from external actors, for instance, but can also create threats in order to solidify its
role and authority as a security provider, such as creating the perceived threat of war.157
Cosa Nostra also engages in racketeering through creating fear about social conditions—
such as banditry in the 1860s—and subsequently coercing civilians into paying protection
tributes out of threat of force.158 Therefore, state and mafia both attempt to possess a
protection racket over Sicilians, but the state does so by taxation through legal and
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legitimate mediums to support the army and defense, whereas the mafia does so in the
form of pizzo extracted through fear and violence if necessary.159 Thus, because both the
mafia and state perform essentially the same functions and have the same aims, according
to instrumental rationalism it is logical that the state would delegate its functions to the
mafia if Cosa Nostra proved more adept and effectual at providing protection, enforcing
order, and controlling violence in a territory.
EVOLUTION OF STATE-MAFIA RELATIONS:
Once a state becomes reliant on organized crime in order to carry out certain
functions and enforce its authority and legitimacy, it is incredibly difficult to break this
relationship of dependence and mutual benefit.160 Peter Lupsha describes three
evolutionary phases that explain how organized crime groups can come to possess
intimate relations with a state. The more phases state-organized crime partnerships
proceed through, the more entrenched mutual reliance becomes, and the harder these ties
of dependence are to sever. The “predatory stage” marks the first phase, in which a
criminal group establishes itself within a territory and creates its own practices and
methods for gaining control, such as how Cosa Nostra offered protection from banditry
and thievery in the 1860s for a fee.161 Once organized crime establishes its presence in a
market, the “parasitical” phase follows, when organized crime begins to pervade “legal
businesses and local and regional politics.”162 Cosa Nostra entered into this phase when it
began to dominate legitimate industries such as sulfur and citrus, and started “acting as an
159
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instrument of local government” as early as 1876 through attaining placement within
political institutions and governing bodies in Sicily.163 Political appointments became an
early practice of rewarding the mafia’s support of state functions on the island. Finally,
after establishing this level of prominence and infiltration, organized crime then moves to
the third phase, entering into a “symbiotic” relationship with the state, where organized
crime becomes “fully integrated into the political and economic structure of a region.”164
This is the phase that represents state-mafia relations today, and has reflected the state of
relations between these two powers since the years following WWII. From the postwar
years through the contemporary period, the mafia has become fully emerged in Sicily’s
politics and economy through legal grants of impunity, political alliances with powerful
politicians, and relations with authorities in charge of controlling business contracts and
licenses.165
Because Cosa Nostra and the state have existed in this “symbiotic phase” for
decades, therefore, the mafia is in a position of formidable influence where it is able to
place demands upon and extract support from the state relatively easily as a result of the
mutual dependence between these two entities. Shelley refers to states that enter into
“symbiotic relationships” with organized crime groups as “criminalized states,” which
have the effect of encouraging criminal groups through their favorable treatment and
policies.166 Even in circumstances where the citizenry becomes committed to dismantling
and eradicating these intimate ties to crime, it is difficult for a state to withdraw from this
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relationship.167 This is because mutual extractions are relied upon by both entities to the
extent that dependence becomes entrenched through daily transactions. The fact that there
exists a symbiotic relationship between Cosa Nostra and the Italian state is reflective of
the challenge the antimafia movement faces in bringing an end to this deeply historical
alliance.
ESTABLISHING STATE-MAFIA RELATIONS AS A HEGEMONIC BLOC:
The Italian state and Cosa Nostra entered into a hegemonic partnership in the
years following unification, creating a hegemonic bloc that would work to perpetuate the
strength of the state-mafia system and the ability of Cosa Nostra to act as a fundamental
pillar of state authority without receiving challenge. These two powers worked in
congruence with one another until total dominance over the economy, politics, and
culture of Sicily was achieved. By 1890, a controversial report by policeman Ermanno
Sangiorgi attested to the hegemonic power of the mafia, illustrating the “brutality and
labyrinthine complexity of mafia influence at every level of Sicilian society.168
According to Gramsci, a hegemonic bloc must meet two criteria: 1) the bloc must
manifest in total physical and ideological domination over the masses to the extent that its
power infiltrates all levels of society and discourages any challenge to the hegemonic
system, and 2) external “hegemonic apparatuses” within society continually must work to
reproduce and maintain this system. It will be demonstrated that the state-mafia system
attends to both these ends, and thus constitutes a hegemonic bloc that has controlled the
masses in Sicily since the 1860s.
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The state-mafia system fulfills Gramsci’s condition of total physical and
ideological domination over the masses, and therefore can be conceptualized as
representing a hegemonic bloc. Physical support of the state-mafia system manifests in
the form of the mandatory pizzo tribute, which suggests that to do business in Sicily, one
must respect and go through the state-mafia system.169 Through the pizzo, the mafia has
found a method of indirectly controlling businesses that it does not own. The physical
domination over the masses by Cosa Nostra is also evident in the direct ownership the
mafia possesses over many industries and markets in Sicily. This control over restaurants,
drug trafficking, garbage disposal, and agricultural production, for instance, reinforces
the idea that Sicilians have no other choice but to participate in the hegemonic system.
When support is not granted, the mafia has historically responded with a host of
strategies to extract consent. In the absence of spontaneous consent, threats of violence
are utilized; if threats prove insufficient, the mafia polices any deviation from the statemafia bloc through a variety of demonstrations of physical violence, including but not
limited to: “poisoning guard dogs, burning cars, vandalizing citrus fruit trees…sending
threatening letters with skulls drawn on them, placing bombs in offices, damaging
machinery on building sites, and a great deal of hanging around.”170 Non-consent is
therefore constantly curbed so as to discourage and limit any deviation from granting
physical support to the state-mafia system.
The state-mafia system also produces ideological domination over the masses,
further indicative of the fact that this relationship manifests in a hegemonic bloc that
reigns over Sicilians. The hegemonic bloc advances the ideology that Cosa Nostra exists
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neither as an oppressive criminal organization on the island nor as an essential
collaborator upon which the state depends. Cosa Nostra supplements weak and
ineffectual state authority on the island, therefore, by creating a culture of fear and apathy
in order to discourage denouncement of the illegal tactics the mafia uses in order to
provide security, enforce order, and control violence in Sicily. Threats of and actual
demonstrations of violence are again imperative in maintaining ideological domination
over the masses. Through this coercion, the mafia limits the desirability of civilian
denouncement against pervasive illegality and criminality that Cosa Nostra embodies. As
Saviano describes, the general thinking under the hegemonic system discourages
deviation: “Among the many reasons for keeping quiet, for pretending nothing happened,
for going home and living as before, are the fear of intimidation and, even more,
futility—one killer arrested was just one out of many.”171 As a result, acquiescence to
power structures in place since the 1860s is strongly, and forcibly, encouraged.
Through physical and ideological domination over Sicilians, the state-mafia bloc
limits the expression of any alternatives outside the hegemonic system. Cosa Nostra,
through violence if necessary, ensures that Sicilians believe that playing by the rules of
the system is the only way to live and work. The benefits derived from the hegemonic
system, including protection and the guarantee of safety against mafia violence,
encourages Sicilians to make sense of their realities by participating in and furthering the
system through their everyday actions. This is why total domination over the masses is
imperative to the state-mafia bloc: the stability of this symbiotic relationship depends
upon keeping the masses ignorant about the extent of state-mafia relations so they do not
realize that this system ultimately only serves the two hegemons, while effectively
171
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oppressing society as a whole by limiting how they conduct their lives and conceive of
the realities in which they function. Consequently, this hegemonic bloc ensures that
Sicilians’ “perception of themselves as oppressed is impaired by their submersion in the
reality of the oppression…they have no consciousness of themselves as persons or as
members of an oppressed class.”172 Cosa Nostra and the state represent a hegemonic bloc
in Sicily as a result of the physical and ideological domination it imposes over Sicilians,
and the all-encompassing system it develops where individuals do not perceive another
alternative to the hegemonic system and therefore contribute to its perpetuation believing
it to be a normal state of affairs.
HEGEMONIC APPARATUSES AT WORK IN SICILY:
True to the nature of a hegemonic bloc, the state-mafia system relies upon
“hegemonic apparatuses” within society that work to maintain and entrench hegemonic
ideology within the Sicilian mentality. As Gramsci theorized in 1930s Italy, the Catholic
Church, civil society, institutions like political parties, and traditional intellectuals all
participated in solidifying the hegemonic system in Sicily. Through examination, it is
evident that the same apparatuses work in Sicily to perpetuate the hegemonic bloc and
solidify the state-mafia system.
Historically, the Catholic Church largely has acted as a hegemonic apparatus in
Sicily, furthering the hegemonic ideology of the state-mafia system that denied the
existence of the mafia and its involvement with the Italian state. While the Church
arguably has taken steps to renege on this acquiescence and support in recent years,173
and it would be inaccurate to conclude the Church as a whole has historically supported
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the mafia,174 it is indisputable that many elements of the Church have possessed a
convoluted relationship with Cosa Nostra for much of Sicily’s history. Indeed, Pope John
Paul II was the first pope to state the word “mafia” in a public address, and this did not
occur until 1981—despite the fact that Cosa Nostra was a dominant organization on the
island since the late 1800s.175 This reference, therefore, can be viewed as rather
anomalous in an otherwise complex history of the Church’s relationship with Cosa
Nostra, where most church affiliates remained silent about the mafia issue for decades.
The reason for this silence can be attributed to the fact that at various times in
Sicily’s history, and particularly in the 1950s, the Church benefitted from state-mafia
hegemony because the mafia proved adept at delivering electoral support to the Church’s
favored political party—the Christian Democratic Party. The Church supported this party
because it was considered to be the only viable party against socialism.176 The fact that
the Church and mafia had “common ideological ground in their hatred of socialism,”
therefore, provided fertile ground for the development of a relationship of mutual
benefit.177
Because most Sicilians are practicing Catholics and consider the Church to be a
moral authority on the island, frequent denials of the existence of Cosa Nostra radiating
from prominent Church officials helped keep Sicilians in the dark about the nature of
state-mafia relations for many decades—a lack of awareness that effectively stifled any
attempts to challenge this relationship.178 In the 1960s, Ernesto Cardinal Ruffini—at the
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time the preeminent official of the Church in Sicily—contributed to solidifying the
hegemonic bloc by suggesting to his followers that “the mafia exists only in the minds of
those who wish Sicily ill.”179
Examining the intertwining of religious and political hegemonic apparatuses
within Sicily sheds light on the role the Christian Democratic Party (DC) as a powerful
political organization in Italy also played in supporting the hegemonic bloc prior to the
1980s. At the same time Ruffini was publicly advancing the hegemonic mentality that
denied the existence of the mafia, Ruffini held an intimate relationship with Salvo
Lima—a DC politician with indisputable mafia connections in the 1950s. Indeed, Cosa
Nostra considered Lima to be such a strong ally that mafiosi ordered his murder in the
wake of the Maxi Trial after he failed to protect the organization from judicial
prosecution.180 Refusals to acknowledge Cosa Nostra as a formidable problem requiring
attention were a “great help to the illegal organization known as the mafia when people
thought it did not exist,” as this allowed the hegemonic bloc to continue to solidify
without challenge or protest.181 Denials of the existence of the mafia as “no more than a
suspicion, a theory, a point of view,” were highly characteristic of the Sicilian mentality
up until the 1980s-90s as a result of the work of hegemonic apparatuses like the Church
and the DC.182 Therefore, despite recent mafia denouncements, the Catholic Church as a
result of its relationship with the Christian Democratic Party historically has acted as a
“hegemonic apparatus” helping to solidify the mafia-state system in Sicily.
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The state-mafia hegemonic bloc has also received support from the diligent work
of “traditional intellectuals” working in a variety of capacities in Sicily. Traditional
intellectuals exist in a variety of capacities and occupations—a further testament to the
strength of the hegemonic bloc that receives strength from multifaceted mediums in
society. Local and national politicians who denied the existence of while simultaneously
allying with and benefiting from Cosa Nostra are one such example. The mayor of
Palermo—the Sicilian city most pervaded by the mafia—perpetuated hegemonic
ideology in the late 1960s by claiming that the early Antimafia Commission was
unnecessary and had overstated “the mafia phenomenon which was, he claimed,
‘nonexistent.’”183 The questionable stance of many politicians was further elucidated
when those who would refuse to acknowledge Cosa Nostra as an oppressive force in
Sicily could be found participating in funeral marches for mafia members while
maintaining their reasoning for doing such was grounded in the fact that said mafiosi was
“just a friend,” and not a fundamental political ally.184 Mafiosi, as well, have been a more
obvious form of traditional intellectuals, who work to further perpetuate the system by
upholding the code of omertá—helping to keep Sicilians largely in the dark about the
oppressive effects of and the extent of state-mafia relations through their silence and
conspicuousness.
Schoolteachers historically perpetuated the hegemonic bloc and a “culture of
silence”185 in Sicily, as well, preventing education from becoming a medium for
challenging the creation of acquiescent masses by refusing to teach about Cosa Nostra in
the classrooms. The agendas of these educators were dictated by the Italian state’s
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Ministry of Education, which worked hard to keep mafia topics out of the classrooms
until the 1980s.186 Indeed, before changing mentalities of the mid-1980s demanded
educational reforms, the mafia was left out of history textbooks, and was not a subject
breached by educators out of an understandable fear of foreseeable repercussions.187
In addition, many media reporters can also be viewed as traditional intellectuals
who contributed to the hegemonic bloc by selectively publishing news pieces in
deference to Cosa Nostra. The Giornale di Sicilia, for instance, was historically
manipulated by mafiosi interests who attempted to dictate its agenda, publishing stories
of the questionable credibility of pentiti as well as tainting the image of several prominent
antimafia activists—actions that suggested to many that Giornale di Sicilia was “the
newspaper of the mafia.”188 While several media sources deserve credit for deviating
from this trend, such as La Repubblica, the mafia worked diligently to patrol sentiment
not supportive of hegemony, firing or even killing those who sought to use the press as a
medium for expression and challenge against the state-mafia bloc.189 It is worth noting
that even today, with Prime Minister Berlusconi in control of many media networks in
Italy, it is hard for Sicilians to come across the truth through these outlets and learn of the
current nature of mafia power and antimafia efforts.
Traditional intellectuals, no matter their positioning in society, help to create a
culture that discourages an informed citizenry and promotes acquiescence to the
hegemonic system by limiting the ability of alternative systems to be conceived. By
aiding the mafia’s desire to “peddle falsehoods for a century and a half” about its true
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nature and relationship with the state, traditional intellectuals in conjunction with other
hegemonic apparatuses in society have thereby helped entrench the state-mafia system
deeply within Sicilian society and culture.190 Therefore, by patrolling any deviation from
hegemonic ideology, hegemony has become embedded within daily practices to the
extent that such ideals and practices became self-producing and natural. The fear of force
and violence against deviation effectively curbed any expression that went against the
state-mafia hegemonic bloc until the 1980s.
Gramsci suggests that another variable indicative of the strength of a hegemonic
bloc is the extent to which a hegemonic system results in the existence of “double
consciousnesses” within the minds of the masses. The pervasiveness of the state-mafia
hegemonic system is reflected in the “double-consciousnesses” present among many
citizens during the height of the mafia’s symbiotic relationship with the Italian state. The
diligent work of non-state actors to reinforce and constantly reproduce hegemony led to
the inability of the masses to see how their actions and apathy were furthering hegemony,
domination, and the lack of control Sicilians possessed over their own lives. By
examining cultural manifestations of hegemonic domination present in the 1980s, the
strength of the state-mafia bloc will be made clear. These examples will also highlight the
imperativeness of a counter-hegemonic movement that would work to deconstruct the
detrimental effects the state-mafia system produced in Sicilian society.
The cultural manifestations of hegemonic domination were evident particularly in
the violence and chaos of the 1980s, when “as many as 1,000 people were murdered,”
often very publicly in the streets of Sicily in broad daylight, and few eyewitnesses would
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come forward to denounce the mafiosi perpetrators.191 In addition, this domination is
reflected by the fact that nearly 80% of businesses in Sicily paid the pizzo tribute to the
mafia until antimafia efforts in the late 1990s began to discourage this form of mafia
submission.192 The state-mafia hegemonic system ensured that business owners “have
had to accept the oppressive presence of mafioso business partners,” with Cosa Nostra’s
success at extortion becoming “so widespread that no town or village is spared.”193 Many
Sicilian business owners thereby demonstrated their symbolic support of the mafia, either
because they believed it to be natural and conceived of no other alternative in order to
ensure the protection of their business and interests, or did so out of legitimate fear of
mafia repercussions.
Furthermore, domination by the mafia over the minds of Sicilians became
apparent when Falcone and Borsellino initially had limited success in incensing and
mobilizing ordinary Sicilians to participate in the antimafia cause through denouncing
known mafiosi and pervasive criminality. The “double consciousnesses” within many
Sicilians in the 1980s that the hegemonic system had fostered were apparent in the fact
that many verbally claimed to be opposed to Cosa Nostra, but would not participate in
the antimafia fight in any tangible way. This conflict between actions in “theory and
practice” directly perpetuated hegemony.
Gramsci suggests that a hegemonic bloc exists to the extent that the bloc is able to
“enforce invisible, intangible, and subtle forms of power, through educational, cultural,
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and religious systems and institutions.”194 The state-mafia system constitutes a
hegemonic bloc, therefore, because state-mafia relations have historically manifested in
the form of the bloc’s control and influence over society, creating norms and acceptable
behaviors that discourage deviation from the system, over politics by working to enforce
the mentality that state-mafia alliances are a natural occurrence, and over economic
production by extracting monetary submission from businesses and by dominating many
legal and illegal markets and industries alike. This total physical and ideological
domination that pervades all aspects of life, therefore, which is continually reinforced by
“hegemonic apparatuses” in Sicily reflects the existence of the hegemonic bloc created by
the symbiotic relationship between the state and Cosa Nostra.
While there are many similarities between the aims and function of Cosa Nostra
and the Italian state that has allowed for the development of a symbiotic relationship
between these two hegemons, it is important to note that these same similarities are also
responsible for creating a tenuous relationship culminating in potential “endogenous
fissures” that can compromise the stability of the hegemonic bloc.195 Because Cosa
Nostra is more effective at performing functions normally reserved to the state, Cosa
Nostra jeopardizes the authority and legitimacy of the state in the eyes of the masses.196
The historical dependence of the state on the mafia, therefore, can create a fissure in the
sense that it prompts the masses to lose confidence in the ability of the state, setting the
stage for the state to perhaps question this symbiotic relationship if it begins losing
vestiges of its power and legitimacy that the mafia was supposed to reinforce.
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Cosa Nostra has proven particularly adept at addressing societal problems like
unemployment and poverty that the Italian state historically has inefficiently mitigated.
Because the mafia has been able to guarantee basic necessities to Sicilians, this paints a
picture of state ineffectuality, where citizens turn to the mafia at the expense of the state,
believing the mafia to be “more efficient and even ‘fairer’ than the state.”197 As
Borsellino explained, “if the mafia pays, you, finds and keeps you in work, helps you win
contracts, get promotion or run your business, then you won’t reject it” because the mafia
ensures things the state cannot.198 Moreover, because the mafia unabashedly has
historically demonstrated its power through violence, the masses came to fear and thus
respect Cosa Nostra, as they began to realize that real and retributive power in Sicily
stemmed from the mafia and not the state. Consequently, Sicilians historically have been
more likely to turn to the mafia for their needs out of fear and based on the recognition
that mafiosi have a greater ability than a weak state to coerce individuals into compliance
and enact punishment for defiance.199 Cosa Nostra therefore represents a medium that
bypasses state authority and institutions, where mafiosi exist as “powerful alternate
authorities which are giving a social basis to political order and disorder” in Sicily.200
Thus, while similarities between the mafia and state represented the reason the
Italian state found it prudent to delegate its functions to Cosa Nostra in the first place,
these similarities also create a potentially fragile relationship between these two
hegemons, particularly because the mafia detracts legitimacy from and encourages
circumvention of legal state institutions that exist to bolster state authority. As a result,
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citizens have preferred to go through Cosa Nostra to obtain what they need, and instead
do not trust in the power of the police or court systems for instance to mitigate their
problems. These are among the many repercussions of ineffective state-building postunification in Sicily; while this symbiotic relationship was initially enacted to help
solidify authority and order on the island, the mafia’s efficacy over the years has
weakened the state in the eyes of Sicilians, thereby compromising the state’s influence
and legitimacy as a service provider and possessor of a legitimate monopoly of violence
to act in the interest of the public good. Tensions between the state and mafia will be
further explicated in Chapter Three. What is imperative to note, however, is that despite
the tenuous nature of state-mafia relations, these interlinked hegemons depend on each
other in a substantial way, helping to continually reinforce the hegemonic system and
rendering any challenging to this deeply-rooted bloc very difficult.
Chapter Three follows, which attempts to fully delineate the history of the
antimafia movement. Now that the symbiotic relationship between Cosa Nostra and the
Italian state has been established as a hegemonic bloc reinforced by various apparatuses
within Sicilian society, Gramscian theory can be utilized in order to understand what
must be done to challenge this system of affairs on the island, and why the early 1980s
presented an opportunity for a challenge of the state-mafia hegemonic bloc. In order to
dismantle a hegemonic bloc, Gramsci states that a counter-hegemonic movement is
needed. Chapter Three, therefore traces the early history of the antimafia movement to
show its counter-hegemonic nature. During the 1980s-early 1990s in the midst of a mafia
war, new intellectuals arose within Sicily that began attending to the first phase of
counter-hegemony: dismantling hegemonic ideology by calling attention to state-mafia
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relations and how Sicilians were oppressed by the hegemonic bloc that manifested in
physical and ideological dominance over the island. This chapter will show how the
movement in its nascent form targeted the state to initiate reforms that would end its
accommodative practices towards Cosa Nostra. Gramscian theory will help to offer an
understanding of why simply targeting the state was not enough to dismantle hegemony,
however, as various hegemonic apparatuses within society contributed to the perpetuation
of the state-mafia system. Therefore, Chapter Three will highlight the antimafia strides
made during the 1980s-early 1990s, but also will show why political reforms were
insufficient at delivering Sicily from Cosa Nostra, and why the movement realized the
need to work at the societal level in the mid-1990s.

Diefendorf 65
CHAPTER 3: The History of the Antimafia Movement
As Chapter 2 established, the Italian state historically delegated imperative state
functions to Cosa Nostra, a criminal organization that helped bolster state authority in
Sicily by controlling violence and enforcing order. During the early years following
unification, this nascent partnership went unchallenged by Sicilians, as the amount of
chaos and disorder in the region made it difficult to see clearly the oppressive power
structures developing. Moreover, the fact that Cosa Nostra offered vital services during
this time made its presence harder to question and discourage; protecting Sicilians against
widespread banditry and thievery as well as distributing land brought order and safety to
many who could not guarantee such things for themselves in a region dominated by
instability. Thus, denial, acquiescence, and passive support throughout Sicilian society
manifested in approval of early state-mafia relations.
When acquiescence was not “spontaneously” granted through consent to this
structure of rule, the mafia obtained compliance through violence and force. Sicilians
learned early on, therefore, that resistance was futile and acquiescence to status quo
power structures was a mechanism of survival. Moreover, acquiescence was reinforced
through the benefits granted to those who consented to state-mafia hegemony. When
hegemonic apparatuses such as the Catholic Church, political parties, and traditional
intellectuals began reinforcing the state-mafia system, challenges to hegemony became
even more infeasible. This culminated in the solidification of a pervasive physical and
ideological domination over the masses in Sicily, allowing the Italian state and Cosa
Nostra to solidify a mutually-dependent relationship that served their respective needs for
power and authority.
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If Sicilians began protesting against this state of affairs, and recognized Cosa
Nostra for what it really was—an oppressive and criminal organization—the hegemonic
bloc would crumble, and the Italian state would lose any semblances of authority and
legitimacy it was able to derive as a result of its partnership with the mafia in this region.
Therefore, the stability of the hegemonic bloc depended on Sicilians’ ignorance of the
state-mafia system so they would not recognize their ability to challenge this hegemony.
As Gramsci states, civil society represents a medium that can either reinforce or
challenge hegemony. However, as the state-mafia system succeeded in ensuring Sicilians
did not realize how their actions perpetuated hegemony, this prevented the understanding
of how relinquishing this approval would deal a divisive blow to state-mafia relations.
Thus, the ideology the state, mafia, and hegemonic apparatuses worked to spread during
from the 1860s onward was a denial of the existence of Cosa Nostra as the pillar of state
legitimacy and efficacy in Sicily. This ideology became so entrenched in the Sicilian
mentality that any challenges to the system were effectively stifled before attracting any
widespread support. Because Sicilians could not challenge a system that hegemonic
forces ensured they did not become aware of, state-mafia hegemony became an everyday
part of life. The Italian state and Cosa Nostra, with the help of hegemonic apparatuses,
worked diligently to maintain this symbiotic relationship for over a century.
As Gramsci suggests, in order to dismantle a hegemonic bloc, civil society must
recognize its counter-hegemonic potential, producing a widespread movement that
attends to two essential tasks. Counter-hegemonic movements must 1) dismantle
hegemonic ideology by capitalizing upon existing, while also creating their own, fissures
within the hegemonic bloc, and then the movement can 2) offer a new, counter-
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hegemonic ideology to the masses that provides a new way of conceptualizing their
realities and delivers them agency in a new realm outside the hegemonic system. I will
propose that in the 1980s-early 1990s, the antimafia movement was able to attend to the
first step of counter-hegemony, creating new and organic intellectuals that dismantled
hegemonic ideology to which Sicilians long acquiesced. The way in which to do this was
through legislative and political reforms that would force the Italian state to end its
accommodative history with Cosa Nostra, while also providing for a penal framework
from which to fight the mafia.
This chapter, therefore, will focus on the unique conditions in 1980s Sicily in
order to understand what factors jeopardized tenuous fissures in the state-mafia
hegemonic bloc—allowing civil society to begin working to finally dismantle a
hegemonic system that had reigned dominant in Sicily for nearly 120 years. This chapter
will describe how “new intellectuals” capitalized on state-mafia fissures in order to create
an opportunity for Sicilian civil society to recognize its ability to “reclaim political
society” by challenging instead of reproducing state-mafia hegemony.
Antimafia efforts and ensuing state and mafia responses will be broken down into
two different time periods, describing activism from the 1980s-early 1990s compared to
efforts after 1992. It is important to differentiate between these two different periods
because the nature of the movement changed fundamentally following the deaths of
magistrates Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino in 1992. It will be demonstrated that
during the 1980s-early 1990s, the antimafia fight was largely magistrate-driven with
limited civilian involvement, composed of efforts that were state-centric and politically
motivated. The importance of the year 1992 will be stressed, as this was the formative
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year in which the widespread, civilian-dominated antimafia movement was finally born.
Political reforms were still the primary goal of the movement during this time, until the
mid-1990s when it became clear that Cosa Nostra represented much more than a political
problem.
Political work targeting the state from the 1980s-mid 1990s was an imperative
first step of counter-hegemony before the second phase of counter-hegemony—working
amongst society through cultural work to offer a new, counter-hegemonic ideology to the
masses—could be carried out. This second step came about only after political reforms
proved insufficient in fully uprooting hegemony; in the mid-1990s, the state had initiated
important political reforms and had developed a full penal legislation capable of attacking
Cosa Nostra’s perceived impunity, yet the mafia still reigned dominant over the island.
This suggested that Cosa Nostra represented much more than solely a political problem.
Therefore, the antimafia movement beginning in the mid-1990s recognized the need for
cultural work amongst society to create a new counter-hegemonic mentality.201
Gramscian theory offers an understanding of the prudence of changing focus from state
to society, as it is not enough to target a hegemonic state when apparatuses throughout
society work diligently to ensure the daily reproduction of the hegemonic system. The
second phase of the counter-hegemonic movement that materialized in the mid-1990s—
working culturally to advance a new counter-hegemonic mentality among Sicilians—will
be the focus of Chapter 4.
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STATE-MAFIA RELATIONS IN THE 1970s-80s:
As described in Chapter Two, the reason the Italian state found it prudent to enter
into a partnership with Cosa Nostra in the 1860s was a result of the similarities in aims
and purposes between these two hegemons. Simply put, the mafia was capable at
performing the same functions that the state was inefficient at carrying out in Sicily.
These similarities, however, also had the potential to create natural fissures within the
hegemonic bloc. The state and mafia continued their symbiotic relationship for decades
without disruption, relying on one another for things that they could not guarantee
themselves. State-mafia relations resembled something of a balancing act, consequently,
where both hegemons remained content to the extent that they possessed a certain amount
of power and authority derived from the partnership. This tenuous relationship began to
change, however, from the 1960s-80s when Cosa Nostra began to acquire unprecedented
wealth and jeopardized the balance of power between the state and mafia by failing to
uphold its end of the hegemonic bargain.
By nature of this relationship, where power is shared between Cosa Nostra and
the state, and each depends upon the other for specific functions, it is evident that the
hegemonic bloc is far from a stable entity.202 Moreover, the methods for state and mafia
power, including “extortion, threatening, and protection will always produce turbulence”
because these are lucrative realms in which at any given time a plurality of actors seek to
dominate.203 Natural fissures within the hegemonic bloc thus result from the tenuous hold
that the state and mafia possess over these instruments of power that they both seek to
dominate, merely in different ways. It is a relationship that has persisted for over a
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century, to be sure, but not without contestation and renegotiation in order to stabilize the
bloc and limit the spread of cracks within it over time.
During several periods in Sicily’s modern history, the state and mafia have had to
renegotiate the terms of their relationship in order to maintain the hegemonic bloc. For
instance, under fascism, Mussolini began eliminating mafiosi whom he accurately
perceived to be a threat to state power.204 While it seemed for a time, therefore, that the
state fundamentally might reconsider its relationship with Cosa Nostra, in the 1950s
following WWII the relationship was solidified once more. Emerging strong and
prosperous in the wake of WWII, when mafiosi received political appointments and
virtually all construction contracts during rebuilding, Cosa Nostra was increasingly relied
on by the state which again failed to engage in effective state-building after this
tumultuous period. Moreover, the mafia acquired considerable strength during this time
from the emergence of the Christian Democratic political party that was intent on
fostering close ties with Cosa Nostra in order to maintain electoral domination in
Sicily.205 Exchanging electoral guarantees for promises of public works and construction
contracts, Cosa Nostra helped ensure the continuation of its symbiotic relationship with
the state.206 Thus, during fascism and in the postwar years following WWII, the state had
to renegotiate the terms of its symbiotic relationship with the mafia, recognizing the
mafia’s growing power and ability to dictate the direction of the hegemonic bloc upon
which they both depended, but this renegotiation never culminated in the state’s
withdrawal from its partnership with Cosa Nostra.
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Such renegotiations between state and mafia were possible during Sicily’s history
because there was not yet pressure from a counter-hegemonic source acting to put strain
on these fissures. As Johnson and Soeters succinctly surmise, each entity had an interest
in maintaining the hegemonic bloc because this “matted coexistence resulted from the
symbiotic interdependent relationship fostered between both ‘sovereignties.’” Due to the
mutually beneficial nature of this relationship, “each force would therefore only attack its
political competitor as a response to an initial attack,” not wanting to threaten an
otherwise lucrative affiliation.207 The nature of a hegemon, however, is the desire for and
attainment of total physical and ideological domination over the masses. Thus, it can be
inferred that the moment this tenuous balancing act between these two competing, yet
‘interdependent’ hegemons is thrown into question, compromising cracks will appear
within the bloc.
As a result of the Italian state’s historical reliance on Cosa Nostra, the criminal
organization began to possess inflated notions of its impunity. Especially with the state’s
dependence on the mafia for electoral support, Cosa Nostra rightly recognized itself to be
a fundamental pillar supporting the state’s authority in Sicily. As Lupsha describes, when
states and organized crime groups enter into symbiotic relations, it is easy for criminal
groups to begin placing heavier demands upon the state and extracting what it desires to
gain more power. While power contestations had been mitigated between these two
hegemons in the past, a fundamental change occurred in the 1970s that threatened the
tenuous fissures between the Italian state and Cosa Nostra. The mafia’s entrance into the
drug trafficking industry in the 1970s represented a significant event that forced the state
to begin re-evaluating its symbiotic relationship with the criminal organization.
207
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Through entering the drug market in the 1970s, Cosa Nostra families gained
unprecedented wealth as they began ushering heroin shipments from South America
through Europe and the United States.208 The mafia already controlled a number of
lucrative businesses and industries in Sicily, such as citrus and sulfur, but heroin
represented a new venture with incredible monetary benefits and global markets.209
Consequently, during the 1970s “the mafia was at the height of its power, boundlessly
rich, and so certain of its status that it acted with impunity.”210
While the drug market brought considerable monetary gains, it also brought about
violent intra-organizational power contestations that began to threaten Cosa Nostra’s
loose, hierarchical structure.211 The mafia is characterized by a number of regional
families falling within a pyramidal structure, with one family and head capo, or boss,
always reigning supreme. During the 1970s, the head family was the Corleonesi from
Corleone, who quickly earned a reputation for unprecedented brutality and
“overwhelming violence” to secure their hold on power in the face of increasing interfamilial conflict.212 While mafiosi families compose a collective entity and benefit from
one another’s successes, factions and contestations between families have been a
common characteristic of Cosa Nostra’s history. These frequent conflicts reached a
climax first in the 1960s during the “First Mafia War.”213 In the 1970s, violence
culminated in a Second Mafia War, reflective not only of the unresolved tensions from
the first war, but more importantly the strong desire among families to dominate the
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boundlessly-rich Cosa Nostra empire.214 Because the Corleonesi believed they had
benefitted unequally from drug profits, the family sought to end this inequality through
violence that would unequivocally demonstrate its ability to dominate the mafia
empire.215
Mafia wars are known for their violent and brutal tactics. As Roberto Saviano has
described, during mafia wars “the hint of kinship or physical resemblance is all it takes to
become a target…what matters is to concentrate as much pain, tragedy, and terror as
possible” against rival factions.216 The Second Mafia War was different than the first in
several notable respects, however. For one, the stakes in controlling the Cosa Nostra
organization increased the determination of competing families to emerge victorious from
the battle. Moreover, because entrance into the drug market and the mafia’s growing
riches gave Cosa Nostra inflated perceptions of its impunity in relation to the state, the
mafia in the 1980s abandoned some of its old tactics that had long been responsible for
helping to alleviate the tenuous fissures between the state and mafia.
Prior to the 1980s, Cosa Nostra had taken deliberate strides to avoid
unnecessarily implicating ordinary Sicilians in mafia conflicts. While intra-mafia
conflicts had occurred before the 1980s, civilians were rarely affected and violence was
contained within family factions. Moreover, the mafia rarely used violence against the
state in order to extract more from this symbiotic relationship, not wanting to disrupt this
lucrative relationship.217 The largely isolated nature of mafia violence allowed the state to
turn a blind eye to Cosa Nostra conflicts over the years, therefore, because this
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aggression did not jeopardize the security of Sicilians or rule of law on the island. In the
1980s, however, these tactics governing mafia violence were abandoned;218 the war
became more brutal and increasingly public, with the goal being total domination at any
cost. As violence spilled into the streets, it became apparent that the state was beginning
to lose remaining vestiges of its authority in Sicily.
The Italian state first found it prudent to enter into a contractual relationship with
Cosa Nostra because the mafia proved adept at enforcing order and offering security to
Sicilians post-unification. However, the Second Mafia War demonstrated that mafiosi
cared more about solidifying their power than fulfilling these functions upon which the
state depended. With the mafia not performing its intended role, it became clear that this
symbiotic relationship increasingly was benefitting only one hegemon. This symbiotic
relationship rapidly was transforming into a parasitic partnership, therefore, where the
mafia served to benefit from the declining power of the state.
The primary factor that most significantly threatened fissures between the state
and mafia was the fact that the state failed to protect the security and lives of ordinary
Sicilians in the 1980s amidst increasingly violent power contestations. As Chandhoke
describes, “the basic function of every state is to maintain law and order.”219 However,
because the state historically relied on the mafia for this function, the Italian state had
never developed its own ability to act in this regard. When the mafia failed to perform the
functions of maintaining order and controlling violence, Sicilians began to fall victim to
the mafia’s haphazard tactics. The state’s influence in the region declined as Cosa
Nostra’s grew, and it became clear which hegemon reigned dominant as violence erupted
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and the Italian state proved powerless to stop it. It is clear, therefore, that a deep, natural
fissure was widening between the state and mafia. Because both these hegemons desired
power and profit, when the mafia began to profit more from this relationship than the
state, the state feared the total loss of its authority in the face of Cosa Nostra’s desire for
supremacy.
The state’s fear of losing authority to its competing yet supplementary hegemon
seemed a very real possibility in the 1970s-80s. In an interview with a retired Guardia di
Finanza, or Sicilian Customs Officer, he painfully recalled this period of unchecked
illegality and disbelief in the state’s authority in Sicily. Because it was well-known
throughout the island that state power in Sicily was fallacious, he commonly would be
laughed at and even spit upon in public areas while wearing his uniform.220 This is
particularly significant because Guardia di Finanza represents the state body responsible
for regulated and patrolling drug trafficking; the disrespect this officer faced, therefore, is
reflective of general sentiments in the 1980s that acknowledged the growing power of
Cosa Nostra as a result of the heroin industry and the state’s relative ineffectuality in
doing anything to prevent this progression of events.221 During the mafia war, therefore,
more so than at any other point in Sicily’s history, many state authorities realized they
were beginning to lose completely their historical ability to dictate the terms of state
relations with Cosa Nostra.
Believing it could prevent the state from withdrawing from the symbiotic
relationship that had allowed Cosa Nostra to become so powerful in the first place, the
mafia began demonstrating its determination to wage war against anyone that threatened
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the organization’s growing power and influence. As a result, the 1980s claimed the lives
of several “eminent corpses,” as no attempt was made to contain mafia violence within
the organization.222 These murders left a bitter taste in the mouths of once apathetic
Sicilians, as the mafia’s disregard for law and order began to jeopardize the lives of
Sicilians who had no involvement or stake in Cosa Nostra.223 Moreover, beginning in the
1970s and early 1980s mafiosi showcased their disregard for the rights of Sicilians and
legality through the public murdering of political allies who broke the trend of
accommodative state policies towards Cosa Nostra. This was exemplified in the murder
of General Carlo Alberto dalla Chiesa, the Sicilian whom the Italian state hired as “high
commissioner against the mafia” in Sicily.224 His murder would be one of several
assassinations that highlighted a changing tide in Cosa Nostra that no longer respected
the Italian state’s right to direct mafia operating procedures or curb the organization’s
expression of its power.225
It was in this climate of increasingly public brutality that individuals within the
state began devoting their lives to Cosa Nostra prosecution, fighting against the impunity
the mafia believed itself to possess as a result of its long relationship with the state. It is
important to revisit Skocpol’s definition of the state, however, as she states that by nature
the state is not a monolithic entity, and is rather composed of a variety of offices and
institutions that contribute to its power.226 During the 1980s, magistrates Falcone and
Borsellino highlighted the divergent nature of the various apparatuses of the Italian state
with their decision to stand apart from other recalcitrant state actors by using their
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political positioning to wage a significant attack against Cosa Nostra. These magistrates
recognized that they “could not stand back and accept open warfare” on Sicilian territory
and turn a blind eye as the mafia made a mockery of the state on the island—the same
state whose authority these magistrates were supposed to represent and uphold.227
Falcone and Borsellino refused to remain passive as they watched the mafia
showcase its resolve to brutally “attack the symbols and representatives of the state.”228
In a sense, Cosa Nostra had “declared an open war on the state with a long spate of
assassinations” which suggested that the state would lose all credibility if its authority
was not reaffirmed quickly.229 While the state and mafia were able to frequently
renegotiate their symbiotic relationship since the 1860s, and were thus able to mitigate
pressures that threatened the fissures between the two hegemons, the true success of the
hegemonic bloc over time was the absence of any counter-hegemonic force putting
pressure on and attempting to widen this fissure. In the 1980s, with the Italian state losing
all ability to restrain Cosa Nostra, key magistrates within the state therefore began
putting pressure on these noticeable fissures in hopes of encouraging ordinary Sicilians to
take up the fight to dismantle the hegemonic system.
THE ROLE OF THE ANTIMAFIA MOVEMENT: Widening the Fissures
As Gramsci explained, natural fissures are present within a hegemonic bloc, either
created over time or as a natural development of insufficiently being able to completely
dominate a society and its institutions ideologically and physically. The role of a counterhegemonic movement is to capitalize on existing—while simultaneously creating new
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fissures that threaten the hegemonic bloc. It will be demonstrated that Falcone and
Borsellino, by capitalizing on the tenuous relations between the state and mafia, but also
by creating their own fissures threatening the stability of the state as a whole by breaking
away from the state’s trend of dependence on the mafia, launched a counter-hegemonic
attack against Cosa Nostra. This movement, by drawing attention to the vulnerability of
the state-mafia system, encouraged Sicilians to reclaim “political space” away from the
hegemonic bloc and begin attending to the first task of counter-hegemony: dismantling
hegemonic ideology that had dominated Sicilians since the late 1800s.
As state actors, Falcone and Borsellino’s decision to break from an
accommodative state is indicative of the fissures between Cosa Nostra and the state,
where not all state authorities wished to continue relations with the mafia after seeing the
dangerous implications of the mafia’s ability to compromise law and order in the 1980s.
The mafia war can be seen as not only creating fissures between the state and mafia, but
also within the Italian state itself. Falcone and Borsellino were able to capitalize on a
classic political opportunity structure created from national legal reforms in the late
1970s, which granted magistrates greater independence and authority from the state to
carry out their own investigations.230 This allowed these new intellectuals to break from
other state authorities who were “never likely to have the animus required to tackle
organized crime,” and instead launch their own attack against Cosa Nostra despite the
presence of a largely obstinate state body.231 As a former Customs Officer described, the
maneuverability of magistrates is one of the greatest attributes of the Italian Constitution.
Because the Constitution grants magistrates with their own power independent of party
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affiliation, and are thereby theoretically impartial and not influenced by external actors,
these judges have had more flexibility than other state actors to pursue a hard stance
against the mafia.232 These early leaders utilized this unique political positioning within
the state to play upon and create fissures within the state-mafia system in a way that
began mobilizing Sicilians to recognize their opportunity to dismantle the hegemonic
bloc that had long seemed impregnable.
According to Gramsci, a counter-hegemonic movement must produce “new
intellectuals” that will combat the power and efforts of traditional intellectuals working to
reproduce hegemonic ideology. While Falcone and Borsellino undoubtedly stimulated
the widespread antimafia movement of today, it is important to recognize that “new
intellectuals” within Sicily first appeared on the island decades before these magistrates
began attacking state-mafia relations. The inability of these early activists to challenge
the state-mafia system prior to the 1980s is telling of the extent to which state-mafia
hegemony had become entrenched by the mid-1900s, but also reflects the need for
counter-hegemonic initiatives if Cosa Nostra were to be successfully challenged.
ACKNOWLEDGING PRIOR EFFORTS: The Antimafia’s New Intellectuals Prior
to the 1980s
Particularly in the 1950s—when state-mafia relations illustrated by electoral
manipulation and judicial clemency became harder to conceal—authorities and civilians
displeased with this state of affairs and domination began to protest against the statemafia system. These early efforts were carried out by individual, isolated activists in a
time period that was not yet ready to turn against a trend of decades of acquiescence to
state-mafia hegemony. For example, in the 1960s a young man named Giuseppe
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“Peppino” Impastato, who lived “within one of the most mafia-saturated” towns outside
of Palermo, began using his independent radio show to protest and denounce Cosa
Nostra.233 Despite the fact that a powerful mafia boss lived merely i cento passi (a
hundred steps) away from his home, he continued his public attack against hegemonic
forces and encouraged awareness among his neighbors who had historically denied the
existence of Cosa Nostra among them. Peppino’s own father was a mafioso, and
membership in the organization was common in his familial tree; through his public
denunciations, demonstrations, and incendiary articles Peppino described the mafia to be
a “mountain of shit,” not something to be worshipped or supported.234 Through this bold
rhetoric, Peppino hoped to rally other Sicilians under similar circumstances who were
raised to either deny the existence of the mafia or to join in the system’s perpetuation.235
Because of his lack of support among local Sicilians under the trance of hegemony who
feared disrupting the state-mafia system, however, Peppino stood alone and was easily
silenced by Cosa Nostra through his brutal murder.
In addition, important antimafia events occurred at the state level in the late
1950s-60s which attested to budding antimafia sentiment in Sicily. The first Antimafia
Commission came about at this time, created in the hopes of coming to a larger
understanding of the mafia phenomenon and how to address it. The early commission
mostly represented a “study body,” however, with little clout, as it primarily aimed to
gather more information about Cosa Nostra and the unique political problems it
presented.236 It is equally important to note that several prominent authorities worked in
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Sicily prior to 1980 to address the mafia problem, such as General dalla Chiesa and Pio
La Torre, to name only a few.237 These early activists represented “solitary heroes” who
stood alone in a sea of Sicilians that failed to join behind these individuals either out of
fear or because the strength of the hegemonic state-mafia bloc had succeeded in creating
the mentality that Cosa Nostra was not a real phenomenon, let alone a problem requiring
addressing.
The early commission and the courageous efforts of these authorities prior to the
1980s were largely ineffectual due to fundamental misunderstandings about the mafia
and an insufficient penal framework from which to launch a substantial attack. This is
apparent in the fact that the Antimafia Commission in the 1960s-70s found it prudent to
forcibly relocate known mafiosi outside of Sicily, reflecting the commission’s lack of
knowledge about the larger underlying political issues that perpetuated Cosa Nostra
power during this time.238 The most substantial reason that these early antimafia efforts
failed to challenge hegemonic ideology, however, was a result of limited knowledge
about how the hegemonic system operated and achieved its strength. While these new
intellectuals attempted to begin to “publish links between mafia crimes and political
patronage,” at this time little was known of the nature and extent of state-mafia ties.239
Consequently, these new intellectuals knew not how to effectively capitalize on the
state’s fear of losing power and influence to Cosa Nostra.
In addition, in the 1950s-60s when these early antimafia efforts occurred, little
was known about the apparatuses that worked to reinforce hegemony in Sicilian society.
The strength of new intellectuals is contingent upon their ability to call attention to the
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actors working to reinforce hegemony in order to dismantle their influence over the
masses. Because knowledge of these hegemonic forces and state-mafia relations would
not become apparent until Falcone and Borsellino began working with mafia pentiti in
the early 1980s, the efforts of these early new intellectuals—while important to pay
tribute to—did not bring about the desired challenge to state-mafia relations.
Working with pentiti, magistrates Falcone and Borsellino were able to acquire an
unprecedented wealth of information about Cosa Nostra, its structure, operating
procedures, and relations with the Italian state. These committed magistrates arose as the
prominent faces of the antimafia fight from an “antimafia pool,” a group of four
magistrates headed by magistrate Antonino Caponnetto.240 These magistrates shared
information amongst one another in the hopes of creating “an organic and complete
picture of the mafia problem,” dedicated to uncovering the truth about Cosa Nostra and
the varied sources of its strength. 241
A major reason Cosa Nostra perpetuated for decades and succeeded in remaining
highly elusive was the code of omertá. This code held mafiosi to strict expectations of
secrecy, imposing brutal and harsh repercussions on members who failed to stay silent
about the organization and its tactics. Omertá—along with promises of immunity from
the state beginning in the 1950s when state-mafia political ties were strong—kept
authorities in the dark about Cosa Nostra since its origins in the 1860s and rendered
earlier efforts to repress the organization largely ineffectual.242
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By creating a witness protection program and rewards for pentiti, magistrates
encouraged mafiosi to come forward and renounce omertá.243 This cooperation with state
authorities began in the early 1980s. One pentito in particular, Tommasso Buscetta,
provided Falcone with incriminating information against mafiosi that had infiltrated
powerful political positions within Sicily, as well as prominent politicians who had
dependent relationships with Cosa Nostra.244 Therefore, pentiti like Buscetta were able to
provide new intellectuals of the 1980s with knowledge about state-mafia hegemony that
allowed Falcone and Borsellino to understand how state-mafia domination had come to
pervade all levels of society.
During the early 1980s, Falcone and Borsellino also learned through mafiosi
testimonies the nature of non-state actors that historically functioned as hegemonic
apparatuses within Sicily, such as the Christian Democratic Party and the Catholic
Church. With this knowledge, these new intellectuals were better able to target the
traditional intellectuals and members of the hegemonic bloc in order to limit the continual
reproduction of hegemonic ideology and practices. Falcone and Borsellino were effective
at beginning to capitalize on state-mafia fissures, therefore, because they came to possess
intimate knowledge of the functioning of the hegemonic bloc, and thus knew how to
direct their energies to best dismantle hegemony. As Roberto Saviano explains, pentiti
are of vital importance to the fight against the mafia, because without their testimonies,
the truth—facts, details, and mechanisms—is only discovered ten, twenty years later, as
if a man were to understand how his vital organs worked only after he is dead.”245 Before
pentiti testimonies, it was not known that the mafia represented a collective system,
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whose power and influence was reproduced daily through a variety of apparatuses within
society that acted as “organs” sustaining the state-mafia system. Pentiti thereby provided
evidence of the organs crucial in supporting the state-mafia bloc in society—the
apparatuses that would need to be tackled in order to dismantle hegemony in Sicily. A
counter-hegemonic movement was born, and with critical knowledge of the functioning
of the hegemonic bloc, Falcone and Borsellino worked to ensure that state-mafia fissures
would not be able to be smoothed over as they had for nearly 120 years.
THE EARLY NATURE OF THE ANTIMAFIA FIGHT: 1980s-Early 1990s Sicily
From pentiti testimonies, Falcone and Borsellino came to conceptualize Cosa
Nostra as a fundamentally political problem, believing that the mafia was “only
interested in its own power, and is affected only when the sole other real power that can
threaten it, the state, takes action.”246 After learning intimate and previously unknown
details of state-mafia ties, these magistrates held the Italian state responsible for the
unchecked power of Cosa Nostra they saw openly and unashamedly demonstrated in
Sicily in the 1980s. As a result, the magistrates believed in the need for legislative
reforms that would end Cosa Nostra’s domination over Sicily by forcing the state to
withdraw from symbiotic alliances with the mafia.
Falcone and Borsellino hoped to rally Sicilians to cultivate their potential to
dismantle hegemony by publicizing discoveries of state-mafia ties that were brought
about through pentiti testimonies. The magistrates encouraged Sicilians to pressure the
recalcitrant Italian state to withdraw from its ties to Cosa Nostra and adopt antimafia
reforms that would weaken the criminal organization. One early way Falcone
demonstrated to the public that the mafia was a real criminal organization with
246
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formidable international power was through publishing reports about mafiosi linked to
heroin trafficking and extortion in Sicily.247 By providing irrefutable evidence that Cosa
Nostra existed as an oppressive force within Sicilian society, Falcone encouraged
Sicilians to question power structures on the island and overturn the mentality that the
mafia merely represented a suspicion or myth. As Falcone’s former friend and fellow
magistrate, Ignazio De Francisci said, “Falcone was like Christopher Columbus. He was
the one who opened the way for everyone else. He broke new ground.”248 This task was
significant, however, as Sicilians in the 1980s “seemed to have accepted with resignation
the idea of not mounting any resistance and even adapting to the situation, especially
when failure to do so would have created problems of survival.”249 Through their emotive
calls to action, these magistrates encouraged Sicilians to overturn decades of
acquiescence by showing how hegemonic ideology that had long denied the existence of
state-mafia relations had oppressed Sicilians into passivity to and ignorance of their
realities.
Falcone and Borsellino employed a variety of strategies in the hopes of educating
Sicilians about the hegemonic state-mafia system that oppressed them. By suggesting
how state apparatuses and institutions within society were compromised as a result of
their affiliations with Cosa Nostra, these new intellectuals attempted to show Sicilians
that it was up to them to demand more from the government and to not accept this state of
affairs. They promoted awareness of Cosa Nostra and its political ties to the state through
public speeches and court trials of the need to destroy the hegemonic system that was
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responsible for compromising their safety. In a number of regional courtroom trials
throughout the 1980s, state-mafia relations became indisputable, as politicians like the
former mayor of Palermo Vito Ciancimino were among those imprisoned for their role in
perpetuating mafia power.250 Outside the courtroom, these magistrates drew from real
events from the 1980s—such as the death of state authorities like Judge Chinnici and
dalla Chiesa—as evidence of the state’s inability to provide security to its citizens
because of its historical delegation to the mafia.251 Moreover, in a speech to Sicilians in
Agrigento in 1988, Borsellino brought attention to state-mafia alliances by suggesting
that this relationship of accommodation was responsible for the state’s refusal to
sufficiently support the antimafia efforts of the 1980s, which had led to the state’s lack of
protection of authorities who consequently became antimafia martyrs as a result of their
lack of support.252 Falcone and Borsellino hoped to dismantle the pervasive idea state that
state-mafia alliances were natural and acceptable, therefore, calling on Sicilians to expect
and demand more from their state.
Falcone and Borsellino also advanced a counter-hegemonic movement by
working to raise awareness about the various hegemonic apparatuses within society that
were responsible for perpetuating state-mafia power. These apparatuses included the
Catholic Church and political parties, but most importantly Sicilians themselves.
Borsellino preferred going into schools to raise awareness about the apparatuses in
Sicilian society working to advance state-mafia hegemony.253 He also had aspirations to
utilize television as a medium to promote awareness of Sicilians’ oppression under the
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hegemonic system, creating a show where he would guest-star as a lecturer and
knowledgeable authority on state-mafia ties. Borsellino was killed before this ambition
could come to fruition, however.254 Nonetheless, these magistrates succeeded in drawing
attention to the institutions in Sicily that reinforced hegemonic ideology, while also
raising awareness about how Sicilians furthered the hegemonic bloc by their grants of
acquiescence to status quo power structures on the island—something that individuals
under the trance of hegemony could not properly conceive of prior to this time.
The already tenuous relationship between the two hegemonic powers of state and
mafia, therefore, was capitalized upon by Sicily’s “new intellectuals” who pushed for a
restructuring of power and for reclamation of state authority in order to delegitimize the
mafia.255 Most importantly, these individuals sought to reaffirm the state’s authority in
the eyes of the citizenry by showing the extent to which the magistracy—as an element of
the state—was devoted to prosecuting mafiosi and bolstering the ability of the state to
protect its citizens and uphold justice.
A major reason Falcone and Borsellino succeeded in extracting legislative
concessions from the state in the early 1980s was because the state realized during the
“mafia war” and Cosa Nostra’s subsequent, relentless attack against state authorities that
something needed to be done to check the mafia’s growing sense of indestructibility. It
was clear that the state was no longer able to carry out its most basic function—
protecting civilians—as a result of the mafia’s growing power. Falcone and Borsellino
framed the necessity of state reform in a way that resounded with the state’s fears of its
perceived loss of hegemony to Cosa Nostra, which was a very possible reality in the
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brutality and chaos of the 1970s-80s when it became clear just how powerless the state
had become in Sicily. Putting pressure on this fissure that the state already recognized
and feared, magistrates succeeded in encouraging the adoption of a stricter penal code
against mafiosi—thereby representing a break from decades of state grants of impunity
towards Cosa Nostra.
EARLY STATE RESPONSE: Early Legislative Reforms of the 1980s
Falcone and Borsellino had succeeded in linking the detrimental mafia power of
the 1980s to the Italian state and its historical trend of accommodation and leniency
towards Cosa Nostra. The state had little option but to adopt much needed reforms in this
time, as the most vocal and prominent calls to action radiated from within the state itself,
in the form of magistrates Falcone and Borsellino. Increasingly, however, civilians also
began asserting pressure on the state to reevaluate its dependence on the mafia. Thus, in
the 1980s the Italian state could not afford to lose any more credibility among Sicilians
by failing to make important political concessions that were widely demanded. This
growing pressure for reform made it difficult for the state to ignore what it realized
during the mafia war—that the symbiotic relationship upon which the state had long
depended was now only benefiting one hegemon. Thus, because of the work of these new
intellectuals and growing civilian discontentment against the hegemonic bloc, “after 130
years, the Italian state had finally declared to Sicilian mafia to be an organized and deadly
challenge to its own right to rule.”256 The implications of such a declaration only become
evident when one considers that state authorities long played a hand in perpetuating
hegemonic ideology that refused to acknowledge the existence of Cosa Nostra in the
Sicilian landscape, let alone the organization’s role as a critical state ally.
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The most significant manifestations of the state’s reevaluation of Cosa Nostra
were the legislative reforms of the 1980s. The need for antimafia legislation became
glaringly apparent not only due to the ease in which mafiosi had infiltrated and corrupted
political offices, but also due to the “judicial jungle” and “lack of coordination between
local and national authorities”257 that made it nearly impossible to effectively and quickly
prosecute mafia-related criminals even after their elusive identities were revealed. The
ineffectuality of Sicily’s criminal legislation was a major roadblock to the first stringent
antimafia efforts of the Antimafia Commission in the 1960s-70s. Because of the
clandestine nature of Cosa Nostra, where hierarchical levels of authority made it
impossible to discern who controlled the infinite number of puppet strings within the
mafia empire, magistrates and other prosecuting authorities faced a formidable challenge
in arresting mafia criminals. If the state was serious about taking a harder stance against
the mafia—and pressure from magistrates and civilians allowed the state little
alternative—new laws were needed to criminalize Cosa Nostra.
One of these crucial early reforms was the Rognoni-La Torre Law, which
officially made it illegal to be a member of Cosa Nostra, no matter how small that
involvement. The importance of this law cannot be overemphasized, as this marked the
first time in which the mafia was finally recognized as a criminal organization.258 This
law also ensured harsher and longer prison sentencing for mafiosi. Previously, even in the
rare instance that an important mafioso was imprisoned, cushy sentencing and lax
treatment ensured that incarcerated mafiosi could still operate with considerable
influence, issuing orders and initiating lucrative business deals from behind bars. For
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example, in the 1970s before such legislative reforms came about, prominent mafia boss
and eventual pentito Tommasso Buscetta “spent his entire imprisonment in the hospital
wing where he was able to receive friends, family, and lawyers and telephone all over the
world.”259 The Rognoni-La Torre Law, however, which guaranteed a minimum sentence
of 3 years for convicted mafiosi, represented a crucial step towards a harder antimafia
stance at the state level. Also of importance was the fact that this law allowed for state
seizure of mafia property.260 This suggested the recognition of the need to end symbolic
manifestations of Cosa Nostra’s power—where sprawling multi-million dollar estates
served to enforce not only the dominance the mafia had over the Sicilian landscape, but
also the success and respect that was afforded to any member of Cosa Nostra.
These early legislative reforms against organized crime finally provided
magistrates Falcone and Borsellino with the legal framework from which to launch an
unprecedented judicial attack against Cosa Nostra that showcased the wealth of
incriminating information the magistrates had gained through working with pentiti. With
mafiosi membership illegalized and Cosa Nostra finally recognized as a criminal
organization, Falcone and Borsellino had the penal code they needed to utilize pentiti
testimonies compiled over several years to weaken the mafia through the court system.
Falcone and Borsellino launched their attack in 1986-7 in the form of the Maxi Trial,
which led to over 300 mafiosi arrests and seemed to suggest a changing tide in Sicily’s
future.261 Demonstrating to Sicilians that notable state authorities would no longer deny
the existence of Cosa Nostra or acquiesce to its domination, the seeds of a civilian-based
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movement against the mafia were cultivated in the soil outside of the newly constructed,
bomb-proof courthouse in Palermo.
POLITICAL SOLUTONS: Attending to the First Track of the Antimafia “Train”
The Italian state irrefutably adopted important reforms in the 1980s as a result
from the pressure new intellectuals and Sicilians began to place upon fissures separating
these hegemons. It is important to note, however, that because Falcone and Borsellino
conceptualized Cosa Nostra as a political problem, this directly influenced how the state
began re-evaluating its relationship with the mafia. In the 1980s, the Italian state focused
exclusively on political reforms that could be enacted to weaken Cosa Nostra.
By examining events occurring in Sicily’s capital during this time, it is clear the
extent to which a select number of political authorities began to reevaluate Cosa Nostra,
but also the extent to which their antimafia efforts centered on political solutions to
combating the mafia problem. Leoluca Orlando, Palermo’s antimafia mayor during the
1980s-early 1990s, demonstrated his resolve to fighting the mafia in numerous ways that
broke from a history of corrupt Palermo politicians who fostered and depended on ties
with Cosa Nostra. While Orlando advocated for and initiated a handful of important
cultural efforts during this time to fight mafia hegemony, including renaming city streets
and parks to honor fallen antimafia heroes,262 antimafia efforts in Palermo prior to 1992
were largely politically-based and state-centric. This focus on the political solutions to
address Cosa Nostra that were championed until the mid-1990s was the general
sentiment among antimafia activists during this time. Orlando’s primary focus during the
late 1980s centered on removing mafia influence from politics, and also working to end
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mafia-infiltration of government and public works.263 Therefore, while there were
important cultural projects initiated during this time that should not be ignored, it is
indisputable that antimafia activists and political authorities alike in the 1980s and early
1990s focused predominantly on political solutions and pressuring the state to break from
its accommodative history with Cosa Nostra.
The full realization of the importance of cultural reforms would not come to
fruition until the mid-1990s, and indeed could not have been realized until political
reforms were initiated. This state-centric focus of the early antimafia movement,
therefore, was a necessary stepping stone to the socially-centered focus the movement
came to harbor in subsequent years. Similarly to a metaphor Mayor Orlando made in a
speech to the Sicilian public, the antimafia movement can be described as a train
dependent on two separate tracks in order to move forward.264 One train track represented
a state-focused approach, initiating legislative and political reforms needed to address
state relations with the mafia.265 The other track, which could only be fully developed
after the first, represented societal work to change Sicilian mentalities. This second track,
whose construction began in the late 1980s, would not be focused on fully until the mid1990s when it became clear that a single track of political reforms was not enough to
make the train “go forward” towards a future no longer determined by Cosa Nostra.266
It is also imperative to note that—despite these important concessions in the
1980s that represented a notable break from the state’s history of leniency towards the
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mafia—the Italian state did not come to a decisive “turning point” when it fully withdrew
from its relationship with Cosa Nostra.267 While things looked hopeful based on the
legislative reforms in the 1980s, the most promising and dedicated antimafia efforts were
initiated by the “virtuous minority” of primarily magistrates and law enforcers, whose
efforts were supported by another “virtuous minority” of “politicians, administrators,
journalists, and members of the public.”268 The majority, therefore—within the state and
also society—“remained ambivalent.”269 Thus, the state did adopt important antimafia
platforms during the 1980s, but this should not be mistaken for widespread support of
and steadfast dedication to the antimafia movement. The movement, in the face of
uncertain state support, would consequently need to be fought primarily by civil society.
CIVILIAN RESPONSE PRE-1992:
The first demonstration of changing mentalities among Sicilians was evident in
the public funeral for antimafia martyr General dalla Chiesa, which produced a visible
“wave of emotion” among attendees.270 With the help of new intellectuals, Sicilians were
becoming attuned to their oppression under the state-mafia system, coming to realize that
respectable authorities who committed themselves to the fight against Cosa Nostra
should not face isolation and threats against their lives merely for challenging state-mafia
hegemony. The start of a society that was beginning to question power structures in
Sicily was apparent by the fact that funeral attendees voiced “their suspicions that the
politicians were complicit in what had happened,” where dalla Chiesa easily was
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eliminated as a threat to mafia power due to lack of state protection.271 Therefore,
Sicilians began to appreciate that the state was complicit in many mafia-related events
that occurred, and they voiced their concern that the state should have done more to
protect one of their own—and anyone brave enough to challenge Cosa Nostra.
However, because these beliefs in the interweaving of state-mafia actions and
interests were mere “suspicions” among Sicilians at this time attests to the counterhegemonic work that remained to be done before state-mafia hegemony would be
uprooted and Sicilians would come to realize the full manifestations of the state’s 120
year relationship with Cosa Nostra. Nonetheless, civilian response at dalla Chiesa’s
funeral reflects the beginning of civil society’s recognition of its ability to “reclaim
political society” away from the state-mafia system, choosing to challenge instead of
reproduce hegemony through their interest in actively understanding and questioning the
power structures that shaped and determined their realities.
Falcone and Borsellino worked diligently to take advantage of this changing
sentiment prompted by an environment of growing mafia violence. These new
intellectuals worked tirelessly to mobilize Sicilians to join in the antimafia fight before
and especially during the Maxi Trial, therefore, fearing that this sudden discontentment in
society might lose its steam if the mafia was able to rebound from this judicial assault and
demonstrations against its violent attacks on state authorities.272 While civilian outrage
was undoubtedly present in the streets outside dalla Chiesa’s funeral and again outside
the Palermo courthouse in 1986-7, the scope of civilian involvement was limited during
this time compared to what it would become following 1992. Civil society, therefore, had
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not yet fully realized its potential to dismantle the state-mafia hegemonic bloc. This can
be attributed to the strength of mafia hegemony that worked to discourage any challenge
that went against the hegemonic system and did not manifest in ‘spontaneous consent’ to
Cosa Nostra and the state. Civilian response can be broken down into two periods,
therefore: initial efforts encouraged by Falcone and Borsellino that came to fruition prior
to 1992, and the increasingly dedicated civilian-led antimafia movement after 1992.
The nature of early civilian responses to the growing antimafia fight can be
characterized as politically-motivated. As previously mentioned, Falcone and Borsellino
as state actors advocated for a movement that was state-centric: addressing the Italian
state to extract legislative concessions to dismantle state-mafia ties. Thus, civilian efforts
in the late 1980s primarily manifested in attacks against the state calling for an end to
state-mafia alliances now that the true nature of this symbiotic relationship had come to
light through events like the Maxi Trial. It was during this time that many of Sicily’s
most powerful antimafia organizations were established, and these organizations began
by working to challenge the state and its role in perpetuating Cosa Nostra influence over
the island. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, civilians also worked to pressure the state to
remove corrupt and mafia-associated politicians from power.
The Association of Women against the Mafia in Palermo was a formidable female
organization during the early 1980s whose efforts exemplify the antimafia’s early focus
on the need for political reforms to destroy Cosa Nostra power.273 The Association of
Women represented “the first permanent antimafia association in Italy.”274 This group
lobbied the state to ensure the adoption of the Rognoni-La Torre Law, but also provided
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financial support to women of mafia victims who took mafia-related cases to court.275
This association, therefore, hoped to end the trend that those brave enough to stand
against the mafia had to stand alone.276 By putting pressure on the Italian state to
withdraw from its contractual relations with the state, early antimafia organizations also
helped to bring about Law No. 56 in 1990, which enacted harsh retribution against
“businesses, public administration, and state employees found working in collaboration
with the mafia.”277 While these early efforts accomplished much, the real face of the
civilian-led antimafia movement in operation today did not develop until 1992.
MAFIA RESPONSE:
It was not like Cosa Nostra to lay dormant as the state and civil society launched
an attack against its empire that left some of the mafia’s most powerful bosses behind
bars, with their once elusive identities now broadcasted across international media
networks. During the 1980s and particularly in the wake of the Maxi Trial—when the
Italian state publicly reevaluated its accommodating relationship with the mafia in
important ways—Cosa Nostra was very publicly suffering from “the worst defeat in the
entire history of the world’s most famous criminal organization.”278 The mafia believed it
could depend on allies within the state solidified over decades to thwart this judiciary
offense to its power, as it had been able to do since the late 1800s.279 When prominent
mafia allies failed to protect top mafia bosses from prosecution, the mafia was
determined to demonstrate its strength, independent of state support. Salvatore Lima, a
member of the Christian Democratic Party and long-time mafia ally was murdered as a
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result of his failure to insulate Cosa Nostra from judicial attack.280 Thus the state-mafia
war waged heavy, as the mafia continued to murder its enemies within the state, killing
those who “believed in the power of the state against the power of the mafia”—exactly
what Cosa Nostra needed to stand up against to protect its long-unchallenged influence in
Sicily.281
As Falcone and Borsellino spearheaded state antimafia efforts and continued to
acquire more information and incriminating testimonies from pentiti, the mafia believed
itself to possess two more enemies in need of immediate attention.282 For years, Cosa
Nostra had engaged in smear campaigns against the magistrates, hoping to discredit their
influence and incriminating knowledge.283 Hegemonic apparatuses like the media
controlled by mafia bosses were instrumental in these attempts to strengthen the ideology
that suggested Cosa Nostra was not a real phenomenon that dictated Sicily’s politics,
economy, and culture. While these campaigns undoubtedly discouraged many Sicilians
from joining the antimafia fight, it did not dissuade the magistrates from continuing their
lonely battle.284 Thus, in 1992 the mafia responded with the brutal executions of Falcone
and Borsellino. Members of the international community felt that Sicily consequently had
lost its antimafia fight for good, with its two most effective and vocal activists executed.
These brutal murders led many prominent and once hopeful Sicilian authorities to
surmise “it’s the end, it’s all over now.”285 What was not expected, however, was the
amount to which civil society would react in the wake of these murders, determined to
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collectively organize in an antimafia movement that would challenge Cosa Nostra’s
perceived impunity.286
National symbols for the antimafia cause, Sicilians now elevated Falcone and
Borsellino to the ranks of martyrs, worshipping their efforts and channeling their anger at
this injustice in the form of stronger and more organized antimafia efforts at the civilian
level.287 Remembering the now immortalized words of these men, Sicilians banded
together in increasing numbers to strengthen the power and influence of the antimafia
movement.288
THE IMPORTANCE OF 1992:
Ordinary Sicilians were not enticed in large numbers to join in the antimafia
movement until after the deaths of Falcone and Borsellino.289 This can be explained in
Gramscian terms; while these new intellectuals worked diligently to incense Sicilians to
fight Cosa Nostra in their daily lives, the primary role of new intellectuals is to tackle the
presence and influence of traditional intellectuals. It is not their function to work amongst
society to ensure the adoption of a counter-hegemonic ideology. This step in dismantling
hegemony must be carried out by “organic intellectuals”—individuals who stay within
the level of society from which they arose, helping to perpetuate a new way of
conceptualizing the world for the masses that discourages their acquiescence to the
hegemonic system in place. Thus, Falcone and Borsellino undoubtedly spearheaded the
antimafia movement that began in the 1980s, but their efforts prior to the 1992 only
solicited a limited response because organic intellectuals—ordinary Sicilians
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themselves—would need to carry on the antimafia fight if Sicilians were to be recruited
in large numbers to the movement.
The imperative need for organic intellectuals to provide the fodder for a broadbased, civilian-driven antimafia movement can be explained further by Paulo Freire.
Freire suggests that calls to action against oppressive ruling groups must radiate from
individuals within society, intimately connected and affected by hegemony just as the
masses, because “no pedagogy which is truly liberating can remain distant from the
oppressed by treating them as unfortunates and by presenting for their emulation models
from among the oppressors.”290 While Falcone and Borsellino in their role as new
intellectuals worked to dismantle hegemonic ideology, they did not mobilize the masses
in large numbers to join the movement in the 1980s because they were state actors, and
by nature of this position—despite their involvement in Sicilian communities and
genuine antimafia commitments—were fundamentally disconnected from the Sicilians
masses most prominently suffering under hegemony’s daily repercussions.
An indisputable change came in 1992, however, that forever changed the face of
the antimafia movement. Widespread rage against the magistrates’ murders culminated in
a far-reaching commitment to end Cosa Nostra among the Sicilian masses, creating a
plethora of organic intellectuals who hoped to prompt a widespread recognition of
Sicily’s oppression under Cosa Nostra. Witnessing other individuals from similar societal
backgrounds courageously fight against hegemonic forces helped rouse the masses
towards counter-hegemony following the violent year of 1992. These organic
intellectuals succeeded in rallying ordinary Sicilians because “those who recognize, or
begin to recognize, themselves as oppressed must be among the developers of this [new]
290
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pedagogy” in order to encourage the realization that the masses possess the ability to
dismantle hegemony.291 While the composition of the antimafia movement changed
during this time, its focus did not. Following 1992, the state remained as the primary
target of these increasing antimafia efforts. Sicilians had first been made to recognize the
state-mafia hegemonic system by Falcone and Borsellino, and in their honor, civilians
carried on the antimafia fight in the best way they knew.
Antimafia organizations still worked to solve the mafia phenomenon through
political solutions, employing unique strategies to continue to capitalize on the fissures
within the state-mafia hegemonic bloc. In the wake of the deaths of Falcone and
Borsellino, public memorials and street demonstrations were a common tactic used to
coax otherwise apathetic and acquiescent Sicilians into pressuring the state to reform.292
Most importantly, perhaps, is the “moral support” the antimafia movement offered to the
politicians and authorities willing to denounce state-mafia relationships293—a powerful
statement of encouragement that helped to ensure antimafia heroes would never again
have to stand alone like they had in the past. Falcone fearfully predicted the need for
collective action to defeat the mafia: “You are killed generally because you are alone or
else because you have gotten into a game that is too big. You are often killed because you
don’t have the necessary alliances, because you are without support.”294 By generating a
widespread movement in the wake of 1992, the antimafia movement had the support it
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needed to ensure it could not be quickly eliminated or swiftly “cancelled out like a
foreign body.”295
Another important way in which the antimafia movement helped create a climate
of pressure for state reforms was through effective protesting to dismantle political
alliances and systems that were known to have mafia ties. The end of blurred boundaries
between state and mafia could be permitted no longer, Sicilians believed, if Cosa Nostra
were to be eradicated. As a result, many corrupt politicians in power were implicated as a
result of their relations with mafiosi, including then Prime Minister Andreotti.296 While
never fully convicted, the infamous mafiosi turned pentiti, Tommasso Buscetta, testified
to the extent to which the prime minister had political ties and associations with Cosa
Nostra during his time in office.
Women’s groups continued to have a dominant presence on the antimafia stage
following 1992, as well, and adopted innovative ways of challenging state-mafia
hegemony. The Association of Women continued to remain prominent, and in 1992
launched a public protest and hunger strike in the heart of Palermo. The female activists
proclaimed “we are fasting because we are hungry for justice.”297 This association
continued to push for political reforms, demanding that the state remove from office
corrupt politicians with known mafia affiliations. Furthermore, these female activists
called upon the state to play a larger role in investigating the deaths of Falcone and
Borsellino in order to discern which state authorities were responsible for failing to
protect these martyrs from their tragic end.298 Even women not necessarily linked to an
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antimafia organization took direction from organizations like The Association of Women,
gaining the courage to speak out at the funerals of loved ones murdered by Cosa Nostra.
Rosario Schifani, the wife of one of Falcone’s bodyguards (who died with Falcone in
1992), shook the crowd at her husband’s funeral with her demands for justice to be
served. Schifani directed her speech towards mafiosi whom she knew were in attendance,
as she proclaimed “they’re here, yes here, inside this church!”299 These incredible
demonstrations of female courage in a bleak and violent period in Sicily’s history were
responsible for encouraging several mafiosi to become pentiti, roused by these emotive
calls to destroy Cosa Nostra.300
Another female-dominated antimafia organization arose following the murder of
Falcone and Borsellino called “The Sheets Committee.” This loosely-based organization
of twenty angered women (and later, six men), mobilized Sicilians into action by hanging
sheets with messages from their urban dwellings in Palermo.301 The sheets were scrawled
with words such as “Basta!” calling on the state to “stop” its alliance with Cosa Nostra
and to end the injustice that had culminated in the murder of Falcone and Borsellino.302
The Committee furthered its campaign of awareness through creating and selling t-shirts
to Sicilians with antimafia slogans and even through creating antimafia commercials that
aired on Sicilian television in the mid-1990s.303 In these varied ways, “The Sheets
Committee” assisted in pressuring the state to sever its ties and political alliances with the
mafia.304
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Other notable antimafia groups began actively working during this time, as well.
Libera, an antimafia organization established in 1995,305 successfully lobbied the state to
initiative many of the important legislative reforms of the 1990s, particularly in terms of
creating a new law that would allow organizations to reconvert former mafia property
into space for community projects.306 As a result of Libera’s efforts at the state level, Law
109/96 was passed, allowing for mafia property to be turned over to social cooperatives
furthering antimafia ideals.307
Along with launching an assault on corrupt politicians and pressuring the state for
legislative reforms, the antimafia movement also elevated its own political candidates in
an attempt to promote a new era of transparency and the end of state-mafia relations in
Sicilian politics. La Rete was the political party of the antimafia that arose on the political
scene in the 1990s.308 While La Rete was a young party, it succeeded in electing Orlando
as Mayor of Palermo in 1993 by 70% of the popular vote.309 As a result, high
expectations were put on the elections of 1994, where La Rete produced candidates at the
local and national level. While strictly electoral considerations that likely contributed to
La Rete’s defeat are important to note, such as the attractiveness of the new, more
conservative party Forza Italia, this election nonetheless has been described as a “big
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shame for Sicily”310 because of the electorate’s decision to vote into office candidates
who had largely remained mum about the mafia issue throughout campaigning.311 The
electoral failings of La Rete in 1994, despite incredible expectations placed on its success
as a result of growing popular antimafia sentiment, demonstrated at least in part that
political reforms had only addressed one aspect of Cosa Nostra’s power, and that the
mafia still remained deeply embedded within the minds and fears of Sicilians. Despite
this setback, in the early years of the 1990s the antimafia movement still succeeded in
elevating antimafia-committed politicians to several local offices, especially female
mayors from female-dominated antimafia organizations.312
STATE RESPONSE FOLLOWING 1992: Still Politically-Focused
The power of the Sicilian legislator was greatly strengthened in the 1980s-90s as a
result of the antimafia’s focus on the need for political reforms to dismantle Cosa Nostra.
Over the course of ten years, 161 criminal-related laws were created in the hopes of
addressing the problem of organized crime in Sicily.313 This rush of legislative reforms
produced a new law on average every three weeks.314 These laws produced dramatic
results in terms of criminal prosecution. Mafiosi arrests skyrocketed under this nascent
legal framework from 874 in 1991 to 2,136 in 1994.315 The murder rate in Palermo also
drastically decreased during this time under new penal legislation that provided harsh
retribution for mafiosi whose affiliations with Cosa Nostra could be proven.316
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Inspired by increasing civilian pressure and the martyred magistrates, other state
authorities stepped forward to carry the antimafia torch. Giovanni Spadolini, President of
the Republic of Sicily, gave a stirring speech at a public memorial commemorating the
judges’ deaths in Sicily’s capital.317 The extent to which Sicilians continued to believe the
mafia to represent a political problem requiring political solutions is evident in examining
the rhetoric Spadolini utilized in this pivotal speech. Spadolini’s public lecture was
significant not only for its words, but for its symbolism; as President, Spadolini’s
willingness to publicly denounce Cosa Nostra stood in stark contrast to decades of
acquiescence to and cooperation with the mafia, and suggested a new era where perhaps
more than just a “virtuous minority” would join the antimafia fight.318
The goal of Spadolini’s speech was to “demonstrate the resolve of every Italian
magistrate to carry out an ever more determined campaign to reinstate the rule of law and
good order” on the island.319 One way this resolve manifested was through increased
efforts with pentiti in order to further investigate the extent to which the mafia had
infiltrated the state.320 Pressure from civil society during this time succeeded in producing
an indisputable echo throughout state levels, therefore, to end the “ignorance and underestimation of the mafioso phenomenon” by politicians and state authorities.321 This
newfound determination seemed to suggest a new era for Sicily. Spadolini recognized the
state’s role in leading the antimafia fight through reform and close review of how its
policies were perpetuating mafia power. As he surmised, “the fight against organized
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crime is an emergency which involves the whole nation and calls for precise, calculated
and also severe action on the part of the state.”322
It is clear that Falcone and Borsellino had begun to profoundly affect the Sicilian
mentality, as prior to the 1980s the recognition of the state’s need to end relations with
Cosa Nostra would not have been made publicly, let alone voiced by a prominent state
authority. As a result of mafia infiltration within the government and the historically
symbiotic relationship between state and mafia, the boundaries between Cosa Nostra and
the Italian state were incredibly muddled and difficult to discern, making it nearly
“impossible to tell where the legitimate state leaves off and the mafia begins.”323 Thus,
Spadolini suggested his commitment to respond to civilian pressure to remove corrupt
politicians from power and to advance a new era of transparency and accountability in
government.
From examining speeches that transpired at the first antimafia convention entitled
“The Mafia—What to Do Next?” in the wake of 1992 further points to the success civil
society had in prompting state authorities in a variety of capacities to become highly
motivated to addressing the political problems that were responsible for continuing statemafia hegemony. This convention represented a collective gathering of numerous
political authorities in Sicily who sought to address how to advance an antimafia platform
when the movement’s most prominent leaders had died. These speeches highlight not
only how civilian pressure was beginning to prompt a change in attitude at the state level,
but also how political reforms were heavily referenced as the way to mitigate the Cosa
Nostra problem during this time. As Italian politician Giorgio Napolitano (now the
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President of the Italian Republic) voiced, “everyone must be aware of the need to halt and
reverse the most negative and disturbing trends towards the degradation of political and
civil life, towards the degeneration of the legal State.”324
Another attendee, Adolfo Beria di Argentine continued this rhetoric by
referencing the deplorable position to which the Italian state had been demoted as a result
of its historical dependence on Cosa Nostra. Argentine suggested that “a state relegated
to purely economic functions has not only failed to produce a culture of legality, but has
favored the culture of partiality, of doing favors for a friend, of trading interesting, of
ignoring the law—of promoting mafia-type crime.”325 The Italian state, by delegating to
the mafia its roles of controlling law and order and monopolizing violence, therefore, had
created a scenario in which the mafia was able to trample upon state authority in 1990s
Sicily to the extent that the state could no longer protect the public good and act
impersonally in the territory.326 The symbiotic relationship between mafia and state
ensured that all state institutions in Sicily had “no authority, even of a moral nature,
attached to them.”327 While this convention reflects the pronounced effect early antimafia
efforts at the magistrate and civilian level had on calling the state to reevaluate relations
with Cosa Nostra, it is important to note that no mention as of yet was made of the
cultural problems that equally contributed to the power and influence of Cosa Nostra in
1990s Sicily.
The role of ordinary Sicilians in pressuring for reforms during the 1980s-90s
should not be underestimated. While magistrates and notable political authorities were
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instrumental in creating a climate of mafia intolerance within Sicilian politics, this time
period saw the politicization and involvement of ordinary Sicilians who took to the
streets demanding such reforms, demonstrating their stance against Cosa Nostra and
against pervasive illegality. Spadolini himself praised Sicilians for their role in ushering
in a new era for Sicily, stating that “we are witnessing a genuine mobilization of the
public conscience, a revival of civic and moral values. It is a spontaneous movement,
manifested in a thousand small initiatives.”328 Spadolini therefore accredited ordinary
Sicilians with taking up the antimafia cause of their own accord. The antimafia
movement would only continue to attract attention in the coming years.
THE BEGINNINGS OF A TRANSFORMED SICILY:
How much had really changed in the wake of state reforms brought about by
pressure from new intellectuals and civil society? Examining events in Palermo at the end
of the period of state reforms is telling of the need for a continued counter-hegemonic
movement that would begin to work within society to challenge hegemonic domination at
the cultural level.
Palermo, the capital of Sicily and the locus of mafia power,329 hosted a United
Nations conference in 2000 in an attempt to show its new face to the international
community.330 To be sure, long-term Mayor Leoluca Orlando deserves substantial credit
for revitalizing Palermo during the 1990s in the wake of the murders of Falcone and
Borsellino. When the Italian state was forced to re-evaluate its relationship with Cosa
Nostra in the 1990s, substantial monetary assistance flooded into Palermo, helping
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Orlando to continue his “renaissance campaign” he had begun in the mid-1980s. This
initiative involved a beautification campaign to erase the physical remnants of mafia
power including old buildings, dirty streets, and dangerous neighborhoods that previously
had contributed to the perpetuation of hegemonic ideology.331 However, while notable
strides were made under the state reforms of the 1980s-90s, the mafia was far from gone.
Rita Borsellino, sister of the immortalized magistrate, has worked to make sure
that Sicilians and the international community do not forget that this is not the time for
contentment or praise, as much work still remains to fully dismantle Cosa Nostra.332
Speaking in the wake of the U.N. conference, as Palermo was being labeled as an “anticrime success story,” Borsellino dissuaded fellow Sicilians and conference attendees
from becoming overly optimistic: “I don’t want people leaving this conference thinking
that the mafia no longer exists. It just hides itself more.”333 Borsellino believed that the
antimafia movement was beginning to work in the right direction at the turn of the
millennium, “working from the grassroots to resist the mafia.” 334 The unavoidable
reality, however, was that the antimafia movement had just begun to turn its attention to
pervasive social and cultural problems responsible for perpetuating Cosa Nostra
hegemony in the mid-1990s, a battle that would take decades to wage. Borsellino
therefore stressed the need for more work at the cultural level after years of focusing
solely on the political manifestations of the Cosa Nostra phenomenon. Through her
public speeches, Borsellino sought to undermine the naïve assumptions voiced by many
conference attendees that “we have taken the mafia out of people’s heads, and crushed its
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hegemony.”335 While state reforms prompted by the antimafia movement may have taken
Cosa Nostra in its most tangible and visible forms off of the streets, it was far from out of
the minds or memories of Sicilians.
At the turn of the century, the state had proven committed to withdrawing from its
symbiotic relationship with Cosa Nostra in notable ways, but this in no way implies that
the relationship was severed. The state-mafia hegemonic bloc continued well into the
2000s, as it does today, because Cosa Nostra still has a powerful domination over
Sicilian society and culture. At the turn of the century, therefore, at the same time as
Palermo was being hailed for its “defeat of Cosa Nostra,” one had to look only through
the façade of cleaner streets to find testament to the extent to which Cosa Nostra still
dominated the landscape. While perhaps the most physical manifestations of its power
had been removed, the mafia channeled its power into increasingly elusive and global
markets and evolved its strategies to make its influence less visible to the untrained eye,
but unquestionably still felt.
Ordinary Sicilian citizens still very much felt Cosa Nostra’s hegemonic control,
not yet believing an alternative system outside the state-hegemonic bloc to exist. At the
turn of the century, 80% of businesses in Palermo still paid the pizzo, either out of fear or
because they were so accustomed to perceive this act of subordination as natural.336
Moreover, violence and murder were still tactics used against those few individuals brave
enough to denounce the mafia in a public way. Murder rates had declined notably from
the violence and brutality of the 1908s,337 but outspoken antimafia activists still had
reason to fear mafia repercussions for their counter-hegemonic actions. In addition, the
335
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mafia continued to dominate incredibly lucrative, legal businesses ranging from garbage
collection and construction to restaurants.338 This is not to mention the illegal channels
that Cosa Nostra dominated, including drug trafficking and illegal immigration.339 The
prevalence of drugs on the island and the increasing number of North African illegal
immigrants at the turn of the century attested to the fact that, in many ways, the new
millennium did not yet represent a “new dawn” for Sicily—an island that was still
desperately trying to escape from under the oppressive shadow of Cosa Nostra.340
THE LIMIT OF POLITICAL REFORMS:
In the wake of the legislative rush of the 1980s-90s, it was widely held that Sicily
finally had a “complete penal legislation” that could effectively challenge Cosa Nostra.341
Why, then, was the mafia still so powerful? The mafia’s continuing prominence can be
explained in part by the fact that static legislation could only do so much, as Cosa Nostra
was fluid and ever-changing in nature, possessing the ability to reinvent itself and its
operations in order to capitalize on volatile markets and political climates.342 The laws,
therefore, could not predict exactly which direction the mafia might take in the future to
preserve their power and dominance.
The most significant reason why the mafia remained powerful, however, was due
to the fact that Cosa Nostra was a deeply cultural problem, as Rita Borsellino attested to
in her speech in 2000. Hegemonic ideology was still not dismantled; in the late 1980s, in
the hub of mafia and antimafia activity, wealthy Palermo citizens of the upper class
pretended to be in “complete ignorance of the mafia,” refusing to acknowledge such
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“unsavory aspects of Sicilian life.”343 Only attending to the political factors that
perpetuated the mafia’s power would never fully challenge an organization whose right to
rule over the island was deeply and historically entrenched within the minds of Sicilians.
Hegemony was engrained through daily actions that went uncontested since the 1860s,
and hegemonic apparatuses within society had long worked to promote the widespread
uptake of an ideology that denied the existence of Cosa Nostra. Consequently, political
reforms did not address this ideology that was a prominent feature in Sicily. Thus,
beginning in the mid-1990s, it was realized that legislative mechanisms for curbing the
mafia had gone as far as they could go,344 and that the next logical step was to attend to
the second train track of the “antimafia train”; the antimafia movement needed to redirect
its efforts to society, and work towards the development within Sicilian culture of a
respect for and adherence to these newly created laws. In this way, the hegemonic
ideology of Cosa Nostra’s historical right to dictate Sicily’s trajectory could be
overturned fully, and a new way of conceptualizing the world could be offered to
Sicilians through counter-hegemonic initiatives.345 True to Gramsci’s theories, the
counter-hegemonic nature of the antimafia movement reared its head, in which to
dismantle pervasive hegemony it became known that challenging the state-mafia
hegemonic bloc did not “represent an enemy that is to be overcome once and for all with
an extraordinary effort and campaign, but an enemy against which to wage a constant and
ongoing daily struggle” using all means possible.346
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Chapter Four will address how the antimafia movement today is waging this long
battle. The changes in the movement that have come about since the mid-1990s will be
analyzed, as it was at this time when the movement changed from targeting the state to
targeting society as the agent that could bring Sicily towards a future without Cosa
Nostra. As Chapter Three established how the antimafia movement first worked to
deconstruct mafia ideology and hegemony by waging a war against traditional
intellectuals and manipulating fissures within the state-mafia bloc, Chapter Four will
show how the counter-hegemonic movement has now begun attending to the second step
of counter-hegemony: offering a new ideology for the masses and a new way for Sicilians
to conceptualize their realities outside of the hegemonic state-mafia system. The efforts
and tactics of four different organizations in Sicily will be examined in order to highlight
the contemporary nature of the antimafia movement that now works among Sicilian
society to produce a counter-hegemonic ideology that encourages Sicilians to reclaim
their identity, their island, and their future.
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Chapter Four: The Antimafia Movement Today and its Counter-Hegemonic Nature
THE MOVEMENT TODAY:
Chapter Three examined how the early antimafia movement was born in the
1980s from natural fissures between the Italian state and Cosa Nostra that “new
intellectuals” in the form of magistrates Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino
capitalized on in order to create a political opportunity for Sicilians to “reclaim political
society” by no longer acquiescing to the hegemonic ideology of the state-mafia system
which historically worked to deny the existence of Cosa Nostra as a Sicilian phenomenon
and essential state collaborator. These magistrates broke the trend of state compliance
with mafia power, and were able to draw attention to fissures in the hegemonic bloc as a
result of their work with mafia pentiti. After learning from pentiti that Cosa Nostra
possessed formidable power as a result of state dependence and delegation to the criminal
organization, Falcone and Borsellino believed it was imperative to target the state as the
locus of hegemony that could dismantle the mafia through withdrawing from its historical
relationship with the criminal organization. Thus, Falcone and Borsellino spearheaded the
antimafia movement, and began rallying Sicilians around the need for political reforms
that would end symbiotic ties between the state and mafia.
Targeting the state to issue political reforms represented the primary focus of the
nascent antimafia movement, therefore, which would continue to be the focus until the
mid-1990s even when civilians began to take charge of the movement after the deaths of
Falcone and Borsellino. With this political focus during the early 1980s-mid 1990s, many
prominent mafiosi had been arrested, Sicily had developed a capable penal code to
addressing the unique judicial problem posed by Cosa Nostra, and Sicilians began to
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have success with removing corrupt politicians from office and creating a political
climate that demanded accountability and transparency in Sicilian politics. Despite these
notable improvements, Cosa Nostra was still a commanding presence that continued to
dictate the island’s politics and economy, and most importantly its culture.
Therefore, in the mid-1990s many Sicilians realized that targeting the state for
political reforms was not enough to dismantle Cosa Nostra’s widespread influence. This
can be explained in Gramscian terms; while the state was a locus of hegemony in Sicily,
merely addressing this element of the hegemonic bloc failed to attend to the various
hegemonic apparatuses in Sicily that worked to reproduce and entrench hegemonic
ideology daily. Along with historical apparatuses such as the Catholic Church, political
parties, and traditional intellectuals, Sicilian society represented a fundamental
component of the state-mafia bloc. As Gramsci explained, civil society can either be a
medium that reinforces or challenges hegemonic power structures. The ways in which
Sicilian society reproduced hegemony were twofold: deliberately through paying the
pizzo or supporting mafia-affiliated politicians, for instance, but also in numerous
unintentional ways that had become so routine over time that many did not recognize the
implications of these behaviors. Daily acquiescence, submission to the mafia system,
denial of Cosa Nostra’s influence, and fear of speaking out against acts of criminality
were responsible for solidifying hegemonic ideology that worked to discourage any
challenges to the state-mafia system.
Through its focus on political reforms and the state, therefore, the antimafia had
begun to attend to Gramsci’s first step of counter-hegemony: dismantling hegemonic
ideology. This was accomplished by new intellectuals Falcone and Borsellino by creating
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awareness of state-mafia relations and encouraging Sicilians to overturn the mentality
that such state of affairs should be accepted or perceived as natural. As Gramsci reminds
us, however, there are two fundamental tasks to which a counter-hegemonic movement
must attend if a deeply-rooted hegemonic system is to be deconstructed. The second task
of counter-hegemony involves offering a new counter-hegemonic ideology to the masses
to take the place of dismantled hegemonic ideals. This occurred during the second phase
of the antimafia movement that came about in the mid-1990s. During this time, when it
was clear that political solutions would only curb mafia power to a certain extent,
Sicilians came to consider Cosa Nostra to be a fundamentally cultural problem requiring
cultural work that would grant Sicilians agency in recognizing how they could participate
in a new reality outside the hegemonic system. By encouraging Sicilians to think
critically about their world and the role they play in that reality, antimafia activists are
now working to challenge mafia “dominance over the mental attitude and spirit of the
people that guaranteed the mafia absolute control over the island.”347 From the mid-1990s
through today, therefore, the antimafia movement has attended to the second phase of
counter-hegemony by offering a new ideology to Sicilians that emphasizes respect for
legality and honest work, as well as denouncing mafiosi, criminality, and corruption.348
This chapter will explore the nature of the contemporary antimafia movement in
order to demonstrate how la lotta contro la mafia has changed since its origins in the
1980s. By exploring the activities and strategies of four different antimafia organizations
operating in Sicily, it will be demonstrated that each group has changed its primary focus
over time from the Italian state to Sicilian society as the medium through which a cultural
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revolution can be brought to the island. Through an examination of these four
organizations, it will be highlighted how each organization is attending to Gramsci’s
phases of counter-hegemony. An organization can be said to be counter-hegemonic if it
attends to the following tasks: works to dismantle hegemonic ideology by challenging its
remaining manifestations in society, produces organic intellectuals that promote a new
reality outside the state-mafia system, works to challenge double-consciousnesses within
Sicilians that contribute to their perpetuation of hegemony, and promotes institutions and
activities that provide Sicilians with practical ways to incorporate counter-hegemony into
daily behavior. While these organizations have different approaches to answering the
mafia problem, they all are working to cultivate in Sicilians a counter-hegemonic
mentality that grants them the power to challenge the state-mafia system and recognize
how living and working outside the hegemonic state-mafia system can be not only
practical but also lucrative. Because Arci, Libera, Addiopizzo, and the Red Diaries all
attend to these four criteria, each organization can be said to be waging a counterhegemonic attack against the state-mafia hegemonic system.
THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN THE ANTIMAFIA FIGHT TODAY:
As Chapter Three suggested, while the state made significant strides towards
withdrawing from its symbiotic relationship with Cosa Nostra in the 1980s-early 1990s,
these efforts were predominantly championed by a “virtuous minority” of authorities and
politicians committed to eradicating Cosa Nostra from the Sicilian landscape.
Consequently, the majority of state officials and Sicilians “remained ambivalent” to statemafia hegemony, effectively supporting the continuation of an established system that
had solidified its presence for over 120 years. Therefore, important progress that was
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made in adopting legislative reforms against the mafia in the 1980s can be largely
attributed to select magistrates and cultural leaders in Sicily who heavily lobbied the state
during this time. Now that the state is no longer the primary target of antimafia efforts,
however, and the movement from the mid-1990s through the present day instead has
turned its attention to Sicilian society, it is important to examine the role the state plays in
the counter-hegemonic antimafia movement today.
Because political reforms were ushered in by a “virtuous minority” in the 1980s,
it is worth examining whether this absence of widespread commitment to the antimafia
movement at the state level has continued into today. One does not need to look far to
find evidence attesting to the fact that the Italian state continues to have a muddled
relationship with the antimafia movement; while several prominent authorities have
demonstrated their support of the movement through favorable legislation and antimafia
platforms, others continue to carry on Sicily’s historical trend of state accommodation
towards the mafia through political alliances and concessions to Cosa Nostra. The nature
of the state as “an amorphous complex of agencies” makes it difficult to evaluate the
state’s involvement in the antimafia movement today as a whole;349 some aspects of the
state, such as the magistracy, remain devout supporters of the movement, but this
commitment does not radiate equally throughout the varied levels and institutions that
compose the Italian state. There is evidence, therefore, to support both contradictory
claims about the extent of the state’s involvement in the contemporary antimafia
movement.
Indisputably, there is important evidence attesting to the Italian state’s resolve to
aid the antimafia movement since the mid-1990s when the movement redirected its focus
349
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from state to society. In 1996, the state adopted significant legislation that now allows
antimafia organizations to acquire former mafia assets, reconverting these properties into
socially-beneficial projects.350 In addition, the state now guarantees financial assistance
and protection to mafia denouncers, helping to create a culture that praises and supports
those brave enough to condemn Cosa Nostra351. These examples all serve to suggest that
the Italian state has taken an active role in the contemporary phase of the antimafia
movement and is seemingly committed to furthering la lotta contro la mafia through
political methods. Moreover, the judiciary has demonstrated its commitment to utilize
Sicily’s nascent penal code to fight Cosa Nostra, which has led to high-profile mafia
arrests such as Bernardo Provenzano’s arrest in 2006.352 However, this antimafia
commitment is spread unevenly throughout various levels and institutions of the state,
and there is substantial evidence to suggest that the state is not nearly as active in the
antimafia cause as activists might hope.
While the state has undoubtedly taken a harder stance against Cosa Nostra in
recent years as a result of civilian pressure and the budding counter-hegemonic
movement that brought state-mafia ties to light, the state has not withdrawn completely
from its dependence on the mafia. This is evident when one examines recent legislation
that has been issued under Prime Minister Berlusconi. In 2010, Berlusconi dismantled
wiretapping laws that were a primary method for obtaining incriminating evidence
against mafiosi in the 1980s.353 Moreover, Berlusconi has also showcased his wavering
commitments as head of the Italian state through his favorable legislation towards
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overseas banking accounts. Cosa Nostra—a transnational organization with interests and
investments scattered globally—directly benefits from such legislation that grants
clemency to mafiosi maintaining substantial accounts outside of the country.354
In addition, other issues—such as national financial concerns—continue to trump
antimafia commitments of the state.355 Some express concern that the Italian state is not
ready to bear the financial responsibilities that a widespread fight against the mafia would
require.356 This is exemplified in a recent bill that sought to generate income for the state
by capping the number of days social organizations could engage in auctions over stateseized mafia assets.357 Because antimafia organizations do not possess the same financial
latitude of powerful mafiosi backed by a multi-billion dollar criminal organization, this
legislation created the fear that mafia properties could quickly be repossessed by Cosa
Nostra, therefore inhibiting the efforts of antimafia organizations working to reconvert
these lands into spaces for counter-hegemonic projects.358 These examples suggest that
the Italian state as a whole is not fully committed to severing ties with the mafia,
particularly at the national level. These initiatives are cause for discouragement, as they
have been equated to represent “gifts to the mafia from the Italian state,” reminiscent of
the tremendous gift of power and accommodation that the state first gave Cosa Nostra
following unification.359
The state’s continued dependence on the mafia is perhaps best illustrated during
elections, however. Historically, the Italian state and various political parties have
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collaborated with Cosa Nostra in order to extract votes from the Sicilian population. This
trend that started in the 1950s with the emergence of the Christian Democratic Party has
continued into modern day; come election time, mafiosi can still be found working
amongst the Sicilian population offering Euros or food in hopes of “buying” the votes of
primarily apathetic, fearful, or impoverished Sicilians.360
Based on this realization that the Italian state continues to be intimately connected
to Cosa Nostra, some antimafia activists have questioned the state’s genuine commitment
to the cause. Some skeptically wonder whether the state is simply motivated to adopt an
antimafia platform when there are clear benefits that can be derived from such political
maneuvering. For example, while the state has established a legal framework that
provides mafia denouncers with financial support and personal bodyguard protection,
denunciations are not thoroughly investigated,361 and consequently have become a
medium for solving personal disputes and disagreements more than helping to bring
mafiosi to justice.362 This suggests that pressure from international bodies like the
European Union, for instance, might be instrumental in encouraging the state to take a
harder stance against organized crime, and the state’s commitment to the fundamental
ideals behind the movement might be suspect.
Thus, it is clear that the state and the antimafia movement possess a convoluted
relationship, not unlike the unclear relationship the state has historically possessed with
Cosa Nostra. The Italian state occupies an unclear and complex position within Sicily, as
on occasion it has both supported and hindered the efforts of the antimafia movement and
Cosa Nostra, respectively. The antimafia movement has sought to end the state’s “double
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loyalty to the mafia’s laws and the procedures of democracies,” therefore.363 The fact that
the state has never declared an unwavering commitment to the antimafia platform in the
1980s or even today allows the Italian state to continue to operate in an indefinable
spatial position, benefiting by existing in this gray area posited between civil society and
the mafia and not having to formally commit definitively to supporting either side. The
state’s irresolute support of the antimafia cause has manifested in an antimafia movement
that now focuses almost exclusively on Sicilian society. Recognizing that the time for
legislation and reforms has passed and the state has perhaps reformed as much as it ever
will, the antimafia movement now focuses on society based on the belief that real change
can best be delivered to Sicily through working with the ”minds and bodies” of ordinary
Sicilians.364 The counter-hegemonic nature of the movement is apparent, therefore, as
throughout its history the antimafia has had to engage in a “war of positioning,” working
within and outside of the state in the face of uncertain state support of its initiatives and
in recognition of the cultural manifestations of state-mafia hegemony that were
responsible for fueling Cosa Nostra’s power well into the new millennium.
THE MAFIA AND SOCIETY TODAY:
While much progress has been made in the antimafia fight since its origins in the
1980s, it is interesting to examine what conditions are like in modern day Sicily, and
what evidences of mafia power and state-mafia ties are still prevalent today.
As previously stated, one of the main ways the mafia has managed to maintain a
relationship with Cosa Nostra is through elections. Not wanting to break a beneficial and
historical trend of dependence, the Italian state still relies on the mafia in order to gain
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electoral support needed for political victory. A former Customs Officer in Sicily attested
to the continuation of this symbiotic relationship, describing how he was approached by a
mafia affiliate attempting to buy his vote in the most recent national elections:
“Are you free?” the mafiosi inquired.
“No, I’m married,” the former Guardia di Finanza claims to have responded.
“No, I mean did you promise someone with a vote? If not, I will tell you who to
vote for.”365
The former Customs Officer claims that such occurrences are highly common, and that
“70% of Sicilian votes are controlled by the mafia today.”366 As the Customs Officer
explained, it is not uncommon for politicians to promise food or Euros in exchange for
votes. While state-mafia ties have been relinquished in many notable ways, electoral
manipulation thus remains an important way this symbiotic relationship has continued. A
“culture of favors” pervades many levels of society, leading many Sicilians to feel
indebted to giving their vote to mafiosi who provide them with security, income, and
often employment. The Customs Officer expressed that “when this practice of
exchanging favors changes, then the mafia will die.”367
Moreover, evidence of the extent to which mafia hegemony still permeates
Sicilian society is apparent in an examination of business life in Sicily. When
interviewing a prominent Sicilian businessman, he explained the extent to which his life
has changed in the wake of his denunciation of Cosa Nostra and refusal to pay the pizzo.
The man once owned a small bar in the small island of Ortigia. When he decided to
denounce the mafia, young Sicilians from the neighborhood were paid off by mafiosi at
365
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the price of fifty Euros to burn down his business. Sicilian youths burnt down this bar
four times before the local businessman was forced to request state protection, rightfully
fearing for his life after these unrelenting attacks.
Under new legislation, the state is required to provide protection and financial
assistance to mafia denouncers whose lives inevitably change as a result of their
courageous actions. For this local man, denouncing brought the need for 24-hour
bodyguard protection, financial support from the state, and a new business in the
neighboring city of Siracusa. While his new business—a children’s clothing store—is
doing fairly well, he admitted sadly that many Siracusans prefer doing business
elsewhere, at a different business that is not known for its owner’s tendency to speak out
against Cosa Nostra. Customers fear coming into his store, as an armed car is
permanently stationed outside, and one must pass through two armed bodyguards before
entering the storefront. Conversely, however, it is important to note that many consumers
come to his store solely because they believe it to be a symbolic act that conveys their
desire to participate in collective action against Cosa Nostra.
This business owner’s experiences have taught him that much cultural work still
remains before mafia hegemony will fully be uprooted. He recalled that Sicily has not
fully been able to move beyond its history characterized by “solitary heroes,” as the
media was quick to make him into a hero for his actions—a hero who stood alone and
whose actions failed to mobilize other local businessmen to do similarly. He described
how many friends and local consumers claimed to stand behind him in his bravery, but
that this support only manifested in hollow words. Many of his friends and once
dedicated customers did not support his new business initiative, nor were they enticed by
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his example to participate in antimafia efforts themselves. Double consciousnesses
clearly are still a feature of modern Sicily, where many Sicilians act very different in
theory and practice in regards to the mafia. Sicily has very recently entered into a time in
which mafia denunciations are voiced and praised, and thus it is understandable that it
will take more time for other citizens to feel comfortable participating in an act that was
long met with brutal and often lethal repercussions. This unfortunate reality, however,
means that many mafia denouncers still feel ill-supported and unprotected. The business
owner admitted to feeling very “isolated,” just as Falcone claimed to feel in the years
before his death. Instead of empowered, since his denunciation he feels “impotent”
knowing he is not as supported in his actions as he hoped.368
While Falcone urged for collective action and widespread antimafia support so
activists would never feel alone, it is clear that a culture that truly values denunciation
will take more time to come to fruition. As the businessman stated, “many people still
don’t want an antimafia culture to become reality.”369 He believes that antimafia success
“depends on whether Sicilians really want to change and if they really want a better
future.”370 Noting that Italians harbor an incredible capacity for collective action when
they are committed to a cause, he nonetheless questions just how widespread antimafia
commitment remains in Sicily. Therefore, Sicilians must overturn their tendency to
“accept a lot of bad things that transpire” if they are to realize their ability to move
towards a future without Cosa Nostra.371 Again, this attests to the strength and
pervasiveness of mafia hegemony that serves to create reluctance to denunciation, as this
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ideology became incorporated into daily mentalities due to the solidification of the
hegemonic system for a period of nearly 140 years. Moreover, his need to live under
constant protection highlights Cosa Nostra’s continued determination to maintain consent
to the state-mafia system through threat or force.
IMPLICATIONS:
While many antimafia organizations now operate within Sicily and devote
themselves to fighting Cosa Nostra through cultural work, it is clear that hegemonic
ideology still remains in the mentalities of many Sicilians, and counter-hegemonic ideals
have not fully taken root among the population. The mark of a completed counterhegemonic movement is when counter-hegemonic ideals and practices are naturally
reproducing and become incorporated without question into daily action and behavior—
when all Sicilians are integrated into the “process of permanent liberation” from the
hegemonic system that long dominated them.372 This does not yet represent Sicily’s
reality. Contemporary antimafia organizations face an incredible battle in advancing
counter-hegemonic ideology for many reasons. Much of the international spotlight and
attention to the antimafia cause has faded since 1992, and consequently may have lost
some of its appeal and popularity within Sicily. The island was a focus of the
international community at this time due to the extent of mafia atrocities and lethal
attacks against the state. While 1992 may have represented the height of the mafia’s
resolve to establish its supremacy through violence against the state, this signified the
mere beginning of the widespread, civilian-driven antimafia movement in operation
today. La lotta contro la mafia may no longer be a particularly salient focus of the
international community today as it once was, but it is important to examine how
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antimafia organizations have continued to carry on their counter-hegemonic fight, as the
mafia-state system is far from dismantled and Sicilians still suffer under the effects of a
hegemonic system and ideology deeply rooted in the island’s economy, politics, and
culture.
Below is an analysis of the activities of four antimafia organizations I worked
with in Sicily, Italy. Roughly thirty years since Sicilians first exhibited significant
discontentment with Cosa Nostra outside of dalla Chiesa’s funeral, these organizations
continue working diligently to advance a counter-hegemonic movement that will remove
all traces of state-mafia hegemony and demonstrate to Sicilians how they can reclaim
their lives and identities by fighting the hegemonic system through daily, ordinary
actions.
ARCI:
First established in 1957, Arci arose as a national anti-fascist organization
committed to fighting ignorance and building a culturally-aware and active society.
While Arci attends to many different societal problems, the organization’s activities in
Sicily revolve around a two-fold mission: to fight Cosa Nostra, and to address societal
ills and discrimination on the island. These missions are not antonymous, but rather are
intimately linked. Arci has established a community-centric and counter-hegemonic
approach to dismantling Cosa Nostra. The organization views Cosa Nostra as a deeply
cultural problem, and believes the mafia has acquired formidable strength as a result of
its ability to prey upon and manipulate society. While this mentality drives contemporary
Arci operations in Sicily, the organization has not always championed primarily cultural
activities.
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Reflective of the changing antimafia movement as a whole, in the early 1990s
Arci first directed its antimafia efforts around more politically-focused initiatives. 1992
marked the beginning of Arci’s heavy involvement in addressing the Cosa Nostra
phenomenon—a focus that continues to dominate the organization’s activities in Sicily.
During this year, Arci collaborated with other antimafia organizations in order to create
conferences and meetings where Sicilians came together to discuss and debate various
political solutions to combating Cosa Nostra in the wake of Faclone and Borsellino’s
assassinations. However, continuing mafia power and influence within Sicily into the
mid-1990s suggested that organizing conferences and lobbying the state for reforms were
insufficient in prompting the widespread cultural change needed to fully uproot Cosa
Nostra. The Arci Siracusa President explained that at these conferences in the early
1990s, too much time was devoted to dwelling on fallen antimafia heroes, without
effectively challenging these sentiments into productive activities. The organization
recognized, therefore, the need for cultural work and reforms to “fight mafia culture.”373
As the president described, Arci came to believe that “we must work with the people,
with the younger generations, to address what happens when people don’t have chances,
when they don’t believe in parties, government, and institutions, because otherwise
people believe that the mafia boss is the only other solution.”374
Thus, over time Arci has redirected its efforts from targeting the state for political
reforms to targeting society through cultural work in order to dismantle state-mafia
hegemony. The evolution of thought from the mafia as a political to a cultural problem is
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evident in how Arci operates and attempts to address the Cosa Nostra problem through
its two-pronged focus of developing cultural centers and work camps in Sicily.
In the wake of the sweeping legislative reforms of the 1990s, Arci attempts to
dismantle remaining semblances of state-mafia hegemony that still permeate the island.
As previously noted, hegemonic ideology long worked to deny the existence of Cosa
Nostra so as to keep Sicilians ignorant of the mafia’s role in bolstering state authority in
the region. One of the main ways Arci attempts to further an understanding of the
detriments of the state-mafia system is through its “cultural centers” within different
regions in Sicily. These centers are located strategically in areas of poverty, poor
educational opportunities, and high unemployment. Knowing all too well that the mafia
succeeds in “those areas where the moral judgment of public opinions may be
ambivalent,”375 Arci attempts to establish centers of education and learning in at-risk
areas that are suffering under conditions the mafia has proven adept at solving. Thus,
Arci selects Sicilian regions where unemployment rates can be as high as 20% and
dropping out post-secondary school is common, knowing that these are pervasive social
problems upon which the mafia depends for its continued power and influence.376 Arci
locates its centers where “future criminals are likely to be born,”377 and aims to target
younger Sicilians from turning to the mafia as a solution to their multifaceted problems.
The purpose of these centers, therefore, is to deconstruct hegemonic ideals by
raising awareness among Sicilian communities about the true nature and history of the
mafia, and how its activities have directly contributed to the societal issues under which
Sicilians now suffer. Indeed, high dropout rates can be attributed to the mafia’s historical
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control of school construction, which ensured that many educational buildings were
poorly constructed and maintained and lacked necessary resources to encourage children
to stay in school.378
In order to deconstruct hegemonic ideology in regions that have long depended
upon the mafia for certain services, Arci works with youth and families at these cultural
centers to educate Sicilians of the detriments of supporting Cosa Nostra, whether this
support is deliberate or unintentional. Arci volunteers describe this to be a formidable
task; one volunteer described a common mentality among many Sicilian mothers from
impoverished regions who believe that Cosa Nostra is “good” because it provides their
families with basic essentials like bread and money that the state cannot.379 Through these
centers of education and awareness, Arci must work to dismantle deeply pervasive
sentiments that mafia bosses are the most reliable medium through which to receive
essential goods and services. Instead, Arci works to enforce the mentality that the statemafia partnership has directly contributed to the state’s current inability to efficiently
provide for its citizens. The organization therefore operates on the understanding that “as
long as the oppressed remain unaware of the causes of their condition, they fatalistically
‘accept’ their exploitation.”380 Arci works to link Sicilians’ exploitation with Cosa Nostra
by working in areas the mafia commonly preys upon, where “the citizen is weak, when
he thinks he has no choice, where the institutions are inactive.”381 Efforts are hindered,
however, by a “culture of distrust” that has been fostered as a result of Sicilians
historically not being able to rely on the state or institutions for the services they required.
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These cultural centers, therefore, aim to provide Sicilians with a space where discussions
of economic and social problems can be voiced, and where education about the truths of
Cosa Nostra can be shared. Thanks to Arci, which operates these centers in a variety of
regions throughout Sicily, Sicilians no longer need to be “alarmed by the lack of a
neighborhood center where young people might congregate,” which was commonly cited
as a problem in the 1990s that could continue to fuel mafia power if unaddressed.382
Arci cultural centers also serve a second counter-hegemonic aim, which involves
producing organic intellectuals that reconstruct new conceptions of reality for Sicilians
by providing them with ways to live and work outside the state-mafia system. Organic
intellectuals are composed of Arci volunteers that arise from the same Sicilian
communities where cultural centers are located. Arci also creates organic intellectuals
within society through educational campaigns that encourage individuals to return to their
homes and neighborhoods and share their knowledge of state-mafia relations and its
oppressive ramifications. The organization hopes that Sicilians will promote Arci within
their neighborhoods as a center that is dedicated in assisting these individuals in their
efforts to “reclaim political society” and dismantle state-mafia hegemony. By creating
cultural centers where Sicilians can voice their discontentment and come to
understandings of their communal oppression, it is clear that Arci recognizes that “critical
and liberating dialogue, which presupposes action, must be carried on with the oppressed
at whatever the stage of their struggle for liberation” from hegemonic forces.383 Arci
welcomes any and all into its centers, helping to cultivate the knowledge and awareness
among Sicilians necessary before action against state-mafia hegemony can occur. It is
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imperative that these conversations and realizations are brought about by organic
intellectuals arising from similar communities and circumstances as the Sicilians they
attempt to educate, as “the oppressed must be their own example in the struggle for their
redemption” from participating in the hegemonic system if counter-hegemonic ideals are
to be demonstrated as practical and logical.384
An instrumental task before these organic intellectuals is to provide Sicilians with
an alternative way to live and prosper outside of Cosa Nostra. A frequently referenced
hope in Sicily is that “no one would go with the Mafia if they had an alternative.”385
Through its cultural centers, Arci hopes to test this hypothesis by demonstrating to
Sicilians viable economic opportunities outside the mafia system. Arci does this by
investing in the social capital of Sicilians through professional and occupational training
at its cultural centers throughout the island. At the center in Siracusa, for instance,
Sicilians are trained in repairing bicycles—a common means of transportation on the
island. Imperative professional skills are also fostered through hands-on work and
lectures; by fostering skills that Sicilians can derive a living from, Arci demonstrates how
working in a legitimate and dignified job outside of the mafia system can be lucrative.
Arci thereby challenges the mentality among many discontented Sicilians that
“the mafia gave us work, and now the antimafia has taken this work away.”386 It is
important for Arci to prove that the fight against the mafia does not need to imply
declining economic opportunities for Sicilians. Through its cultural centers, Arci works
to provide a place they can go to and rely upon instead of the mafia—not as a service
provider, but simply by demonstrating to Sicilians that they can rely on themselves and
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their own abilities instead of mafiosi. By “working with the hands, and not just the minds
of Sicilians,” cultural centers attend to a two-fold task of dismantling hegemonic
mentalities and putting Sicilians to work in legitimate occupations outside the realm of
the mafia system.
Along with cultural centers, Arci also works through another medium in order to
dismantle mafia hegemony and offer counter-hegemonic alternatives to Sicilians. Thanks
to the early efforts of antimafia organizations, Law 109/96 ensured that antimafia
organizations like Arci would have the opportunity to obtain confiscated mafia assets
from the state in order to reconvert them into socially-beneficial properties.387 Many
mafiosi possess vast, showy estates often sitting upon hundreds of acres of land. Mafia
estates stand in sharp contrast to many urban neighborhoods of concrete that are plagued
by unemployment and poverty. This tangible evidence of mafia power and influence is
highly symbolic, and serves to perpetuate mafia hegemony by suggesting that Cosa
Nostra is the only medium through which Sicilians can attain such a commanding
amount of monetary success and respect. This fallacy is exactly what Arci tries to
dismantle with their seizure of former mafia property. As Roberto Saviano explains, if
mafia assets are not repossessed, “the villas continue to bear the mark of the bosses who
built and lived in them. Even abandoned, they remain symbols of sovereignty.”388 The
importance of Law 109/96 as a mechanism to defeat mafia power becomes clear,
therefore. Through this legislative reform, Arci has acquired a substantial amount of
mafia property that the organization has converted into “work camps” in various regions
of Sicily.
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In 2006, Arci came in possession of a vast estate formerly owned by infamous
mafia boss Bernardo Provenzano—the “reigning boss of bosses” of the post-millennial
mafia.389 This property was in Corleone, a rural area outside of Palermo that has
historically been a mafia-stronghold. Indeed, Corleone was selected as the Sicilian setting
for The Godfather as a result of this notoriety. This exemplifies Arci’s determination to
establish counter-hegemonic initiatives in at-risk areas; an important testament to the
strength of the antimafia movement is whether organizations like Arci can prove adept at
dismantling mafia hegemony in areas long under control by Cosa Nostra, where Sicilians
did not believe there to be any alternative to the state-mafia system, and thus granted
consent to these power structures believing them to represent the normal way of things in
Sicily.
These work camps not only dismantle hegemonic ideology, but also help
conceptualize and forward a new ideology that encourages Sicilians to cultivate their
ability to live outside the state-mafia system. This is a huge task to accomplish in areas
like Corleone where Cosa Nostra has long succeeded in enforcing the mentality that
granting consent to the state-mafia system guarantees the benefits of employment,
income, and other essential services. Individuals come to work on the camps typically for
a period of ten to fifteen days. During this time, education is a large component of the
experience. After work each day, participants attend informative lectures, often led by
prominent antimafia activists. These lectures, by tracing the history of the mafia and
describing state-mafia relations over the years that still continue today, Arci volunteers
help to create more organic intellectuals who return to their home communities after this
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experience and share the knowledge they receive from participating in these cultural
programs.
Through these work camps, Arci also aims to demonstrate how a legitimate and
respectable living can be made outside of the state-mafia system. On these repossessed
lands, Sicilians are able to work in cooperatives, producing agricultural goods and
learning that Cosa Nostra need not represent the only medium through which to find
employment. The individuals who attend these camps are often—but not always—
mentally disabled individuals, troubled youth, and immigrants who otherwise have few
opportunities for employment or education and consequently are often more vulnerable
and likely to turn to Cosa Nostra. These work camps therefore “give people the
opportunities to work and live without having to thank anybody,” encouraging them to
cultivate their own skills, as Sicily’s history has been characterized by favors and
depending upon others for success and opportunities for too long.390 Arci hopes to
overturn this historical trend of feeling indebted to others for opportunities and services
that have been difficult to attain outside of patronage networks and clientelism.
At cultural centers and work camps alike, Arci forces Sicilians to grapple with
their double-consciousnesses, requiring them to evaluate the ways in which they
individually contribute to mafia power through their dependence or passive acquiescence
to status quo power structures. The mafia’s persistent power can be attributed in part to
the fact that many Sicilians continue to act differently in theory versus practice in regards
to Cosa Nostra. Through education, Sicilians are made to see how acquiescence need not
be granted to a hegemonic system that delivers them more harm than benefit. Arci hopes
to encourage the development of critical consciousnesses, as it is when an individual is
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made to evaluate their reality that “he or she comes to a new awareness of self, has a new
sense of dignity, and is stirred by a new hope.”391 By deconstructing false notions of the
benefits of the state-mafia system, Arci hopes to cultivate hope in Sicilians that their own
actions can bring about a new future for Sicily no longer under the oppression of Cosa
Nostra.
At Arci work camps, several goods are produced that can be sold at local markets
for profit. Tomatoes, wine, olive oil, and flour are among the products bearing Arci’s
name and mission statement that find their way to store shelves across Sicily. These
products encourage Sicilians to be conscientious consumers by providing them with a
sure way to avoid perpetuating mafia power by not having to purchase goods like
tomatoes from companies that historically have been mafia-controlled. Through selling
these products, most importantly, Arci is able to derive a profit that can then be
reinvested into the camps. In addition, the sale of these products provides camp workers
with a salary that proves that a living can be made outside of Cosa Nostra through honest
and hard work. This also offers Sicilians with an easy way to contribute to furthering
counter-hegemonic initiatives through daily activities like buying groceries at the market.
While Sicily has made notable progress towards a future that is no longer dictated
by Cosa Nostra, the threats Arci activists face as a result of their antimafia initiatives
attest to the amount of cultural work that still remains to be done in order to dismantle
mafia hegemony at the societal level. These demonstrations of violence are also reflective
of the mafia’s attempt to cling to its declining ability to obtain consent to the hegemonic
system through threat and force. While Arci activities have not gone unchallenged by the
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mafia, it is important to note that the ability of Cosa Nostra to quell activism with fear is
becoming limited as antimafia organizations grow in number and prominence.
In the first year of Arci’s work camp in Corelone, the mafia did not threaten
workers and activists because the criminal organization did not yet fully appreciate what
Arci was aiming to accomplish in the region. The camp merely seemed to be producing
agricultural goods, not furthering an antimafia consciousness or awareness that would
challenge the influence of mafia families living in the area. Nonetheless, within Arci’s
first year in Corleone no local residents were willing to participate out of fear of
retaliation by mafiosi who lived adjacent to the camp. However, over the years as Arci’s
antimafia and counter-hegemonic goals became more well-known within Sicily, Arci has
had to turn away participants as its popularity has grown considerably. Unfortunately,
though, this growing recognition and popularity of Arci’s community work has resulted
in violence and threats from mafiosi who still reside in Corleone and resent how mafia
assets that once strengthened Cosa Nostra domination are now helping to weaken mafia
influence. Cosa Nostra therefore began responding to this challenge by attempting to
weaken Arci’s ability to carry out its counter-hegemonic aims.
In 2008, the vineyards at the Corleone work camp were cut down to destroy the
productivity and profitability of the antimafia property. Consequently, this camp was not
able to produce wine—one of its most lucrative products—for over a year. The Arci
program manager of the Corleone camp has faced personal attack, as well, including
having his car incinerated. Violent retaliation by the mafia is not limited to work camps.
One of Arci’s community centers has been a mafia target in recent years, as well, where
angry mafiosi smashed the windows of the center as an indicator that Cosa Nostra was
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not afraid of this challenge to its authority in the region. Within days, however, women
and children within the community painted murals alongside the building and helped to
repair the damage, attesting to the influence and respect these centers are beginning to
have in at-risk communities. It is clear that Cosa Nostra still relies on the same scare
tactics that the criminal organization relied on in the 1970s-80s to dissuade activists from
challenging mafia power. What is different now, however, is that Sicily is progressing
away from a history largely characterized by “solitary antimafia heroes,” and collective
antimafia action has made it harder for Cosa Nostra to swiftly eliminate and silence
enemies and activists as it once could. Therefore, unlike decades prior, antimafia
activities now garner much attention and support and are not stifled by the mafia before
they achieve any tangible results.
Because Arci is a volunteer-based organization, it is interesting to examine from
what sources it obtains funding to carry out its admirable initiatives. While products from
work camps result in some profit that can be reinvested back into the organization’s
cultural projects, this income is not enough for Arci to carry out its varied goals. Arci is
affiliated with the Leftist Party in Italy, and through this affiliation the organization
attains modest funds from the government. Arci has petitioned the state on several
occasions for funds to purchase the farming equipment necessary for its work camps, for
instance. Arci has also received funding from the European Union which has helped to
buy and repair necessary machinery. Local governments such as Corleone have also
provided funds to Arci, recognizing the organization’s ability to raise awareness and
antimafia sentiment through events and lectures. Thus, governmental funding is put
towards furthering Arci initiatives already in place, and does not pay off Arci workers in
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a way that could potentially compromise their initiatives. Nonetheless, Arci’s tendency to
attract financial support from outside actors has caused some to critique the organization.
In reality, however, many antimafia organizations must rely on some form of external
financial support in order to carry out their cultural projects.
Many Sicilians would prefer antimafia organizations like Arci to not have any
party or state connections, as there is considerable distrust around political parties as a
result of the historical role the Christian Democratic Party played in advancing statemafia hegemony. These anxieties are well-founded, as the state historically has occupied
a muddled relationship with the mafia and the antimafia movement. Most importantly,
these anxieties represent ramifications of state-mafia hegemony, where many now
distrust the state and political parties as a result of their historical role in solidifying the
state-mafia hegemonic bloc. It is also important to note however, that just like the state,
antimafia organizations are not monolithic, and have different needs based on their
unique approaches to the Cosa Nostra problem, which can culminate in the need for
external financial assistance in order to successfully carry out their cultural activities.
Arci has changed from targeting the state to targeting society over time to bring
cultural change to Sicily. Helping to advance the counter-hegemonic antimafia
movement, through cultural centers and work camps Arci works to dismantle mafia
hegemony, provide Sicilians with alternatives to living and working outside of the statemafia system, attack double-consciousnesses still present within many Sicilians, and
create activities and centers that allow Sicilians to easily participate and help advance
counter-hegemony through incorporating these activities into their daily lives.
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LIBERA:
Libera is another antimafia organization operating within Sicily that was
established by priest Don Ciotti in 1995.392 Libera has also changed how it views the
Cosa Nostra problem over time. In line with the general thinking of the 1980s-90s,
Libera was instrumental in petitioning and pressuring the state to enact certain legislative
reforms in the 1990s that would require the state to take a larger role in fighting Cosa
Nostra power in Sicily. Libera was heavily involved in ensuring the passage of Law
109/96, which has helped community antimafia organizations challenge the mafia. This
antimafia organization also was instrumental in lobbying the state to create a national
holiday honoring fallen antimafia martyrs.393 The organization now views the mafia as a
cultural problem, however, that requires more than political efforts to successfully
address. Libera carries out counter-hegemonic cultural work through a dual focus of work
in Sicilian schools and the development of work camps in Sicily.
Working within Sicilian schools is a crucial way Libera attempts to dismantle
remaining hegemonic ideology within Sicilians. Libera’s founder Don Ciotti believed
strongly in the importance of using education as a medium to dismantle mafia power.
This is reminiscent of Gramsci’s notion that schools can be a vital medium for advancing
counter-hegemonic ideals.394 Ciotti based his organization’s initiatives off of the words of
Judge Chinnici—an antimafia martyr in the 1980s—who said to Sicilian youth before his
death that “we can’t make it alone, we can’t make it without you.”395 While educational
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efforts occurred prior to the mid-1990s, it was in 1995 that they most ardently picked up
steam and received the funding and civilian support they needed to continue. The national
Antimafia Commission finally required “education in legality” to enter school
curriculums throughout Sicily in 1993.396 Libera became involved in these initiatives in
1995; because Libera represents an umbrella organization of sorts that coordinates
activities with a variety of other socially-conscious groups,397 Libera’s involvement in
educational campaigns against the mafia ensured that by 1998 “620 schools had
undertaken this type of programme and 1000 projects were underway, involving 8,000
teachers and 800,000 students.”398
Libera school lectures involve a handful of volunteers going into various schools
in regions of Sicily under the effects of poor educational systems and poverty. These
activists are college-educated, fairly young, and usually from the same communities in
which they teach. At a school lecture I attended in Siracusa, the internet and projector
screens were among the varied mediums employed to deconstruct hegemonic ideology.
Video clips and YouTube segments were projected upon the classroom wall in an attempt
to raise awareness about Sicily’s history under the mafia, the history of the antimafia, and
the extent to which the mafia is still powerful today in hopes of showing why it is the
imperative responsibility of every young Sicilian to denounce and fight the mafia. Each
into Sicilian schools, including Act 51 in 1980 but this legislation had “no teeth” and antimafia work in the
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activist spoke at the lecture, delivering his or her own interpretations of the mafia
problem today and what still needed to be done, while also entertaining an array of
questions from the young audience. This open question-and-answer format allowed
young Sicilians to voice their concerns about the mafia phenomenon and its
contemporary manifestations; in this way, Libera created a comfortable space where
these young adults could recognize their ability to “reclaim political society,” working to
challenge instead of reproduce mafia hegemony. By listening to testimonies and appeals
from individuals who grew up under similar socioeconomic conditions and pressures as
the students, the young audience saw visible proof that they too possessed an inherent
ability to fight the mafia through simple daily actions and behaviors, such as remaining
vigilant to evidence of corruption or criminality, and reporting any such activity to the
police.
While Libera activists do not claim to structure their school activities based on
any particular pedagogy, the organization’s teaching methods possess many similarities
to Freire’s ideas about the “pedagogy of the oppressed.”399 Libera works to create
awareness around the suffering of Sicilians under the state-mafia hegemonic system, and
utilizes organic intellectuals from the same communities in which the students live in
order to help guide them into counter-hegemony by “fighting by their side to transform
the objective reality which has made them ‘beings of another.’”400 Libera activist Davide
described these lectures as “a risk,” because getting Sicilian youth to acknowledge their
disempowerment under the oppressive state-mafia system and then mobilizing them to
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recognize their ability to challenge hegemony can be incredibly difficult.401 Davide noted
the importance of being passionate and pragmatic when encouraging the students to
participate in counter-hegemonic initiatives.402 Practicality is crucial in order to overcome
the “fear of freedom,” where individuals long under hegemonic forces are tentative to
claim agency outside of a hegemonic system to which they had no choice but to
acquiesce.403 In order to do overcome this fear, Libera strives to provide the students with
real-life, everyday examples of when and how to fulfill their civic duties of furthering the
antimafia cause and suggesting that a community stands behind them to support and
encourage this action. It is clear that Libera operates on the realization that “it is always
through action in depth that the culture of domination is culturally confronted.”404 Young
Sicilians need to be shown how exactly to incorporate counter-hegemony into their lives
and dismantle hegemonic forces, as these practices and ideals do not appear natural
within a population that has long been subjected to a hegemonic system.
A central aspect of Libera’s school initiatives is to suggest that Sicilians have a
civic responsibility to fight the mafia, urging them to overturn centuries of acquiescence
and apathy to power structures they believed themselves to possess no ability to fight or
challenge. Libera thus must work against the hegemonic ideology that long
conceptualized the mafia as “not only invincible but indeed untouchable.”405 Libera also
works to deconstruct the notion of sicilianismo. This historical fallacy, which suggests
that the mafia exists in Sicily because Sicilians are inherently criminal-minded, has
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manifested in further consent to state-mafia hegemony.406 At the lecture in Siracusa, a
YouTube clip was shown of two comedians debating about why they are “Proud to be
Sicilian,” thereby challenging the idea that Sicilians possess something rudimentary that
has culminated in their suffering under Cosa Nostra.
During the 1980s, Sicilian writer Leonardo Sciascia discouragingly voiced his
disbelief in the capacity of ordinary Sicilians to organize for change. Sciascia
consequently implied that Sicilians would be forever oppressed under the mafia
phenomenon because “in any Sicilian, the residuals of mafia feeling are still present and
alive, so that fighting the mafia is like fighting against myself…a split, a laceration.”407 In
doing so, Sciascia voiced sentiments that had been continually expressed since Italian
unification in 1860.408 At this time, two Italians, Franchetti and Sonnino wrote an early
account of the state of Sicily meant to inform state authorities and northern Italians. In
this account, the men suggested that Sicilians were akin to “the ‘savages’ of North
America, incapable of civilization unless guided by outsiders,” where the “smell of
rotting corpses” enveloped what would otherwise be a picturesque island.409 It also was
widely held for many years that Sicilians possessed a natural disregard for legality and
were naturally inclined to criminal tendencies.410 All of these individuals failed to
appreciate the extent to which state-mafia hegemony had limited the ability of Sicilians to
collectively organize and redirect their futures, not any inadequacy inherent to Sicilians.
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Thus, Sicilians have had to overcome centuries of prominent individuals not believing in
their ability to overturn apathy and actively work for change.411
Consequently, Libera faces a significant battle in attempting to convince young
Sicilians that the mafia does not represent an “irreversible destiny” of Sicily. Instead, the
organization works to suggest that every Sicilian possesses the ability, and indeed the
responsibility, to join in the fight against the mafia. Central to Libera’s ability to make
these requests of the student exists in demonstrating to the young audience that the
hardest antimafia efforts have already been accomplished. Thanks to courageous
individuals like dalla Chiesa, Impastato, Falcone, and Borsellino—to name a few—
ordinary Sicilians no longer have to sacrifice their lives on behalf of the antimafia cause.
In short, the groundwork has already been laid for future generations to continue the fight
against Cosa Nostra. Libera therefore works to highlight the practicality of contributing
to the antimafia movement, by showing that small efforts can be effortlessly incorporated
into daily activities and behaviors without requiring any substantial sacrifices.
Encouraging the students to remember the efforts of Falcone and Borsellino, Libera
activists passed out a quote from Falcone that read “yes I am afraid, but we all should be
more courageous.” Libera hopes to dismantle mafia hegemony to the point of no return,
therefore, fearing that Sicily’s historical trend of largely not standing up to mafia power
might relapse if future generations are not actively incorporated into the antimafia
fight.412
Libera encourages students to engage in critical and independent thinking in order
to see the truths about Cosa Nostra and how the state-mafia hegemonic system has
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exploited them. Libera activists persuade young Sicilians to look beyond the media and
instead turn to investigative journalism outlets outside of Italy and literature by authors
such as Roberto Saviano that offer a clearer understanding of the contemporary fight
against Cosa Nostra. As a former Customs Officer suggested, “in Italy it is hard to find
the truth, and the media makes it hard to find out how strong the mafia still is” because
the major media networks are owned and controlled by Berlusconi.413 Libera pushes
Sicilian youth to look past the confines around which they have grown up and been
educated, and to look for truth about how Cosa Nostra does not benefit them, and
historically has only served the ends of the mafia itself and the Italian state. Promoting a
society that is critical in its thinking and attuned to its environment is instrumental in
ensuring the widespread adoption of counter-hegemony in Sicily.
By working in Sicilian schools, Libera hopes to create future generations of
organic intellectuals who will work within their home communities, furthering
understandings of the importance of the antimafia movement and the need to maintain a
vigilant and intolerant culture against Cosa Nostra. One way the organization does this is
by promoting its Facebook page, which helps to further an understanding of the group’s
aims and efforts, while also creating a collective community that young Sicilians can
join, recognizing that they have support and encouragement to carry forth counterhegemonic initiatives through daily efforts. In addition, the use of popular social media
sites like Facebook and YouTube represents Libera’s attempt to “sell the antimafia
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movement as ‘cool’” to younger generations, while simultaneously helping to
deglamorize Cosa Nostra.414
School initiatives that Libera promotes also attend to the counter-hegemonic task
of dismantling double-consciousnesses in many Sicilians that contribute to the
reproduction of the hegemonic state-mafia system. This is instrumental because
individuals must be made to recognize that “they are perpetuating oppression in order to
claim the ability to challenge this oppression.”415 Through working with Sicilian youth,
Ciotti hopes to drive home the message that inaction is the same as participation in Cosa
Nostra, suggesting that “the real mafia is the mafia of words, the ones said by those that
do not actually act against organized crime, but limit their contribution to the cause to
declarations of disdain.”416 The organization’s members, therefore, through question and
answer sessions as well as lectures, encourages the students to think of how their
passivity and acquiescence helps perpetuate mafia power. Consequently, a successful
antimafia movement depends on active engagement and steadfast commitment. As
founder Don Ciotti suggested, it is not enough to merely pass moral judgment upon the
mafia; Sicilians must actively denounce and fight against all expression of illegality and
criminality that they see. Davide, a Libera activist, noted that Sicily’s history under the
state-mafia system has encouraged “blindness” among youth to organized crime and
violence—something that must be curbed if the movement will succeed in stripping Cosa
Nostra of its influence. By encouraging vigilance among Sicily’s youth, Libera thereby
hopes to avoid the “backlash” of declining civilian awareness and participation in the
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antimafia movement, which represents a possibility if “double consciousnesses” continue
to pervade Sicilian mentalities.417 Defeating “double-consciousnesses,” and requiring
Sicilians to fight the mafia with more than empty words, Libera works counterhegemonically to dismantle the influence the mafia has long possessed over the land.
Libera does not limit its cultural activities to educational work in schools,
however. Simiarly to Arci, Libera advances counter-hegemonic antimafia efforts through
a two-pronged approach, also establishing work camps to invest in and promote the
integrity and capacity of Sicilians. By converting mafia property into counter-hegemonic
spaces for education and work, Libera dismantles hegemonic ideology and attempts to
show Sicilians “the whole history of the mafia in this region,” using these properties as
“laboratories for legality.”418 Libera aims to ensure that “the locals don’t see the mafia
anymore as the only institution they can trust,” furthering the same mentality that Arci
promotes through its respective camps.419 The subdivision of Libera devoted to creating
work camps, deemed Libera Terra, hopes to “create a different future for their children,
in their own territory, a future free from the culture of violence and corruption.”420 A clip
of Ciotti at his early work camps was shown at the Libera lecture in Siracusa, which
referenced how early Libera Terra activists in the mid-1990s felt intense psychological
pressure to give up out of fear, watching other activists and state authorities being killed
for acting against Cosa Nostra. In showing this film segment, it was meant to suggest that
to fight the mafia “today is much easier, and we are not as alone” as many of the early
antimafia activists such as Falcone were. Moreover, by demonstrating to students the
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varied ways in which Libera works, it was suggested that there are many ways in which
Sicilians can participate in furthering the antimafia cause.
Many of the products from Libera Terra’s work camps invoke the memory of past
antimafia heroes, such as “Centopassi” wine that refers to Giuseppe Impastato and his
fight against Cosa Nostra when prominent bosses lived a mere “hundred steps” away
from his home.421 By invoking the spirit and memory of past intellectuals, Libera Terra
promotes the development of organic intellectuals, while also helping to empower
consumers by providing them with the means to purchase products that directly reject
mafia hegemony. Moreover, Libera work camps pride themselves on manufacturing
high-quality products, and thus a substantial profit is derived from the production of
wine, especially. The profitability of wine products reinforces counter-hegemonic
ideology by proving that lucrative opportunities exist outside of the mafia system.422 In
addition, purchasing these counter-hegemonic goods “means to join and uphold those
entrepreneurial activities that aim to foster a different kind of Sicily.”423 Therefore, by
working on the camps or consuming socially-conscious products, Libera offers Sicilians
ways to further counter-hegemonic efforts through simple and practical daily efforts,
helping to prove that the “common man” can carry on the vision of a Sicily free from
Cosa Nostra.424
Libera’s school lectures and work camps both tend to counter-hegemonic ends.
This two-pronged approach to fighting Cosa Nostra allows Libera to continue to
dismantle hegemonic ideology, create organic intellectuals that further an awareness of
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the mafia and the need to actively fight against its presence, deconstruct doubleconsciousnesses within Sicilians, and provide Sicilians with practical ways of
participating in the counter-hegemonic movement.
ADDIOPIZZO:
Another antimafia organization operating counter-hegemonically in Sicily is
Addiopizzo. This represents a relatively young antimafia group, established by young
Sicilian businessmen in 2004.425 When a group of Sicilian men began preparations for
establishing their own bar, they became discomforted when they realized they needed to
account for pizzo in their projected monthly expenditures.426 In Palermo at this time, and
even today, many businesses still pay this symbolic tribute to the mafia. Resenting having
to account for profit lost to extortion, the young businessmen launched their own
antimafia organization in hopes of encouraging other businessmen to denounce the mafia
and refuse to pay the pizzo, while simultaneously hoping to prompt a consumer
revolution that would entice shoppers to purchase only from pizzo-free stores.427
Addiopizzo, meaning “goodbye, pizzo,” was their organization.428 The organization,
according to former Addiopizzo president Francesco Bertolino, drew inspiration from the
earlier efforts of Libero Grassi, an ordinary Sicilian business owner who refused to pay
the mafia pizzo.429 As a result of his deviation from the hegemonic system that Cosa
Nostra patrolled with scrutiny and violent repercussions, Grassi died in the 1990s. Grassi
was easily eliminated as a threat to the mafia because of his solitude, as other business
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owners were too fearful to join or stand behind him.430 It is Addiopizzo’s goal to create a
collective community of pizzo-denouncers so that no Sicilian needs to feel ill-supported
in his or her fight against mafia hegemony as Grassi did.
Addiopizzo launched itself onto the antimafia scene in a provocative way. One
night in Palermo, the young business partners plastered the city with stickers proclaiming
“a population that pays pizzo is a population without dignity.”431 Framing the antimafia
fight in moral terms, and making denunciation synonymous with dignity, had a particular
sway over many, as this represented a tactic that was not used much prior to
Addiopizzo.432 To many Sicilians, this rhetoric represented the “ultimate insult”433 and
was mobilizing because it suggested that acquiescence to the mafia system essentially
represented granting support to Cosa Nostra and its continued rule over the island.
Silence against extortion, therefore, was depicted as “the guiltiest accomplice.”434
Framing the fight against Cosa Nostra in this way was successful because it created an
“us versus them” mentality, implying that Sicilians who failed to participate in “critical
consumption” or denunciation against the mafia were carrying on an unfortunate and
repugnant historical trend of compliance with Cosa Nostra. In addition, this incendiary
rhetoric demonstrated how the seemingly insignificant, traditional “act of submission” to
pizzo actually did much to reinforce mafia dominance and hegemony.435 Therefore, this
framing technique worked to enforce the idea that the mafia was not a normal authority to
which Sicilians should acquiesce. Addiopizzo worked to discourage acquiescence to the
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state-mafia system, therefore, by labeling those who did not participate in “reclaiming
political society” away from the hegemonic system as immoral and undignified.
By making pizzo submission synonymous with direct support of Cosa Nostra,
Addiopizzo called upon Sicilians to face their “double-consciousnesses.” While many
business owners in the 1990s may have denounced the mafia with words, a rare few were
willing to physically stand up against Cosa Nostra—a violent organization that had
repeatedly proven its resolve to wage war against anyone who did not grant consent to
the state-mafia system. In addition, plastering the city with these provocative stickers
helped to further the antimafia cause by encouraging the production of organic
intellectuals who would think critically about how their own actions were perpetuating
the hegemonic system, and mobilize others within their community to stand together in
solidarity against Cosa Nostra.
Addiopizzo’s success depends on its ability to convince Sicilians that an
alternative to the hegemonic system exists. Therefore, Addiopizzo is counter-hegemonic
in nature because it generates networks of support and solidarity for business owners that
pledge to no longer submit to the mafia through the pizzo tribute. For instance, in the
mid-2000s the organization put up billboards reading “contro l’estorsione non sei solo,”
meaning “against extortion, you are not alone.”436 Through this message, Addiopizzo
worked to create a feeling of community and collectivity around the fight against the
mafia, ensuring that business owners and consumers would no longer have to stand alone
in their courageous acts of denouncing. Addiopizzo suggests that business owners need
not be fearful of denunciation, as they not only have support from fellow business
owners, but also from new laws that guarantee protection for mafia denouncers. The
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organization attempts to show Sicilians, therefore, that “the State is there and intends to
help its citizens” who are committed to fighting Cosa Nostra through daily actions.437
Business owners in Sicily are enticed to join Addiopizzo and its counterhegemonic initiatives because the organization has proven its ability to guarantee
lucrative benefits through affiliation with the organization and through pizzo
denunciation. Many incentives await those who denounce Cosa Nostra; not only do
businesses save a substantial amount of money that would normally be reserved for Cosa
Nostra pizzo in the summer, Christmas, and Easter,438 but Addiopizzo also has a
commanding number of affiliates who pledge to consume products exclusively from
pizzo-free stores. Therefore, mafia denouncers no longer need to fear substantial financial
repercussions from mafia denouncement as they once did.
Today Addiopizzo is one of the foremost antimafia organizations in Sicily
because it has succeeded in generating a consortium of hundreds of local businesses that
stand in solidarity against Cosa Nostra. Moreover, Addiopizzo has also created an
emporium where consumers can go to purchase necessities and gifts with the guarantee
that none of the money derived from their purchases supports the mafia. Addiopizzo also
engages in conscious-tourism ventures, leading educational antimafia tours in Palermo
for curious visitors while also generating literature and advertisements about where to
shop and stay without supporting Cosa Nostra. Addiopizzo has thus created positive
publicity for businesses willing to denounce both inside and outside Sicily, which has
helped secure these businesses with profits through promoting them to tourists and
“dignified” Sicilians alike.
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Through banding conscious businessmen together in emporiums and consumer
networks, Addiopizzo works counter-hegemonically, showing Sicilian business owners
and consumers that “being on the side of legality does not mean to be a loser and,
actually, can also be profitable.”439 Because pizzo is a form of symbolic submission,440
refusing to pay such is a hegemonic blow to Cosa Nostra, one that suggests Addiopizzo
is helping to bring about a counter-hegemonic era where businessmen and consumers no
longer need to acquiesce to status quo power structures. This stands in stark contrast,
therefore, to decades of thought under mafia hegemony where Sicilians widely believed
that the only sure way to prosper and survive was through participation in and
acquiescence to the mafia system.
On several occasions, Cosa Nostra has attempted to challenge Addiopizzo’s
assault against its symbolic power, but the mafia has failed in coercing business owners
into submission due to Addiopizzo’s ability to create networks of solidarity where
Sicilians feel protected and encouraged to denounce. Violence against Addiopizzo
activists has been rare, although one recent example includes activist Rodolfo Guajana,
whose hardware store was torched by mafiosi.441 Former president Bertolino concedes
that “there is still fear and it is understandable,” but Addiopizzo works to quell these
uncertainties by creating communities of denouncers who can derive support and
protection from one another. Nonetheless, fear that is still present in Sicilian society can
be understood as a lasting remnant of Cosa Nostra’s historical ability to patrol nonconsent to the state-mafia system with threats or demonstrations of violence.
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While the mafia attempts to rely on old tactics of reproducing hegemony using
threat and violence in the absence of spontaneous consent, these tactics hold little power
among groups who have demonstrated their ability to stand together in denouncement of
these hegemonic mechanisms. Today Addiopizzo boasts a business membership of over
400 stores, with many more Sicilians also pledging to engage in critical
consumption.442Addiopizzo tour guides proudly sport their antimafia t-shirts as they lead
curious tourists down the same streets where antimafia activists were once killed a
decade ago. One tour guide, Eduardo, claims he is not fearful because it is not prudent for
Cosa Nostra to strike against an organization whose activities do not deliver a substantial
economic blow to the mafia. Fellow Addiopizzo activists have voiced similar sentiments,
suggesting that Addipizzo represents “little fish”443 in a larger antimafia sea, and Cosa
Nostra must now be strategic in its use of violence amongst an increasingly intolerant and
vigilant society.444 The pizzo accounts for a small percentage of mafia power, which is
why the mafia does not target stores who proudly display the Addiopizzo sticker in their
storefronts. The power of denying the pizzo, therefore, is not in its economic, but rather
its symbolic ramifications. By overturning a tradition of submitting to mafia domination,
Addiopizzo delivers a more significant blow to mafia hegemony than if the organization
was depriving Cosa Nostra merely of economic power.
As Bertolino suggests, Addiopizzo’s success to date as well as the limited
violence the group has faced reside in the fact that “the businessman feels protects and
knows that the institutions will reimburse and assist him after his denunciation.”445
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Moreover, pizzo denouncers have often demonstrated their resolve to fight the mafia in
the courts, as well, testifying against extortionists that long targeted their businesses.
Cosa Nostra recognizes these businesses as lost causes not worth targeting because the
mafia’s threats of violence and coercion hold no weight among these individuals who
derive protection and support from the alternative medium of Addiopizzo. 446 It is
evident, therefore, the strides Addiopizzo is making in Palermo at moving past the history
of the 1990s and Libero Grassi, where brave businessmen stood alone in their decisions
to denounce, and unknowingly were forced to make the ultimate sacrifice to further the
antimafia movement.
Addiopizzo engages in counter-hegemonic initiatives in its attempt to erase the
influence Cosa Nostra possesses over the minds of Sicilian business owners and
consumers. By engaging in public awareness campaigns and plastering cities with
evocative antimafia slogans, Addiopizzo deconstructs mafia hegemony, creates organic
intellectuals aware and intolerant of pizzo, and creates pragmatic mediums through which
ordinary Sicilians can participate in counter-hegemonic efforts by generating stores
where pizzo-free products can be purchased, for instance. By creating a sense of
community around its counter-hegemonic activities, Addiopizzo shows that communal
and personal benefits can be derived from mafia denunciation.

IL MOVIMENTO AGENDE ROSSE
The “Movement of the Red Diaries” is another antimafia organization operating
in Sicily. Paolo Borsellino’s brother, Salvatore, started the organization in the wake of his
father’s murder. The Red Diaries was formed in order to investigate the death of Paolo
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Borsellino, in the hopes of proving who within both the state and Cosa Nostra were
complicit in this planned murder. The name of the organization refers to Borsellino’s
infamous “red diary” in which he kept his most coveted notes and ideas about Cosa
Nostra. It is rumored that this diary also contained leads on which mafiosi were likely
involved in the murder of his friend and ally, Giovanni Falcone, who was killed a mere
two months prior to Borsellino’s own death. What is undeniable is that the red diary
contained testimonies from pentiti that revealed the identities of several state authorities
who had intimate ties with Cosa Nostra. Borsellino’s red diary disappeared from the
scene of his death, leading many Sicilians to question who was involved in the crime and
what incriminating evidence was in the diary.447
When the Red Diaries began, the organization focused on political initiatives to
dismantle mafia power. The primary activity of the group at this time was pressuring the
state to conduct thorough investigations into the death of Paolo Borsellino. The
organization believed that, as a result of his work with pentiti, Borsellino possessed
incriminating information about state authorities involved in aiding Cosa Nostra power,
and thus hoped that putting pressure on the state would entice those complicit to come
forward. As one Red Diary activist explained, however, in the 1990s with this focus on
the state, “we couldn’t resolve the mafia problem because it is not a political problem. It
no longer is about judges or politicians, it is a cultural problem.”448 This volunteer
explained that there are two ways to address the mafia phenomenon: 1) repressively
through legislation and police, and 2) by educating the youth through cultural work. The
time for the latter is now, the young activist acknowledged, as repressive advances were
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incredibly strengthened in the ‘80s-‘90s and the “laws are beginning to do their job.”449 It
is apparent that the Red Diaries have redirected their efforts from political to cultural
work, therefore, based on the recognition that the state was not the only agent that could
be mobilized to dismantle Cosa Nostra.
The Red Diaries is committed to dismantling state-mafia hegemony just as
Borsellino was attempting to do before his untimely death. Immediately following the
magistrate’s assassination, the organization engaged in publicizing information about
Borsellino’s work that had uncovered the extent of the state’s involvement with Cosa
Nostra in order to educate Sicilians about the strength of state-mafia alliances. As
Borsellino’s diary possessed incriminating evidence of state-mafia ties, the organization
continues to raise awareness of symbiotic state-mafia relations that the hegemonic bloc
long worked to discourage. As Salvatore Borsellino, the organization’s founder, stated:
“He certainly would have informed public opinion of the negotiation [between the state and
mafia], should there have been no other way of stopping it. For this reason it was of vital
importance that he be eliminated.”450 Through carrying on the ideology Borsellino devoted

his life to promoting, the Red Diaries ensure that Cosa Nostra did not simultaneously kill
Sicilians’ ability to call attention to state-mafia ties and demand reforms to end this
historical system of symbiosis through their killing of the magistrate.
Organizing rallies and public events, the Red Diaries operate throughout Italy in
order to pay homage to Borsellino’s efforts and remember that state-mafia complicity is
not a thing of the past. The associate thereby promotes the recognition that the
449
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eradication of these compromising relations depends on the maintenance of a society that
is intolerant of such corruption. Another way the Red Diaries promotes awareness about
the state-mafia system is through the production of educational videos about electoral
corruption; interviewing Sicilians about their experiences during past elections when
mafiosi attempted to buy their votes, Red Diaries hopes to draw attention to this
prominent connection still linking the mafia and the Italian state that Sicilians must resist
in order to put pressure on the hegemonic bloc. These educational campaigns create
organic intellectuals who show Sicilians that the state-mafia system is not natural, nor
something to which they should grant approval—passively or otherwise.
Another way the Red Diaries works to dismantle pervasive hegemonic ideology is
by working with Sicilian youth. Hegemonic ideology that has long suggested state-mafia
relations are natural and that this system delivers benefits to Sicilians has manifested in
Cosa Nostra’s continued appeal among the youth. The mafia is not an organization of
criminals, but rather of artists, the Red Diary activist described. One must possess
specific skills and character in order to join, as it is not enough merely to be willing to
engage in criminality. Particularly today, when repressive legislation has had the effect
of changing mafia operations into more elusive markets, Cosa Nostra no longer
showcases its influence in a public way on the streets of Sicily as it once did. Rather, the
mafia of today is much more concerned with skillfully extracting political alliances,
contracts, and legal immunity from the state, away from the increasingly watchful eye of
citizens. Consequently, mafiosi must possess certain skills in order to be an asset to the
modern-day Cosa Nostra, whose aims and tactics have changed over times as a result of
changing political climates.
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With tremendous funds now coming into Southern Italy from the international
community in order to boost crime fighting, development, and address economic
problems, it is more prudent than ever for the mafia to infiltrate public offices and have a
say in the distribution of these funds. The President of the district of Ortigia—a small
island off of Sicily that recently hosted a G8 conference—notes that significant money
from the European Community now floods into Sicily, and that “the mafia takes a lot of
this money, making up fake projects and activities. Where there is money, the mafia is
ready.”451 Thus, contemporary mafiosi are not the unintelligent thugs and “combatants”
they are stereotypically depicted as, and are rather selected based on the possession of
certain marketable “talents,” and overlooked if they do not comply to certain standards
regardless of familial affiliation.452 As the Ortigia President described, “we shouldn’t
confuse mafia with micro-criminal activity. The mafia is smart, you must have a
management-oriented mind. You can’t simply be a criminal.”453 Belonging to this art,
this “political ideal” continues to attract people, the Red Diary activist explained.
The Red Diaries works to delegitimize Cosa Nostra in the eyes of young Sicilians
by deglamorizing the criminal organization. The organization stations its activities in
regions affected by the underlying problems that perpetuate mafia power, including
unemployment, poor educational systems, and illegality. In many poor neighborhoods,
urban youth learn at a young age how to avoid police, steal, sneak out at night, and avoid
school. These are youth problems the Red Diaries work to address in the absence of an
effective state presence in these areas like Siracusa, for instance. The Red Diaries is
working against a pervasive historical trend, however; as prominent pentito Antonio
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Calderone attested to, the strength of the mafia lies in the fact that “around every man of
honor of a certain rank is always a circle of twenty or thirty kids—nobodies who want to
become something…there to do small favors, to be put to the test…”454
Based on this recognition, the Red Diaries organization works with boys 10-12
years old who have already learned to steal mopeds and shoot guns. It is precisely in
these regions where the mafia is strong. For example, while in Campania, a Red Diary
activist worked among youth who were enamored by Cosa Nostra—wanting to see
pictures of their properties and assets, as well as of the jail cells where once prominent
cappomafia spend the rest of their years. This intrigue needs to be carefully managed; it
can be channeled into a fascination with antimafia education and the antimafia cause, or
it can be unaddressed and mismanaged, which would consequently add to the
glamorization of Cosa Nostra as a medium for respect and success. By working among
the youth, Red Diaries works to deconstruct mafia hegemony that has long had the effect
of suggesting that violence and illegality are acceptable and normal. Moreover, Red
Diaries hopes to bring attention to the real societal problems perpetuating mafia power,
promoting awareness through lectures and community events that Cosa Nostra need not
be the solution for these problems of unemployment and destitution, but instead should
be blamed for amplifying these problems in Sicily and contributing to the state’s
ineffectuality in mitigating these ills.
The Red Diaries not only deconstructs mafia hegemony, but also works to offer
an alternative conception of reality to Sicilians that further encourages the youth to look
outside the state-mafia system for livelihood and needed services. One main problem, an
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activist described, is that “people like belonging to something.”455 Having a sense of
purpose and a semblance of community have long been features of Cosa Nostra. The fact
that a collective identity is derived from participation in this organization—where
nicknames are given to members and a unique “code language” marks those among the
organization’s ranks—attracts young Sicilians.456 The youth remain intrigued by this
elusive organization and its secrecy of tactics and rituals, believing that membership in
Cosa Nostra “situates them ‘outside’ normal society, and, in their view, ‘above’ it.”457
Thus, the success of this counter-hegemonic movement depends on its ability to offer an
alternative to the state-mafia system that attracts Sicilian youth and provides them with a
new group in which to belong. In order to do this, Red Diaries attempts to showcase the
antimafia movement as “cool,” responsible for imprisoning immoral criminal bosses who
have long oppressed Sicilians. The Red Diaries seeks to create a collective community of
young Sicilians who pledge to uphold legality, civic responsibility, and stay in school.
Red Diaries teaches the youth that they will be valued for their contributions to society in
fighting the mafia, and that la lotta contro la mafia is an important and respectable
struggle in which all upstanding citizens should participate.
The Red Diaries association also works counter-hegemonically in its attempts to
call attention to the “double consciousnesses” within many Sicilians that effectively stifle
the ability of civil society to dismantle hegemony. One Red Diary volunteer describes an
important event in Sicily following Borsellino’s death that highlights this debilitating
feature still present in many Sicilians. The volunteer discussed a young Sicilian girl, Rita
Atria, who spoke out against the mafia in the 1980s-90s even though her father was a
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mafioso.458 She delivered her testimonies to Borsellino, and felt protected enough as a
result of her friendship with this magistrate to continue her denunciations. When
Borsellino was murdered in 1992, however, the 23-year-old girl threw herself from her
balcony, knowing that no one could protect her any longer from Cosa Nostra and its
resolve to eliminate all denouncers.459 Her own mother, disgusted and horrified at her
daughter’s involvement in the antimafia movement, vandalized her daughter’s grave after
the funeral.460 Rita’s mother therefore embodied the double consciousnesses her daughter
believed existed in many Sicilians when she proclaimed prior to her death that “we
cannot defeat the mafia until we kill the mafia within ourselves.”461
The Red Diaries uses this example as rationale for the need to educate Sicilians of
the differences in mentality they possess between “theory and practice.” Many are not
aware of the effect their silence has in perpetuating mafia power. Red Diaries,
particularly in its work among Sicilian youth, urges that the antimafia is not about words
or simply waving a flag and proclaiming a dedication to legality. “The power of the
antimafia,” the volunteer explains, “is in denunciations and helping judges to make
arrests.”462 Because Cosa Nostra still possesses important political ties and, therefore,
impunity, it is the role of ordinary citizens to actively denounce against any expression of
corruption. As the activist noted, “Borsellino told us it was not time to cry, it’s time to
work. But every year, we are still mourning heroes, not working.”463 The Red Diaries,
therefore, creates solidarity networks of support that encourage active work in the
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antimafia cause, helping to mobilize and effectively channel antimafia sentiment into a
productive fight against Cosa Nostra.
By bringing organic intellectuals into Sicilian schools and “at risk” communities,
Red Diaries helps to demonstrate to Sicilians that counter-hegemony can be incorporated
into simple, everyday activities. It is not the goal of the Red Diaries to enlist young
Sicilians to join the antimafia organization, but rather to encourage the youth to stay in
school and learn values and ideals that will allow them to contribute to the antimafia fight
when they are older. A Red Diaries activist suggests that the antimafia fight is one in
which all Sicilians can participate in by being citizens of legality and by denouncing any
expression of criminality that they witness. Thus, the Red Diaries shows the youth in
Sicily that they need not be fearful of denouncing Cosa Nostra, and rather can feel
confident that fellow Sicilians and the state support them in the fulfillment of their civic
responsibilities.
Red Diaries is evidently a counter-hegemonic antimafia organization, as it works
to dismantle hegemonic ideology by deglamorizing Cosa Nostra in the eyes of Sicilian
youth, provides Sicilians with a new way of conceptualizing their realities outside the
state-mafia system, tackles double-consciousnesses in a way that encourages Sicilians to
put into practice their antimafia sentiments, and lastly promotes simple ways in which
Sicilians can incorporate counter-hegemonic activities into their everyday lives.
SUMMARY: Thus, it is clear that Arci, Libera, Addiopizzo, and the Red Diaries are
counter-hegemonic organizations working to dismantle Cosa Nostra’s power and
influence in Sicily. These organizations have unique interpretations of why the mafia
remains strong in Sicily today, which dictates their slightly different methods of
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approaching the mafia problem. What these four organizations share in common,
however, is that they all consider the mafia to be a cultural problem requiring cultural
reforms to effectively address, believing political reforms and targeting the state to no
longer be as expedient. Moreover, all four organizations advance the counter-hegemonic
antimafia movement by attending to remaining semblances of hegemonic ideology,
producing organic intellectuals that reframe reality for Sicilians and pose alternative ways
to live and prosper outside the state-mafia system, attacking the double-consciousnesses
of Sicilians, and finally by creating ways in which ordinary Sicilians can incorporate
counter-hegemonic activities seamlessly into their daily lives and everyday behaviors.
As Gramsci described, the longer hegemonic forces are in power, the longer it
takes for a counter-hegemonic movement to dismantle these pervasive ideologies and
power structures. Because state-mafia hegemony solidified over a period of nearly 120
years before receiving widespread challenge, the antimafia movement will take time to
fully remove and mitigate the effects Cosa Nostra has had upon the attitudes and
mentalities of Sicilians. The recognition of the long-term nature of this counterhegemonic movement, however, is precisely what serves as the fuel that propels
antimafia organizations forward despite uncertain political climates, frequently evolving
and changing their strategies in hopes of better reaching a population that still bears deep
scars from Cosa Nostra that cannot easily be removed. There is considerable reason for
hope, however. In the words of magistrate Paolo Borsellino, the antimafia fight has
managed to persevere “in spite of everything”—in spite of historical trends of fear and
apathy, violence against deviance from the state-mafia system, and in spite of symbiotic
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relations that still persist between state and mafia.464 “In spite of everything,” the
antimafia movement will continue to wage its counter-hegemonic attack on Cosa Nostra.
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CONCLUSION:
This thesis has built upon existing scholarly literature on the antimafia movement
in Sicily, but has also attempted to fill the void in this scholarship by examining the
contemporary nature of la lotta contro la mafia and how it has changed since its origins
in the 1980s. While much has been written about the unique aims of the movement and
the challenges it faces in attempting to deliver widespread cultural change to Sicily, the
disproportional scholarly attention the movement has received in recent years compared
to the 1980s has resulted in a lack of understanding about how the movement has
changed its strategy from no longer targeting the state, but rather focusing on society as
the agent that will bring Sicily into a future no longer defined by Cosa Nostra. This thesis
has employed Gramscian theory to understand why it was prudent for the movement to
work both within and outside the state in order to bring fundamental changes to the
island. Gramsci’s ideas of hegemony clearly elucidate the formidable challenge the
antimafia movement faces in eradicating physical and ideological domination that has
become entrenched for over a century, deeply pervading Sicily’s economy, politics, and
culture.
By using this Gramscian framework, this thesis has sought to explain how civil
society is attempting to dismantle the state-mafia hegemonic bloc in Sicily through the
antimafia movement. This movement first began in the 1980s, when magistrates
Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino aptly recognized growing fissures between the
Italian state and Cosa Nostra as an opportunity to launch an attack against this hegemonic
system that had long dominated Sicily. Fissures were always present within the
hegemonic bloc, but were historically mitigated due to the similar aims and desires of the
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two hegemons, which long served to hold these two powers intertwined and dependent
upon one another. Changing circumstances in the 1970s-80s, however, put pressure on
these tenuous fissures as the mafia grew richer through the drug market and began
neglecting its roles of protecting citizens and enforcing order—roles that the state
depended on Cosa Nostra to carry out. The “Second Mafia War,” which jeopardized the
safety and lives of Sicilians and state authorities, consequently produced deep fissures
between the state and mafia, but also within the state itself.
Falcone and Borsellino utilized their unique political maneuverability as
magistrates to play upon these fissures, encouraging Sicilians to recognize their
unprecedented opportunity to dismantle the state-mafia system. Through working with
mafia pentiti, the magistrates gained critical knowledge about the extent of state-mafia
ties, as well as the various hegemonic apparatuses within Sicilian society that worked
daily to reproduce and strengthen hegemony. With this information, the magistrates knew
what sources of mafia power to target in order to attend to the first task of counterhegemony, which Gramsci describes to be the dismantling of hegemonic ideology.
The unremorseful demonstrations of mafia power in the 1980s against civilians
and the state, alike, convinced Falcone and Borsellino of the need to target the Italian
state to enact political reforms that would end its symbiotic relationship with the mafia.
The mafia had grown strong over a period of 120 years of state delegation and
accommodation, but this trend could continue no longer. These magistrates, therefore,
encouraged Sicilians to join la lotta contro la mafia by pressuring the state to adopt
legislative reforms against Cosa Nostra and to bring about an era of accountability and
transparency in Sicilian politics.
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Ordinary Sicilians would not become widely mobilized to join the antimafia
movement until after 1992, however, in the wake of the murders of Falcone and
Borsellino. Incensed by the deaths of the leaders of the movement, Sicilians became
motivated to work among their communities and neighborhoods to carry on the fight to
which the fallen magistrates had devoted their lives. The focus on the state and the need
to generate political reforms to eradicate Cosa Nostra from the Sicilian landscape
continued until the mid-1990s.
By the mid-1990s, Sicily possessed a thorough legislative framework from which
to challenge the mafia. While these reforms had brought about many high-profile trials
and arrests of powerful mafiosi, Cosa Nostra’s power was far from dismantled. By
focusing almost exclusively on the state and on political solutions in the 1980s-early
1990s, the antimafia movement had merely addressed the locus of hegemony, not the
varied hegemonic apparatuses within society that reinforced the hegemonic system daily.
Therefore, by the mid-1990s it was clear that Cosa Nostra represented a fundamentally
cultural problem requiring cultural work to fully dismantle. Consequently, the antimafia
movement turned its focus to society as the medium through which cultural change could
occur.
By examining the activities and aims of four different antimafia organizations
currently operating in Sicily, this thesis strove to demonstrate how the antimafia
movement is attending to both Gramscian phases of counter-hegemony: dismantling
remaining traces of hegemonic ideology, but also offering the masses a new, counterhegemonic ideology that provides Sicilians with an alternative reality and system outside
of the state-mafia hegemonic bloc. The counter-hegemonic nature of Arci, Libera,
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Addiopizzo, and the Red Diaries has been proven by highlighting how each of these
groups works to dismantle hegemonic ideology by challenging its remaining
manifestations in society, produces organic intellectuals that promote a new reality
outside the state-mafia system, works to challenge double-consciousnesses within
Sicilians that contribute to their perpetuation of hegemony, and promotes institutions and
activities that provide Sicilians with practical ways to incorporate counter-hegemony into
daily behavior.
While notable strides have been made towards creating a society that supports and
embraces mafia denunciation, legality, and the rule of law, much work remains to be
done. This is understandable, as counter-hegemonic initiatives in Sicily began roughly
twenty years ago, and are challenging hegemonic forces entrenched and solidified over a
period of 140 years to date. As Paulo Freire suggests, it is clear that a society has moved
beyond its oppression when ‘the reality of the oppression has already been transformed,
[and] this pedagogy ceases to belong to the oppressed but becomes a pedagogy of all
people in the process of permanent liberation.”465 Because not all Sicilians have yet
recognized their ability and responsibility to break free from their oppression under the
state-mafia system, it is clear that “permanent liberation” from hegemony has not yet
been attained in Sicily.
Gramsci himself recognized that counter-hegemonic movements require
substantial time to carry out. The counter-hegemonic antimafia movement is undoubtedly
a slow process, requiring deliberate action, unrelenting efforts, and evolving strategies.
Yet, there are many reasons to be hopeful. There is much evidence that suggests Sicily is
moving steadfast towards a future no longer defined by Cosa Nostra as a result of the
465
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movement’s focus on and investment in the ability of ordinary Sicilians to demand an end
to state-mafia hegemony. Not only has the state enacted crucial antimafia legislation that
has provided a legal framework to fight Cosa Nostra, but citizens are coming to
recognize their ability to participate in daily actions that weaken the mafia’s power, such
as denouncing against corruption, educating the youth about Sicily’s history under the
mafia, working in respectable jobs outside the state-mafia system, refusing to pay the
pizzo, and purchasing mafia-free products at markets across the island. Sicily has seen a
genuine mobilization against state-mafia hegemony, therefore, and thanks to the work of
a variety of antimafia organizations and activists, Sicilians are cultivating their individual
abilities to reclaim their society, their economy, and the politics that govern them. By
focusing on the contemporary nature of the antimafia movement, I have sought to show
how Sicilians are making remarkable progress towards dismantling the state-mafia
hegemonic bloc, and are fostering in its place counter-hegemonic ideals and practices that
deliver them agency from a system that has long dictated and restricted their behaviors,
beliefs, practices, and livelihoods.
While studying abroad in the small island of Ortigia, there stood a massive
concrete wall along the coast that was built through Cosa Nostra construction contracts.
The wall was intended as a future docking platform for cruise ships, but was never
completed due to lack of funding and waning interest in the initiative. The unfinished
wall remained for years, blocking an otherwise picturesque view of Sicily’s waterfront.
Despite frequent protests against the wall—which continued to serve as a symbolic
reminder of Cosa Nostra’s presence on the island—mafiosi refused to dismantle this
tangible manifestation of its influence or to recognize and cater to civilian pressure. On
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my return trip this November, however, the wall was gone. Unrelenting civilian pressure
from ordinary civilians and antimafia organizations finally succeeded in forcing
contractors to demolish the once formidable wall that had been built years before when
state-mafia alliances were so strong that Cosa Nostra easily obtained building contracts
for nearly all construction on the island.
There are a multitude of signs, therefore, that ordinary citizens have been
mobilized through the antimafia movement and its counter-hegemonic initiatives to
dismantle physical and ideological manifestations of state-mafia hegemony on the island.
Sicilians are beginning to recognize that their lives no longer need to be directed by Cosa
Nostra, particularly when communal networks of solidarity exist to support mafia
denunciation, and counter-hegemonic organizations have succeeded in developing
institutions and pragmatic ways to live and work outside the state-mafia bloc.
As a result of the counter-hegemonic movement, Sicilians have now come to
resent vestiges of mafia power like the docking station that conjure up memories from a
different time—a time when the island was still under the trance of hegemony and did not
yet possess the means to recognize or resist this oppression. While one wall invoking the
memory of state-mafia hegemony has come down, the more formidable hegemonic bloc
still stands in Sicily. However, with the increasing popularity and strength of the counterhegemonic movement, the same energy and widespread mobilization that destroyed the
docking station will in time destroy the state-mafia hegemonic bloc, as well.
With the docking platform removed, a beautiful view of the Sicilian coast is now
unobstructed. This spot where the wall once stood—an eyesore that cast a dark shadow
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along the coastline—is now a favored place among locals to watch the sunrise. A “new
dawn,”466 indeed, is upon Sicily.
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